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Abstract 
The European Parliament (EP) has evolved into a powerful legislative actor over the past 40 years. In 
order to exercise its hard won legislative competencies in an efficient and effective manner the EP has 
developed an extensive and influential committee system. The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) recognised its 
equal status as co-legislator with the Council of the EU and introduced the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure (OLP) as the default EU legislative procedure. Despite the fact that after the introduction of 
the OLP all EP committees formally operate under the same legal procedure, disparities remain in the 
levels of influence that each committee commands. This state of affairs demonstrates that if we are to 
understand what drives committee influence we need to explore the informal sources of influence that 
committees draw on in addition to the formal rules. 
This project addresses the lack of understanding of how the committees establish legislative influence 
by identifying and testing the different resources which committees may be utilising to establish their 
influence. The thesis puts forward four hypotheses concerning the factors that can account for how 
committees establish influence. These are developed and tested within three case studies. The case 
studies comprise the highly influential committees on, firstly, the Environment, Public Health and 
Food Safety Committee, secondly, the Budget Committee and, thirdly, the International Trade 
Committee.  
The research project adopts a qualitative approach to complement and create a different perspective 
from the quantitative studies which dominate the field. It draws on extensive primary material from 
thirty semi-structured interviews held with MEPs, advisers, EP staff and party officials active in the 
7
th
 legislative term (2009-2014). A number of the current conventions concerning the way in which 
expertise, partisan dynamics, and policy outputs affect how committees establish legislative influence 
are challenged and new insights regarding their relative importance are offered. Overall, these original 
findings, contained within this dissertation, have highly significant implications, not only with regard 
to the committee system of the EP but, also, for the wider field of legislative politics.  
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Chapter One Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The European Parliament (EP) has undergone a dramatic evolution in its role as a legislative actor 
over the comparatively short period since its establishment (McCormick 2015).
1
 The EP has 
transformed from being a non-elected consultative ‘talking shop’ into becoming a fully elected co-
legislator representing the democratic interests of the people of Europe. While the EP, as a single 
entity, has been the subject of significant, and growing amounts of, academic attention (Westlake 
1994, Tsebelis 1994, Kreppel 2002a, 2002b, Judge & Earnshaw 2003, Rittberger 2007, Hix et al 
2007, Corbett et al 2007, 2011) the system of committees, which the Parliament uses to operate 
efficiently, has been woefully neglected despite its vital importance to the formation of the EP’s 
position on all legislation (Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, Whitaker 2011, Yordanova 2013). 
Furthermore, the role and importance of EP committees has grown significantly since the Treaty of 
Lisbon (ToL) (2007) (enacted 2009), which recognized the EP as a full co-legislator alongside the 
Council of Ministers (Duff 2009, Judge & Earnshaw 2011). While some attempts have been made to 
address a lack of scholarly attention over the role of EP committees, with the most notable examples 
being the studies by Whitaker (2011) and Yordanova (2013), the issue of EP committee influence 
within the EU legislative process requires further attention. Within the timeframe of this thesis (the 7
th
 
legislative term 2009-2014), it is particularly puzzling that while all EP committees enjoy the same 
legislative powers since the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, some committees continue to be more 
influential than others. While committees of the EP have been acknowledged as influential legislative 
actors (Corbett et al 2007, Ringe 2009, Whitaker 2011, Yordanova 2013), how committees practically 
establish and maintain their influence, remains vague. By drawing upon a range of comparative 
studies from the US Congress (Shepsle & Weingast 1981, 1987, Baron & Ferejohn 1989, Krehbiel et 
al 1987, Gilligan & Krehbiel 1989, 1990, Krehbiel 1991, 2004, Cox & McCubbins 2007a, 2007b) and 
other national committee systems within Europe (Arter 1984, 1990, 2008, Della Sala 1993, Norton & 
                                                          
1
 The parliament has matured significantly over a relatively short period of time since its 1952 inception as a 
debating chamber and its establishment in 1979 as a fully elected parliamentary body. Many other parliamentary 
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Olson 1996, Strøm 1998, Grøn et al 2015), this thesis addresses the highly pertinent research 
question: “how do committees establish legislative influence?” The thesis, therefore, does not retread 
the well-worn ground attempting to measure EP influence, rather it is concerned with identifying the 
sources of committee influence, through an in-depth comparative analysis of three prominent EP 
committees during the 7
th
 parliamentary term (2009-2014).  
The context of the EP’s legislative committee system is examined within the first section of this 
chapter in order to begin to highlight the outstanding puzzles surrounding committee influence. The 
chapter discusses how the central research question was arrived at, and why it is of vital importance to 
have this answered within the context of EP committees. This discussion is conducted alongside an 
account of the potential variables identifiable within the study. The chapter presents a research design 
to elaborate on the choices made over the research methods, and the theoretical perspective that this 
thesis has adopted to generate a better understanding of the topic. Finally an outline of the decision 
making process of the EU is presented to ensure the reader understands the backgrounds and the 
environment within which EP committees work. This introductory chapter concludes by outlining the 
structure of this thesis with an overview of all chapters contained within. 
1.2 Legislative Committees 
With the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 at the start of the 7
th 
parliamentary term (2009-
2014), the legislative powers of the EP have increased significantly. The extension of the co-decision 
procedure, known after the ToL as the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), into all policy areas
2
 
has established the EP as an equal co-legislator with the Council of Ministers (Duff 2009, Judge & 
Earnshaw 2011). As a result of these new powers, the pressure the EP has been under to be an 
increasingly efficient actor within the EU legislative process has intensified (Jensen & Winzen 2012). 
This is important, as to maintain itself as a relevant policy actor (an actor deserving of influence) the 
Parliament must demonstrate its continued ability to deal efficiently with an increasing workload of 
policy proposals (Kreppel 2003). 
                                                          
2
 Except for the limited policy areas of tax and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
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Committees, in theory, result from the need for greater specialization as governmental systems 
develop and the policy problems they face become more complex (Blondel 1969, Krehbiel 1991, 
Mattson & Strøm 1996, Strøm 1998, Shaw 1998). As a result committees often become privileged 
subsets of legislative actors, due to their ability to deal with complex legislation in an efficient way 
that the main chamber of a parliament could not achieve (Krehbiel 1991, Strøm 1998). If a 
parliamentarian wants to influence a policy he/she will do it through a committee (Mattson & Strøm 
1996, Longley & Davidson 1998). Committees, therefore, become conduits for the parliament and its 
members to actively influence legislative outcomes. 
In order to operate efficiently, the EP, as with many other parliaments (Blondel 1969, Strøm 1998), 
has adopted a system of legislative committees. Increasingly the EP has had to deal with complex 
policy matters, and it is within the EP committees that legislative specialization takes place in order to 
process these multifaceted issues of legislation (Bowler & Farrell 1995, Dinan 2005). It is also within 
the committees that the formal positions of the whole EP towards legislative proposals are formulated 
(Tsebelis & Kalandrakis 1999, Yordanova 2013). The EP committees set the agenda of the 
Parliament’s position towards legislative proposals as it is extremely rare for the EP to amend 
committee reports in plenary: in fact, it follows the committee reports, largely, verbatim (Bowler & 
Farrell 1995, Tsebelis & Kalandrakis 1999, Yordanova 2009a, 2013). Thus, the committees are the 
main conduits through which parliamentary legislation takes place and, as a result, the most 
appropriate way for a member of the Parliament to participate and influence legislation is by being a 
member of a committee (Jensen & Winzen 2012). 
While committees of the EP have been recognized as highly influential legislative actors (Bowler & 
Farrell 1995, Kreppel 2002a, McElroy 2006, 2013, Corbett et al 2007, Ringe 2009, Whitaker 2011, 
Yordanova 2013)
3
, how they are able to establish themselves in this role remains significantly 
understudied. Simply stating an actor has a formal power does not equate to practical influence. 
Influence is only realised once a committee mobilises the resources it has at its disposal (Bowler & 
                                                          
3
 See chapter 2 for a detailed account of how committees are practically assessed as influential. 
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Farrell 1995). Indeed, many successful outcomes result from informal interplays between actors 
outside the formal institutional conventions (Farrell & Héritier 2003, Häge & Kaeding 2007). 
Interactions such as ‘trialogue’, where the EP (in the form of committee members in the relevant 
area), the Council and the Commission meet informally to discuss compromise agreements is a prime 
example of an informal interaction which has now become a central element of the EU legislative 
decision making process (Judge & Earnshaw 2011). 
Previous attempts to understand the influence of EP committees have often only focused on the 
formal powers, which a committee has to potentially affect legislative outcomes. Work on the EP’s 
influence has often examined it under different legislative procedures in an attempt to measure when 
it was either more or less influential according to the application of formal rules (Tsebelis 1995, 1997, 
Moser 1996, 1997, Tsebelis & Garrett 1997a, 2000, 2001, Garrett & Tsebelis 1997, Scully 1997a, 
1997b, 1997c, Crombez 1997, 2000). These ‘legalist’ approaches, as they have been termed (Häge & 
Kaeding 2007: 345), while contributing significantly to the field have, however, been criticised for 
being sometimes too narrow in their normative assumptions over the concept of ‘influence’ (Thomson 
& Hosli 2006: 415), too focused upon the use of purely theoretical or quantitative methodologies 
(Kreppel 2002b), and often not taking account of the informal factors at play behind the scenes when 
attempting to understand influence (Häge & Kaeding 2007).
4
 The quantitative approaches, which have 
dominated the field, have notably been inconsistent in their findings, differing in their conclusions 
over EP committee influence, despite often using matching data sets.
5
 Furthermore, these approaches 
which have been adopted in the field, especially when formal legislative processes are uniform as they 
were during the timescale of this study, the 7
th
 parliamentary term (2009-2014)
6
, offer little 
understanding of how committees can be influential and the source(s) they draw upon for this 
influence. Overall no current consensus exists as to how different sources of influence help to 
establish a committee’s legislative influence as all committees operate under uniform legislative rules. 
                                                          
4
 Most approaches previously did not account for the role of EP committees within the parliament, but rather 
focused upon the influence of the parliament overall in policy areas.  
5
 As will be discussed in more detail within the methodological section, this thesis adopts a qualitative approach 
to address and counterbalance the dominance of the quantitative studies within the area of legislative politics. 
6
 At the start of the 7
th
 term the ToL came into effect making co-decision the default legislative procedure. 
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Despite the default application of the OLP some committees operate better, and are more able to 
establish a high level of influence, than others. 
1.3 The Puzzle 
All committees of the European Parliament, upon entering into the 7
th
 parliamentary term (2009-
2014) with the enactment of the ToL (2009), operated under the same legislative procedures. As a 
result of the uniformity of legislative procedure, with the introduction of the OLP, all committees are, 
in theory, equal in legislative influence having matching formal powers to impact legislative 
outcomes. In practice, however, committees are not uniform in their influence and this has been 
observed empirically (Corbett et al 2007, Yordanova 2013). It is here that the central puzzle of this 
thesis becomes apparent. Before the ToL, differences between the levels of influence of committees 
could have been attributed to a disparity of formal powers. That is, to the fact that some committees 
operated under co-decision (more influential) whereas others did not (less influential) (Yordanova 
2009a: 256). The literature on what renders EP committees influential has focused on one dominant 
explanatory factor, the formal rules of legislative institutions, along with some focus on expertise, 
partisanship, or policy type. A disparity of formal powers has, however, now been eliminated as a 
variable impacting committee influence with the blanket application of OLP. After Lisbon the 
explanation for some committees having a significantly higher level of influence, above others, is not 
readily apparent. It is, therefore, the aim of this thesis to go beyond formal procedures as an indicator 
of influence, and to test alternative explanations that explore the relevance of other potential 
indicators. 
Furthermore, some of the assumptions, which have previously been made over sources of committee 
influence, such as the role of committee specialization, committee unity and policy output, may be 
ready for questioning. Empirical research on specific EP committees has emerged that shows 
committees not considered particularly well endowed with expertise can still, potentially, be highly 
influential (for example the International Trade committee (INTA
7
) (Woolcock (2010a) and possibly 
                                                          
7
 Appendix I contains list of EP Committee for the 7
th
 term. 
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the Environmental, Public Health and Food Safety committee (ENVI) (McCormick 2001), or that 
committees where partisan divisions are not unknown can be among the most influential in the 
chamber (the ENVI committee being the prime example (Burns 2013a)). By focusing exclusively on 
one source of committee influence, most studies (with the notable exception of Whitaker (2011) and 
Yordanova (2013)) thus, only portray a partial view of committee influence and its drivers. A theory 
of committee influence is lacking as there is little consensus on the source of committee influence. 
The present study approaches committee influence as the result of the confluence of a number of 
factors (sources of influence) rather than as attributable to one single cause. It is from this puzzle that 
the research question below is devised. Ultimately this thesis seeks to test the validity of previous 
assumptions, against the case study of the EP committee system, to gain a better understanding of the 
interplay and totality of committee sources of influence, with findings having implications outside of 
the EU. 
A number of comparative studies have attempted to understand the ‘why’, and to an extent the ‘how’, 
committees are powerful or influential in the context of the US Congress and in other systems around 
Europe, such as the Nordic parliaments. The committees of the US Congress have been well 
established as significant legislative actors in a wide range of studies (Lees 1979, Feller et al 1979, 
Shepsle 1979, 1986, Weingast et al 1981, Shepsle & Weingast 1987, 1994, Krehbiel et al 1987, 
Weingast & Marshall 1988, Weingast 1989, Gilligan & Krehbiel 1989, 1990, Krehbiel 1991, 2004, 
Cox & McCubbins 2007a, 2007b, Kellermann & Shepsle 2009
8
). However, despite several studies 
(Corbett et al 2007, Ringe 2009, Whitaker 2011) establishing EP committees as significant actors, no 
clear consensus has been forthcoming regarding the sources of their influence (Yordanova 2013), 
hence the evidence is currently inconclusive. 
                                                          
8
 These US congressional studies have been used as a point of reference to conduct the present study, as EP 
committees have been considered, in some examples, as having more in common with the influential 
committees of the US Congress, than most other comparable European systems (Ringe 2009, Yordanova 2013). 
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1.4 Research Question 
The aim of this thesis is to develop an understanding of sources of committee influence in the context 
of the EP. The main research question, derived from the puzzle stated above, is therefore; ‘How do 
committees establish legislative influence?’ By answering this question a better understanding of how 
committees in the EP can establish themselves as influential actors, able to impact outcomes, under 
uniform procedures, can be gained. It is important that these sources of committee influence are 
understood, as committees are the only direct route with which democratically elected legislators can 
impact the policy making process on behalf of their constituents (Longley & Davidson 1998, Jensen 
& Winzen 2011). Without strong committees, legislation could become the realm of non-elected 
technocrats and administrators (Krehbiel 1991, Arter 2008). It is, therefore, important to actually have 
a firm understanding of how committees are able to assert their influence, as one does not currently 
exist. Indeed, without the committees of the EP processing legislation, the plenary of the EP would 
not have the resources to efficiently deal with the legislative responsibility it has been given (Kreppel 
2003, Maurer 2003), and this would allow the Council and the Commission, or more likely their 
administrative arms, the COREPER
9
 and Directorate Generals (DGs) wings, to dominate decision 
making, significantly weakening democratic oversight. This, however, is not a factor limited to the 
EU, but all committee legislative systems. Therefore, this study does not only speak to the EU, but, 
also, looks to further general understanding of these institutional, legislative committees, so vital to 
democratic systems and which are affected by similar phenomena. If a committee better understands 
how it can be influential the quality of representative democracy could be improved, avoiding the 
development of a less accountable, bureaucratic, administrative system. 
By answering the research question, this thesis will generate empirical data that has not been 
accessible until now. It is the perspective (supported with empirical evidence) of this thesis that 
committees rather than utilising a single source of influence, such as specialist expertise, can 
potentially draw upon a range of different identifiable sources to be influential. The extent to which a 
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 ‘Comité des représentants permanents’, or ‘Committee of Permanent Representatives’ (COREPER) acts as the 
Council’s administrative arm. 
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particular committee draws upon different sources of influence will be significantly illuminated by 
this thesis. A number of different sources (the ‘independent variables’) may, indeed, impact upon the 
dependent variable ‘committee legislative influence’. 
1.4.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of this study is ‘committee legislative influence’. Committee influence is 
defined as the ability of a committee to alter, or attain, a legislative outcome towards its own desired 
preferences (Costello & Thomson 2013). It may not, in all repeated interactions, achieve a perfect 
outcome but will more times than not invariably demonstrate the ability to gain an end product closer 
to its ideal preferences. This phenomenon of committee influence has been observed within the 
comparative field and many studies (Romer & Rosenthal 1978, Lees & Shaw 1979, Riker 1980, 
Shepsle & Weingast 1984, Tsebelis 1994, Mattson & Strøm 1996, 2006, Strøm 1998) have identified 
the concept and observed it empirically within a number of systems. Much has, indeed, been written 
within the context of the United States Congress about the existence of committee influence and the 
potential variables that may impact upon it due to the significant democratic role they play (Shepsle & 
Weingast 1987, Krehbiel et al 1987); however, within the context of the EP, understanding of 
committee influence is still developing. Committee influence is an identifiable phenomenon within 
the EP, which has been established, empirically, within current literature (Bowler & Farrell 1995, 
Kreppel 2002a, Farrell & Héritier 2004, McElroy 2006, 2008, Corbett et al 2007, Ringe 2009, 
Whitaker 2011, Yordanova 2013).
10
 The object of this thesis is to therefore, understand the 
phenomenon of committee influence by testing the different potential independent variables, within 
committees established as influential, in order to determine how it is actually manifested. 
1.4.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables of this study are the different potential ‘sources of influence’ that a 
committee can draw upon to establish and exercise influence. It is these potential sources that enable 
legislative influence; however, the patterns over how and to what extent, different committees draw 
                                                          
10
 For a discussion of how this is established see chapter two. 
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upon different sources to be influential remain to be unravelled and understood. A number of potential 
sources of committee influence have been identified within comparative studies. These perspectives, 
however, have yet to be extensively tested in the context of the EP system for their validity. This 
thesis will test the four main sources of influence currently proposed: (1) levels of committee ‘policy 
making expertise’ and (2) ‘professional expertise’, derived from the ‘informational perspective’ of 
committees (Krehbiel 1991, Bowler & Farrell 1995), (3) ‘committee political unity’ derived largely 
from the ‘partisan perspective’ (Cox & McCubbins 2007a, 2007b; Kreppel 1999, Costello & 
Thomson 2013), and finally (4) the impact of ‘policy outputs’  derived from the ‘public policy 
perspective’(Lowi 1964, 1972, Burns 2005a, 2005b). By testing these different perspectives on the 
sources of committee influence, drawn largely, but not exclusively from studies on the US Congress, 
a more comprehensive understanding will be generated to answer the research question posed. 
Findings will be expected to have a far-reaching impact within the context of legislative politics and 
organization, not just furthering understanding of EP committees but contributing to the wider field. 
In addition, a number of different patterns surrounding sources of influence are likely to be extracted 
from the empirical data. While a unified theory of committee influence is not yet forthcoming within 
the field, this study is intended to contribute towards its future development. So as well as potentially 
identifying how committees can be influential, which could lead to improvements in the quality of 
representative democratic processes in the EP and beyond, the thesis also strives to make a significant 
contribution to the existing literature, by acting as a first step towards a theory of committee 
influence. Many of the assumptions tested within this thesis involve factors synonymous with most, if 
not all, committee systems, leading to far reaching implications for the wider field of legislative 
politics.
11
 
1.5 Research Design 
To answer the research question posed in this thesis, an appropriate research design is adopted, which 
requires discussion. The thesis uses a comparative ‘most similar’ case study approach, comparing 
three highly influential EP committees in terms of the informal sources of legislative influence they 
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 Discussion of the important contribution of this thesis is contained in the final chapter. 
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draw on. What is meant by this is that cases are similar in almost all aspects, apart from the 
independent variable which is different, and is the object of testing. By maintaining all ‘spurious’ 
variables
12
, as they are sometimes referred to, and only allowing for a change in the independent 
variable, a relationship may be established between independent and dependent variables as the 
independent variable will be the only major factor having a direct impact upon the dependent variable 
(Burnham et al 2008: 74-75).  
This thesis is a ‘multiple case study’ which seeks to explain differences across the cases, with the 
classic goal of replicating results across three cases (Yin 2003). Three cases were chosen from within 
the committee system of the European Parliament, as this is both a manageable sample size and 
allows for an in-depth investigation of each case. Each of the cases originates from the exact same 
institutional system and has the same formal legislative powers. Furthermore, each of the selected 
committees has a similar level of political salience
13
 as is outlined below. Thus, while the different 
application of formal rules and the political salience of a committee have previously been suggested 
as variables that impact upon influence, for this study these factors can now be discounted as having 
an impact over influence. Finally, the stage of agreement has been cited as also affecting committee 
influence (Yordanova 2013: 107). Evidence generated by Yordanova (2013) suggests those legislative 
proposals which have an early agreement (at the first legislative stage) are less likely to contain 
committee amendments. Legislative early agreement rates do differ to some degree between EP 
committees (Pittella et al 2014, see Figure 2-1), however, the three EP committees selected as case 
studies in this study have highly similar rates of early agreement, reducing this factor’s potential 
affect. Consequently, the only remaining identifiable variable which can affect the dependent variable 
is the informal source or sources of a committee’s influence. Three main potential informal sources of 
influence, expertise, committee unity and policy output type, have been identified within comparative 
literature. For the purpose of this study, therefore, it is only these variables which will differ and by 
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 i.e. variables which are present but clearly do not have a causal link to the dependent variable (Burnham et al 
2008: 74). 
13
 Salience is understood as, the policy issues within the remit of a said committee, are seen as being of high 
political importance and prioritised by the political groups. For a deeper discussion of the theoretical concepts of 
salience see Wlezien 2005 
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comparing the differences across the cases the relative impact of these informal sources of influence 
can be understood. 
It is important, in order to justify the use of the comparative approach, to discuss the rationale behind 
the adoption of the method, before a deeper discussion over its potential impact upon the thesis is 
conducted below. A significant debate surrounds both the theoretical use, and the practical 
application/empirical merits of the comparative case study method (For an in-depth discussion of the 
methodological debate see Yin 2003, 2014, Gerring 2004, Flyvbjerg 2006, Della Porta 2008). The 
conventional understanding of any case study is that each case is a focused examination of a ‘single 
example’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 2). A single case, or ‘unit’ as it is sometimes referred to, is investigated 
intensively in order to potentially gain more information on a wider ‘system’ within which the 
selected case exists (Gerring 2004).
14
 Case studies are therefore not simply conducted to further the 
understanding of the case which has been selected (the deeper understanding of a case is, however, an 
unavoidable and important product of conducting a case study project), but rather to gain a potential 
understanding of the wider ‘system’ within which the case is located (Gerring 2004: 342). By 
comparing well selected cases a more general understanding of the subject of investigation is 
potentially gained (Collier 1993). This explanation, drawn from Collier (1993), Gerring (2004) and 
Yin (2014), is a basic understanding of the approach; however, in practice the use of the comparative 
method requires wide discussion over its relative merits and potential limitations, both of which have 
clear implications for this thesis. 
In order to practically investigate and provide answers to the research question as outlined, this study 
adopts a small-n comparative approach, which investigates and compares a limited number of cases 
(three in all total) in-depth. The rationale behind adopting a small-n qualitative study is that it allows 
for the in-depth investigation of a limited number of cases, to generate a deeper (sometimes referred 
to as a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973)) intimate knowledge and understanding of the processes and 
practices which each case entails (Collier 1993). The small-n approach potentially helps to better 
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 ‘An intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units’ (Gerring 
2004: 342) 
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contextualise the patterns of causal relationships as they may be affected by different circumstances, 
which are often only understood/identified as a result of examining at a deeper level of analysis 
(Ragin 1987). The type of data which a small-n study generates could not be gained from a study that 
examines a large-n of cases, which while generating a broader data set which comes with different 
merits, results in less depth of understanding of the individual cases examined, which is the direct aim 
of this thesis to provide. 
This study seeks to establish a richer qualitative understanding than has previously existed within the 
field of EP committee research. Previous research on the influence of EP committees has generally 
focused on the committee system as a whole, in what has often been a more general quantitative 
manner, with few examples of in-depth qualitative case studies on individual committees and how 
they have established influence. While they are limited in number, those in-depth case studies (for 
example Judge & Earnshaw (1994) and Hurka (2013) on the ENVI committee) which have been 
conducted have contributed significantly to the current empirical understanding of the formal as well 
as informal processes of influence, a subject often overlooked in the more general studies of the EP 
system. These studies identified processes which worked to establish the individual committee cases 
as influential, and in particular observed important factors, such as the potential role of membership 
policy making experience, which would have been over looked potentially in broader studies of the 
EP legislative system. It is for this reason that the present thesis adopts a qualitative case study 
approach, as a deeper understanding of the selected cases will help to elucidate the processes by 
which each case study committee attempts to establish its influence. This in-depth examination will 
create a rich comparative data set which, as well as further understanding of the processes each 
committee adopts to establish influence, can potentially be used for the future development of theory 
in later studies. Evidence from the Parliament (Pittella et al 2014) already exists claiming that 
different committees of the EP have established different cultures and practices of operations. 
However, little is known, even by the Parliament (Pittella et al 2014) about the affect this has on 
committee influence beyond the point of understanding that the phenomenon of differential influence 
exists within committees despite the general application of the OLP. Without an in-depth 
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investigation, it is unclear how these apparently different factors may affect an individual committee 
in establishing its influence, or indeed what sources of influence are actually available to different 
committees in practice. Therefore the approach adopted here helps to fill a gap within the literature of 
the EP committee system for greater in-depth empirical qualitative data. This in turn, will contribute 
towards a more detailed understanding of how committees can establish influence in the selected in-
depth cases, and potentially set the groundwork for a more general understanding to be developed in 
future research of legislative influence. 
While the aim of the study is to further understanding of how committees can establish influence, 
some of the limitations of the comparative approach small-n type study must be acknowledged. Much 
of the debate over the use of the method centres on how much a few ‘cases’ can, in reality, inform the 
researcher about a wider phenomenon (Lijphart 1971, King et al 1994). The main criticism of the case 
study approach has been that it does not actually lend itself towards generalizations, an important goal 
of comparative research according to seminal studies (King et al 1994). Comparative case study 
research will, normally, sample a number of cases from a wider Universe. However, the point has 
been made within a number of reflective studies that one cannot generalize, with high confidence, 
based on a sample, unless it is a (very) large sample (Giddens 1984, King et al 1994, Burnham et al 
2008). It is, therefore, important to acknowledge this limitation of the case study design in order to 
avoid over-stating the generality or impact of a result generated based on the sample size selected 
within this thesis. This, however, should not detract from the important findings which are generated 
within this thesis, which would be on a par with other ‘small-n’ case study research projects, many of 
which have been influential. The data collected here may indeed form the basis, via extrapolation 
from the results obtained, for future research enabling generalization, as small-n studies are often the 
best first step towards informing on wider platforms (Della Porta 2008). 
One final positive point may also be acknowledged on reflection in the use of case studies. As well as 
being an important method of in-depth research, the comparative case approach is also a useful 
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practical learning experience for the developing researcher. Cases are important for researchers’ ‘own 
learning processes in developing the skills needed to do good research’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 223). 
‘If researchers wish to develop their own skills to a high level, then concrete, context-dependent 
experience is just as central for them as to professionals learning any other specific skills. Concrete 
experiences can be achieved via continued proximity to the studied reality and via feedback from 
those under study. Great distance to the object of study and lack of feedback easily lead to a stultified 
learning process, which in research can lead to ritual academic blind alleys, where the effect and 
usefulness of research becomes unclear and untested. As a research method, the case study can be an 
effective remedy against this tendency’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 223). 
Therefore, as well as acting as an in-depth method of research and data generation, the use of the case 
study approach assists the researcher in their all important development. 
The timeframe of the project takes place during the 7
th
 (2009-2014) legislative term. The 7
th
 term has 
been selected as it is the most recent to be concluded, at time of writing, being still fresh in the minds 
of members active during the term, and whose extensive empirical contributions were invaluable to 
this study.
15
 The 7
th
 term was, also, importantly the first to be conducted with all EP committees as 
full co-legislative actors. The Lisbon Treaty was enacted at the start of the 7
th
 term (2009) and, 
therefore, it was the first time-period in which EP committee influence could be examined at the point 
where they potentially reached their summit of legislative influence. No disparity of rules exists 
during the 7
th
 term, which could be said to affect committee influence, making the EP committees 
during this timescale an excellent case to test and thus to answer the research question. It is important 
to state that some mention of the 8
th
, and of the 6
th
 parliamentary terms will be made, with data also 
collected on committee retention rates, parliamentary retention rates, and previous 
political/professional backgrounds of all members on selected case study committees, during these 
terms. This was done to directly compare these with matching empirical data collected on the 7
th
 term, 
in order to further enhance the findings. 
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 See appendix II for list of interview citations.  
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1.5.1 Case Study Selection 
In order to elucidate what variables are impacting committee influence, three committees that current 
literature (Corbett et al 2007, Whitaker 2011, 2014, Yordanova 2013,) has viewed as maintaining 
similarly high levels of legislative influence have been selected for case study analysis, and used to 
test the hypotheses that have been generated in the following chapter. The committees that have been 
selected are the ‘Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)’, the 
‘Committee on Budgets (BUDG)’ and the ‘Committee on International Trade (INTA)’. While each of 
the three cases was selected for being highly influential, each has been identified as being influential 
for sometimes conflicting and differing reasons. It is these differences which allow for the testing of 
alternative explanations of how committee influence is established. Before discussing the rationale for 
the case selection (the unit of analysis) and the analytical strategy adopted in more detail, it is 
important to discuss the implications, both positive and negative, of selecting each of the cases on the 
dependent variable (legislative influence) of committee influence, in order to place this study in the 
correct context. All research choices must be shown to be systematic and justifiable (George & 
Bennett 2004) and their impact understood. 
The general criticism of studies which maintain a constant dependent variable (in this thesis 
‘committee influence’) across all selected cases is that it is hard to establish causal inferences16, which 
are seen as a vital outcome of social science research (King et al 1994). The criticism is, how can 
something be established as a having a causal relationship (if it is assumed that this is the goal of 
research, as suggested by King et al (1994)) if the dependent variable does not vary to some extent 
between selected cases. If the dependent variable is maintained equally across all cases, the study 
conducted may actually establish a false cause and effect relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables, which is potentially only a correlation rather than an actual causal link. It is only 
when the dependent variable varies, can a study claim strong casual inferences, confirming an 
independent variable is having an impact (King et al 1994). According to the important work of King 
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 Establishing ‘casual inferences’ is the ‘process’ of drawing a conclusion concerning a casual connection 
between a variable and an outcome, or in other words establishing a potential empirical link between a potential 
cause and an outcome effect (King, et al 1994). 
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et al (1994), cases within a small-n study, which adopts a uniform dependent variable across all cases, 
result in a study where the ‘estimated casual affect is zero’, or in other words, casual inferences 
cannot be validated as a result of the study which has been conducted (King et al 1994: 89). A control 
case is required, as in a natural science experiment, to account for a false correlation. This is an 
important point to consider in the context of this research, which made the choice to select cases upon 
the dependent variable, as it has significant potential ramifications for the impact of its implications. 
Thus, as well as recognising the limitations of a small-n case study approach, further consideration of 
the affect of selecting upon the dependent variable must be acknowledged to avoid over inflated 
claims of strong validity of any potential causal factors identified within the study. It is, however, 
important to discuss, that King et al (1994) thesis’ is not a universal one, and indeed many qualitative 
studies do select cases, legitimately, on the dependent variable (Della Porta 2008) despite the 
concerns raised by King et al (1994). 
In contrast to the more ‘scientific approach’ (McKeown 1999: 167) of King et al (1994) to qualitative 
(and quantitative) research, Della Porta (2008) suggests that within case oriented research, and small 
n-studies, selecting upon the dependent variable is a ‘common and legitimate practice’. If little is 
already known about a system of cases, examining positive cases which have the dependent variable, 
can expand current understanding that may be limited and can help to ‘evaluate the impact of a main 
causal variable’ (George & Bennett 2004: 76, Della Porta 2008). Little is currently known about how 
committees of the EP can establish a level of legislative influence and the route(s) to influence they 
may utilize. This thesis seeks to address this by examining cases which have been perceived as having 
a high level of influence, in order to develop understanding of this area by looking in-depth at the 
ways in which these committees utilizes (informal) resources to establish and exercise influence. 
Furthermore, selecting upon the dependent outcome can also be useful for ‘singling out different paths 
to certain outcomes’ (Mahoney & Goertz 2006 :232, Della Porta 2008: 216). While each of the 
committees selected as a case study in this thesis has been observed as equally influential according to 
the literature (table 1-1), these committees are also perceived as influential for different reasons and 
seemingly follow different routes to similar outcomes. By adopting the approach of selecting 
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dependent outcome cases, these different routes to influence can be tested and probed, helping to 
answer the research question of how committees can establish their legislative influence. Cases which 
are selected on the dependent variable may also become so called ‘building block’ cases (George & 
Bennett 2004: 76) as they are vital components in the development of theory in areas where little 
understanding already exists, such as described above. Thus, a more general understanding of 
phenomena can be developed as a result of case studies lending themselves to building knowledge of 
an area. As will be discussed within the theory chapter, little is known about the committee system of 
the European Parliament and there is a major requirement to build knowledge within the area. 
To summarise, the general perspective of King et al (1994) is a legitimate approach, cases selected on 
the dependent variable do not directly facilitate generalization, although they can provide the building 
blocks to construct a wider platform of understanding (George and Bennet 2004). It is therefore 
important to stress that the present study, fitting within the tradition of small-n studies and their 
limited ability to generalise results, can only make limited claims for the data generated. The study 
does, however, provide a more fleshed out qualitative understanding of the cases, which were 
selected, for those interested in the subject area, setting the ground work for more comprehensive or 
wide-spread testing in future studies. While strong causal relationships using small n-studies cannot 
be established with the degree of certainty demanded by King et al (1994), a strong contribution is 
made by the approach adopted (George & Bennett 2004, Della Porta 2008). Thus, while recognising, 
as noted by King et al (1994), that case studies of the type used within the thesis may have 
fundamental limitations in testing a hypothesis and generalizing results, this thesis provides a 
significant step towards future research confirming (or disputing as this thesis appears to indicate) our 
current understanding of sources of committee influence. 
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Table 1-1 Variable Sources of Committee Influence 
Case Study 
Committee 
Committee 
Expertise 
Committee 
Cohesion 
Committee Policy 
Type 
The Committee on 
the Environment, 
Public Health, and 
Food Safety (ENVI) 
 
High Level of 
Expertise
17
 (Bowler & 
Farrell 1995)  
 
Mixed Cohesion 
(Burns 2013a) 
 
Mixed Policy Output 
(Yordanova 2009a) 
The Committee on 
Budgets (BUDG) 
 
High Level of 
Expertise (Lindner 
2006) 
 
High Cohesion 
(Yoshinaka et al 2010) 
 
Distributive Policy 
Output (Rasmussen 
2011) 
 
The Committee on 
International Trade 
(INTA) 
 
 
Low Level of Expertise 
(Kleimann 2011) 
 
 
High Cohesion 
(Settembri & Neuhold 
2009) 
 
 
Regulatory Policy 
Output (Yordanova 
2009a) 
 
Table 1-1 indicates some of the factors that the existing literature has identified as potential sources of 
influence for the three committees. For example, the BUDG committee (Lindner 2006) and the ENVI 
committees are seen as having high expertise, but in the case of the ENVI committee what type is 
debatable (McCormick 2001, Weale et al 2005, Hurka 2013). Consensus is, however, clear in that the 
INTA committee does differ significantly from the other two, by possessing low levels of expertise 
(Kleimann 2011, Richardson 2012, Gstöhl 2013). As table 1-1 shows, each further potential 
explanation, ‘committee cohesion’ (or as it has been also termed in some studies ‘partisan unity’ 
(Kreppel 1999)), but will be referred to in this thesis as ‘committee unity’ to avoid confusion) and 
‘policy output’ (Burns 2005a) also differ between the committees. By selecting these committees for 
analysis, which do display different alternative explanations for committee influence, a range of 
explanations can be tested. The rationale behind the selection of the three cases was driven in the first 
instance by the observation that out of the 20 committees of the EP, each case study selected was 
perceived as having similar high levels of legislative influence. While, as noted above, selecting upon 
the dependent variable (King et al 1994) limits the ability of the study to truly validate any causal 
inferences and broad generalizations, it does, however, allow the thesis to probe how each of the 
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 The presence of ‘technical’ expertise on the ENVI committee, without disputing the committee’s overall 
[high] level of influence, has been subject to debate (McCormick 2001, Weale et al 2005, Hurka 2013). 
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committees are seemingly reaching the same important outcome of high influence despite using 
different resources, and how different sources of influence are, in fact, drawn upon in practice. 
Committees which were of a non-legislative nature, such as the Foreign Affairs committee (AFET), 
which does not, as yet, have a legislative role, while being acknowledged as a senior/important 
committee
18
, were excluded from the study, as an examination of such committees would not assist in 
understanding the role of sources in establishing influence, as even if the identified sources were 
present within a non-legislative committee they could not be applied in practice. Similarly, the level 
of political salience was also considered in the selection of cases. The political salience of a 
committee has often been cited as benefiting a committee’s influence in the comparative perspective 
(Deering & Smith 1997: 67-73, Cox & McCubbins 2007b), and potentially in the EP (Whitaker 
2011), often due to heightened party interest in the committee. The more salience a committee has, 
from the issues it deals with, the more likely it will be to have influence, and a differing level of 
salience will have an impact on overall influence. As a result of selecting three committees with equal 
salience its impact can be isolated in order to test other potential factors determining influence. Both 
the ENVI and the BUDG committees have been identified as highly salient committees due to the 
policy areas they operate within, with both environment (Burns 2013a) and budgets (Corbett et al 
2007) being key areas of EP interest. Within the 7
th
 term the INTA committee has reached a similar 
level of salience, ‘making it the committee everyone wants to be on’19 as a result of an increase in 
formal powers and involvement with trade deals. This conclusion was not only supported by the 
interview evidence collected, but also suggested by previous assessments (Woolcock 2010b). 
By isolating the dependent variable, and levels of salience, the range of potential cases that could be 
studied was limited. It is also important to reflect that when the cases where selected the ability of the 
case to potentially draw upon any, or all, of the potential sources of influence was factored into the 
selection process. While as noted each of the committees, as shown in table 1-1, has their influence 
attributed to differing sources of influence, they were also identified as having no clear impediment in 
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 In the respect that the committee attracts senior parliamentarians and is well respected in the parliament, 
despite the committee possessing little legislative involvement. 
19
 Interview with Senior Member of the Committee on International Trade 15/1/16 Glasgow UK 
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adopting a different source of influence, according to current understanding. Finally, as mentioned 
above, three cases where selected as this appeared to be a manageable sample size for a thesis looking 
to generate extensive qualitative data from representative cases, to directly answer the research 
question. 
1.5.2 Methodology 
In order to empirically identify the variables that are responsible for establishing ‘committee 
legislative influence’ this thesis has adopted a distinct qualitative approach with extensive use of 30 
elite semi-structured interviews, supported by the use of document analysis. In addition to the 
extensive qualitative data, a select amount of statistical data has, also, been collected on the 
backgrounds
20
 of all case study committee members in order to support, and corroborate, the primary 
qualitative data collected. The adoption of this approach has enabled an original perspective to be 
developed in response, or as an alternative, to the quantitative approaches that have dominated the 
early field of legislative decision-making in the EU (Tsebelis 1994, Moser 1996, 1997, Crombez 
1997, 2000, Tsebelis et al 2001). The predominant issue with these quantitative studies, that have 
often adopted spatial modelling to understand EP legislative influence, has been their wide ranging 
and generally conflicting results with little consensus to provide meaningful answers on the subject of 
influence (Tsebelis 1995, 1997, Tsebelis & Garrett 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2001, Garrett & Tsebelis 
1997, Scully 1997a, 1997b). Kreppel (2002b) have identified this mainly quantitative approach as 
resulting in an underdeveloped understanding of legislative decision making and influence, in the 
context of the EP. Consequently, calls have been made (Kreppel 2002b, Yordanova 2013), which this 
thesis looks to answer, for qualitative empirical evidence to be generated in order to create a broader 
comprehension of legislative committee influence. The early studies of the EP, listed above, have 
greatly informed our current understanding of legislative influence. This study, however, seeks to 
address the areas which they have overlooked, such as committees, with original qualitative data. 
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 The previous career backgrounds in politics and professional life of committee members, as well as retention 
rates on committees, and parliamentary experience were examined. 
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A qualitative approach has, also, been adopted for the benefits it brings to the quality of empirical 
data. By directly interviewing legislative committee actors, a clear and direct understanding of their 
actions and the resources that they utilise can be gained (Burnham et al 2008). As this thesis is 
concerned with elucidating the sources of committee influence rather than attempting to simply 
measure the influence that a committee may be able to exercise against and over other EU institutions, 
interviews have mainly been conducted with actors who have directly participated on EP committees. 
Semi-structured interviews
21
 were conducted with elite actors operating on a range of EP committees 
but mainly conducted within the remit of the case studies selected. Those interviewed as well as 
representing a cross-section of experience ranged in partisan affiliation covering all mainstream EP 
political groupings,
22
 as well as politically neutral administrators within the EP secretariat and 
relevant Commission’s Directorate Generals (DGs). It is important, however, to briefly discuss the 
rationale behind the adoption of semi-structured elite interviews as a mode of data collection, as well 
as to highlight the potential risk of this methodology, which the researcher was aware of during the 
data collection stages. 
Elite interviews are today a common and much used research technique (however, as noted above, 
qualitative methods have, in general, been underused in the case of the EP and its committees), and 
have been noted as a significant source of information within many studies, including the early studies 
of congressional policy making, which attempted to understand legislative actor influence (Berry 
2002). The benefits of elite interviews are well known and often outlined (see Richards 1996, Berry 
2002, Burnman et al 2008, Bryman 2015). Elite interviews allow, in the first instance, the researcher 
to acquire data and understanding which is not accessible within written documentation, as well as 
potentially assisting the researcher in understanding the unwritten motivations behind many 
documents and policies, upon which only a direct participant can provide information (Richards 
1996). Many important conventions surrounding policy-making are, indeed, unwritten. This is evident 
in the example of informal ‘trialogue negotiations’ where much of the legislative decision-making is 
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 A sample interview question key can be viewed in Appendix III. 
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 No member of the EFD(D) or ENF groupings has been interview in the course of this thesis. 
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conducted. Interviews help researchers to understand the patterns, interactions, and relationships 
surrounding a process of events, which created an outcome (Richards 1996), the understanding of 
which is central to this thesis. Interviews allow the researcher a direct insight into the, often isolated, 
world they are attempting to understand and it is this rationale that motivates their adoption within 
this particular thesis. Despite their benefits, however, the drawbacks of elite interviews must be 
acknowledged to demonstrate the researcher’s awareness of them, as this is the first step towards 
negating many of the potential pitfalls. 
The potential drawback of elite interviews will always be the reliability of interviewees (and in part 
the skill of the interviewer). An interviewee may potentially not remember accurately their role, or the 
actions of others, which took place within an interaction (Richards 1996). It may, also, be the case that 
an elite interview participant will over emphasise the role which they may have had in achieving an 
outcome. Having a number of different interviews explaining the same events in conflicting ways is, 
also, a potential hazard of this technique (Richards 1996). In both of these instances, data can be 
validated more accurately by increasing the sample size to confirm and eliminate some of the 
mistakes, which do occur, simply as a result of human nature and error. The other major drawback 
associated with elite interviews is the often cited ‘power relationship’ between interviewer and 
interviewee (Smith 2006). An over use of deference may occur in the interviewer’s interactions with 
an ‘elite’ interviewee, meaning that some points and lines of enquiry that may be pursued with a non-
elite actor would not be pursued by the interviewer with an elite actor (Richards 1996).
23
 The ability 
to address this issue depends on the skill of the interviewer to ‘push’ the interviewee in order to 
acquire the information needed. A skilled, or more simply put, an interviewer with a degree of 
common sense will be able, while showing the correct level of deference, to purse a line of enquiry 
without over stepping the boundary which would irritate or alienate the interviewee and harm the 
potential for further data acquisition. No method for collecting data is foolproof but by highlighting 
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 The reverse may be true in non elite settings where the interviewer is potentially dominant over the 
interviewee in the power relationship, again affecting the data collected (Smith 2006). 
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the potential pitfalls of elite interviews many can be avoided, or negated, with proper reflection in 
order to conduct an accurate and informed study. 
Table 1-2 Political Affiliations of MEP Interview Participants 
 EPP S&D ALDE Green-
EFA 
ECR GUE-
NGL 
EFD NI 
Members 
interviewed 
5 6 1 1 1 1 N/A N/A 
 
Table 1-3 Member State Affiliations of MEP Interview Participants 
 United 
Kingdom 
Germany France Netherlands Austria Romania 
Members 
Interviewed 
6 3 2 2 1 1 
 
Of the 30 interviews conducted for this thesis, 14 where conducted with current members of the 
‘committee secretariat’, active during the 7th legislative term. The remaining interviews were 
conducted with members of the European Parliament, assistants to MEPs, and a single supporting 
interview with a senior Commission official. Interviews were conducted with a range of parliamentary 
actors representing a diverse range of political affiliations (table 1-2
24
). It was the aim to collect data 
from as wide a sample base as possible in order to avoid confirming results based only on data 
collected from particular political backgrounds. However, it must be acknowledged, although 
probably reflecting the relative political diversity of the Parliament, most interviews were conducted 
with members representing the largest political groupings, the EPP and S&D. Table 1-3 also 
demonstrates the geographical breakdown of origin of interviewees to demonstrate again that data, 
while mostly acquired from interviewees from the larger member states, derived from a diverse range 
of participants. 
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 Members of the secretariat interviewed are not included within table 1-2 or 1-3 as they are non-political actors 
and do not, in theory, represent their home country. 
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To supplement the extensive interview data collected, policy documents looking at indicative 
examples of legislation were, also, analysed to corroborate interview data collected. A level of 
statistical data was, also, accumulated on committee turnover rates and membership committee 
system experience, within each of the case study committees. With the wide range and significant 
volume of data collected, and verified, this thesis is able to make strong empirical claims when 
answering the research question posed, and to provide the ‘real world’ data woefully lacking in the 
field, as well as adding a dynamic original insight. To elaborate further on the documents used, and 
how they facilitated triangulation of the extensive interview data collected, a short discussion is 
required. 
Documents covering the professional backgrounds of all 146 full committee members were collected 
and examined to confirm the levels of professional expertise contained within each case study. In 
almost all of the 146 examples, members curriculum vitae where available (and in general found in 
English, which avoided the risk of translations which may misrepresent a member’s professional 
background), were accessed. In the limited cases where a formal CV was not obtainable from a 
member’s ‘European Parliament profile page curriculum vitae section’, or from a personal website, a 
general outline of the member’s professional history was found outlined on their personal website. 
The information gained from these documents created a simple database of professional experience 
across the case committees where key professional expertise, relevant to committee policy remits, 
could be assessed and quantified. This collection of data from the documents allowed for relative rates 
of professional expertise to be stated for each of the case studies. 
Policy documents directly related to legislation were also examined to support and confirm statements 
made within interviews, and to test the validity of the data collected. Within a number of the 
conducted interviews, examples of key legislative acts and amendments were often mentioned or 
highlighted, and the role of the interviewee within the relevant policy negotiations outlined. 
Legislative proposals, institutional positions which are published at each of the required readings, 
public statements and press releases were examined to confirm the claims made by the interviewee 
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over the outcomes and their involvement within the legislative process. All of these listed documents 
were readily available and obtained from the ‘EUR-Lex’ and ‘European Parliament Legislative 
Observatory’ service websites. By examining these documents a more accurate picture of events was 
gained, which was generally assistive in significantly validating the interview data presented within 
this thesis. Supplementary to the important validating role which policy documents provided, a 
number of documents were analysed, such as the plastic bag directive, the conflict minerals directive, 
and the TTIP negotiations, in order to better elucidate the progress of some key examples of 
legislation. These documents were also examined with reference to the success and intention of 
amendments which could be rated as distributive or regulatory.  
1.5.3 Analytical Approach 
This study adopts an approach based within the ‘rational choice’ tradition. ‘Rational choice 
institutionalism’ is defined as originating from the ‘new institutionalism’ approach that institutions 
need significant attention of academic focus as they are constructed by the agents (actors) which 
operate within these systems, reflecting the rational choices of those actors (Rosamond 2010). The 
emergence in the application of rational choice, within legislative decision-making, stems from the 
‘social choice’ literature which, itself, has its roots in uncompromising mathematical models used in 
the early research on committees (see Rohde & Shepsle 1973; Pollack 1997).
25
 Within the rational 
choice perspective all actors are viewed as rationally seeking to strategically maximise their influence 
over outcomes. The main focus of the rational choice perspectives is that all actors are constrained by 
the institutional rules and structures, both formal and informal, that they operate within. This 
framework of rules defines the actions of the actors within the institution, dictating what they can do 
(Bache & George 2006), and how they can practically influence outcomes. While actors are guided by 
the rules in place, in order to maximise their outcomes (increase committee influence), actors in the 
real world stretch the rules for their own gains (informational or efficiency) without fundamentally 
violating them (Weingast 1979, Shepsle & Weingast 1981, Weingast & Marshall 1988, Helmke & 
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 This helps to explain the prevalence of quantitative modelling within the field of parliamentary legislative 
influence research. 
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Levitsky 2006). It is for this reason that many informal conventions such as ‘trialogue’ have been 
developed, which guide the actions of committee members. 
The committees of the EP are rule-based institutions operating a clear decision making system based 
in EU law. Rational choice institutionalism best accounts for the mechanics that motivate actors 
within the institutional setting of the EP (Tsebelis 1994, 1995, Garrett & Tsebelis 1997) and has been 
viewed as appropriate in other comparative examples looking to investigate committee influence (see 
Hall & Taylor 1996 for review). Rational choice institutionalism developed in part from comparative 
studies on the US congressional committee system’s influence over outcomes (Shepsle 1979, 1986, 
1989, Shepsle & Weingast 1987, Krehbiel 1991, Hall & Taylor 1996). Rational choice had been 
adopted by many previous studies attempting to, also, clarify the decision-making processes of the 
European Parliament (see Hix 1998; Tsebelis 1994, 1995, Moser 1996, 1997, Garrett & Tsebelis 
1997, Kaeding 2004). It is, therefore, the most appropriate approach to adopt when attempting to 
elucidate the role of committees and from which sources they draw influence.  
However, in order to understand the sources of EP committee influence, it is necessary to establish the 
actual decision making process within which the committees are operating and their context. This 
study, as stated above, does not examine the formal (and informal) rules as a source of committee 
influence but, nonetheless, it is important to explain those rules so that the reader can understand the 
constraints committees face when they attempt to exercise influence, when drawing upon other 
sources of influence. 
1.6 European Parliament Committee System 
A level of description is needed of the context and decision making process under which all EP 
committees now operate before delving into discussion of different sources of influence. By engaging 
with this discussion the reader can begin to understand the legislative context within which EP 
committees find themselves, and the decision making process with which they are involved, and must 
operate within. 
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Over the years the EP has been the beneficiary of the biggest increase in institutional power of any of 
the main European institutions. This can be attributed to attempts by the member states to counter the 
democratic deficit by increasing the legislative role and power of the only directly elected EU 
institution (Dinan 2005, McCormick 2015). The greater the power of the EP the less the democratic 
deficit should be, in theory
26
 according to influential accounts (Follesdal & Hix 2006). The 
Parliament, however, began life as the ‘Assembly’ of the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1952 (McCormick 2011). Originally comprised of sitting members of national parliaments, the only 
legislative procedure then in place was the ‘consultative procedure’ where the Council would only 
have to consult with the Parliament before passing legislation. Table 1-4 summarises the major 
legislative reforms to affect the EP and its committees.  
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 “Federalists consider that the solution to the democratic deficit consists of giving more powers to the 
Parliament, which is, after all, the only directly elected EU institution”. (Crombez 2002: 103) 
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Table 1-4 Treaty Reform in the European Union and the Evolution of the Legislative Procedure 
Reforming Treaty (Date) Legislative Procedure 
Introduced  
Effect on Parliament  
Treaty of Rome (1958) Consultation Procedure  The Parliament must be 
consulted within areas 
consultation applies. 
 
Budgetary Treaties (1970 & 
1975) 
 
New budgetary procedures  Parliament given ability to 
reject EU budget. 
Single European Act (1987) Cooperation Procedure Parliament given a second 
reading of bills, on mainly 
single market issues. 
 
Maastricht Treaty (1993) Co-decision i Conciliation committee (third 
reading stage) introduced. 
 
Amsterdam Treaty (1999) Co-decision ii Co-decision reformed making 
Parliament and Council co-
legislators in areas of its 
application. 
 
Nice Treaty (2003) No new procedure introduced  
 
Lisbon Treaty (2007) Ordinary Legislative Procedure Co-decision applied as the now 
default legislative procedure in 
the EU, renamed the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure (OLP). 
 
Source:  Corbett et al 2011. 
Committees have been a key component of the institution since the early days of the community when 
the EP was the ‘Common Assembly’. Starting with seven committees in 1953 there has been an 
inevitable expansion and during the 7
th
 term there were 23 committees (including two sub-committees 
and one special committee) (Table 1-5). The committees were formed to deal with the ever-expanding 
legislative and budgetary powers increasingly placed with the Parliament over time (Dinan 2005, 
Corbett et al 2007). The increasing of the legislative role of the EP developed in parallel with the 
growing powers of the EU. 
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Table 1-5 Committees of the European Parliament, 7th Term (2009- 2014) 
Standing Committee Committee Formed Committee Chair  
Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(AFET)  
1979 Elmar Brok (EPP) 
- Subcommittee on 
Human Rights 
(DROI) 
2004 Barbara Lochbihler 
(Greens/EFA) 
- Subcommittee on 
Security and Defence 
(SEDE) 
2004 Arnaud Danjean (EPP) 
Committee on Development 
(DEVE) 
1979 Eva Joly (Greens/EFA) 
Committee on International 
Trade (INTA) 
1979 (2004)
27
 Vital Moreira (S&D) 
Committee on Budgets 
(BUDG) 
1979 Alain Lamassoure (EPP) 
Committee on Budgetary 
Control (CONT) 
1979 Michael Theurer (ALDE) 
Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs (ECON) 
1979 Sharon Bowles (ALDE) 
Committee on Employment 
and Social Affairs (EMPL) 
1979 Pervenche Beres (S&D) 
Committee on the 
Environment, Public Health 
and Food Safety (ENVI) 
1979 Matthias Groote (S&D) 
Committee on Industry, 
Research and Energy (ITRE) 
1979 Amalia Sartori (EPP) 
Committee on the Internal 
Market and Consumer 
Protection (IMCO) 
2004 Malcolm Harbour (ECR) 
Committee on Transport and 
Tourism (TRAN) 
1979 (2004)
28
 Brian Simpson (S&D) 
Committee on Regional 
Development (REGI) 
1979 Danuta Maria Hubner (EPP) 
Committee on Agriculture 
and Rural Development 
(AGRI) 
1979 Paolo De Castro (S&D) 
Committee on Fisheries 
(PECH) 
1994 Gabriel Mato Adrover (EEP) 
Committee on Culture and 
Education (CULT) 
1979 Doris Pack (EPP) 
Committee on Legal Affairs 1979 Klaus-Heiner Lehne (EPP) 
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 International was originally called the External Economic Relations committee. The Committee was 
combined with Industry, Research and Energy Committee in 1999 but re-established independently in 2004.  
28
 Responsibilities merged into the Regional Policy Committee in 1999; re-established as independent 
committee in 2004. 
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(JURI) 
Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs 
(LIBE) 
1992 Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar 
(S&D) 
Committee on Constitutional 
Affairs (AFCO) 
1982 (1999)
29
 Carlo Casini (EPP) 
Committee on Woman’s 
Rights and Gender Equality 
(FEMM) 
1982
30
 Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL) 
Committee on Petitions 
(PETI) 
1987 Eriminia Mazzoni (EPP) 
Special committee on 
Organised Crime, Corruption 
and Money Laundering 
(CRIM) 
2012 Sonia Alfano (ALDE) 
Source: European Parliament Website 2014, Corbett et al 2011. 
The makeup of the committee structure of the EP undergoes review and limited operational change 
every few years in order to facilitate efficiency. However, a normal committee will consist of MEPs 
serving on a single committee and substituting on a second committee, where they may have wished 
to be a permanent member. Generally, turnover of membership within EP committees compared with 
other comparative legislative committee systems is high and it is extremely rare for a MEP to stay on 
the same committee for a number of parliamentary terms (McElroy & Benoit 2012). Nevertheless, 
this trend may be changing as it has been noted that it is becoming more common for MEPs to 
continue on the same committee over a number of terms (Corbett et al 2007, Whitaker 2011, 2014). 
Office holders in committees consist of a chair and a number of vice chairs, normally four, who 
attempt to ensure efficient running. The committee chair is responsible for chairing meetings, shaping 
the agenda, and representing the committee outside of the EP. The chair and vice-chair positions are 
spread between the parliamentary groupings depending on grouping size, with seniority not perceived 
as playing an overtly significant role in post selection (Bowler & Farrell 1995). This is in stark 
contrast with the importance of seniority for US Congressional committee chairs (Kellermann & 
Shepsle 2009). While seniority is not the key determinant in deciding which MEPs will gain positions 
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 Began in 1982 as the ‘Committee of Institutional Affairs’ but amalgamated with Rules committee to create 
‘Constitutional Affairs’ in 1999. 
30
 ‘Woman’s Right and Gender Equality’ was originally a temporary committee subsequently made permanent. 
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on a particular committee, it has been suggested that MEPs with many years of EP experience from 
the larger parties will be appointed to the most ‘prestigious’ EP committees more often than 
inexperienced members (Judge & Earnshaw 2003, McElroy 2006). This suggestion has been 
substantiated by Yordanova (2009b: 274) who empirically demonstrates that a ‘less well known MEP’ 
is significantly less likely to be assigned to seemingly important committees.
31
 Yordanova (2009b) 
believes this signifies greater committee specialization with seniority affecting ‘committee 
incumbency’. In contrast to the American congressional committees, EP committee chairs do not, 
however, generally hold their positions for extended periods of time; tenure is normally for a 
maximum of one parliamentary term, although evidence would suggest this is, also, a trend that is 
possibly changing (Corbett et al 2007). 
1.7 Decision Making Process 
Committees are responsible for formulating the EP formal legislative position on any proposed 
legislation coming from the Commission (Tsebelis & Kalandrakis 1999). They will adopt draft reports 
containing their views on the Parliament’s position with regard to the legislative proposal coming 
from the European Commission, in accordance with the OLP as contained within the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
The committee nominated to be responsible for drafting the Parliament’s position will be based upon 
the appropriate policy area and following discussion within the conference of Committee Chairs 
(Pittella et al 2011). The responsible committee will appoint a rapporteur to follow a legislative 
report. The role of the rapporteur, a position not often observed outside of the European Union in a 
legislative context, is extremely important to the legislative process. It is the rapporteur’s 
responsibility to draft a text, which is representative of the committee’s viewpoint. The rapporteur 
will also amend their own text if changes are needed to better reflect the committee’s position. The 
committee will vote to adopt the report, which will then be presented to the plenary by the rapporteur 
who will respond to any proposed amendments by the plenary on behalf of their committee. If the 
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 Original empirical interview data collected for the study, also, confirmed some importance of member’s 
‘name recognition’ in getting committee assignments. 
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process enters a second legislative reading, it will be the responsibility of the rapporteur to follow the 
situation and make recommendations for progression during the second reading (Bowler & Farrell 
1995). Thus, the committees play a significant role in constructing, and not merely reflecting, the 
Parliament’s position to proposed legislation and indicating what amendments the Parliament should, 
and do, include. There is, also, the potential, as indicated, for the plenary to attempt to introduce 
amendments to a report. However, this is generally an unusual occurrence as plenary amendments are 
rarely successful (Tsebelis & Kalandrakis 1999). 
1.7.1 The Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) 
Since the application of the ToL in 2009, to coincide with the start of the 7
th
 term (2009-2014), the 
OLP has become the default legislative process in the EU. As with previous legislative processes that 
have been used in the European Union, the Ordinary Legislative Procedure begins with the 
Commission making a legislative proposal. The Commission maintains the right of initiative in 
making legislative proposals and consequently retains the agenda setting power. Once the 
Commission makes a legislative proposal it is simultaneously sent to the Council and the EP. This 
initiates what is known as the first reading (Council Secretariat 2010). Although two further reading 
stages are possible, there is the provision for the dossiers to be concluded early at the first reading 
stage. 
When the Commission has made its legislative proposal, it will refer the proposal to the relevant 
committee, which will become the ‘responsible committee’ (Corbett et al 2007). After the 
‘responsible committee’ has been identified, the committee will select its rapporteur to draft the 
committee’s position, which will include the legislative amendments the committee wishes to see 
adopted within the act. The rapporteur will summarise the position of the Commission and the 
committee will debate the proposal. The Commission can attend meetings of the relevant committee 
in order to defend its proposal position and clarify any issues that may exist that have been identified 
by the committee (Council Secretariat 2010). The committee will request that both the Council and 
the Commission keep the committee informed of developments within both institutions. 
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Once the committee and its rapporteur have drafted the report containing its amendment to the 
legislative act it will be discussed by the plenary of the EP. If the Commission’s proposal is of a broad 
nature covering a number of policy areas, it is possible that a separate EP committee (or committees) 
may produce a non-binding opinion on the proposed legislative subject. It is the ‘responsible 
committee’ who will draft the Parliament’s position. The opinion giving committee can suggest an 
amendment proposal, which the ‘responsible committee’ will have to acknowledge but is under no 
obligation to incorporate in its position. The ‘responsible committee’ is the main legislative actor in 
the process of creating the European Parliament’s position (Corbett et al 2007). 
Once the committee report amending the Commission’s legislative proposal is presented to the 
plenary of the Parliament it will vote to adopt the report.  If the report is adopted by the whole 
Parliament there are two possible outcomes. The first is that the Council approves the position of the 
EP and accepts any amendments proposed. If this occurs, the legislation is adopted. The legislative act 
will then be signed by the president, the secretaries-general of the EP, and the Council before it is 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) (Council Secretariat 2010), then 
becoming EU law. 
However, the Council may reject the Parliament’s amendment proposals and consequently agreement 
is not reached at the first reading. The Council will subsequently draft its own position, which will be 
presented to the Parliament at a second legislative reading. Receipt by EP of the Council’s position 
marks the beginning of this second legislative reading stage. Within the second reading the Parliament 
has a time-limited period of 3 (+1) months with which to conclude this stage of the process. For 
difficult or time consuming reports either the Council or the EP can request one extra month on top of 
the 3 months provided (Council Secretariat 2010). Once the Parliament receives the Council’s 
position at the beginning of this second reading, the EP committee responsible will examine the 
position of the Council and make recommendations of how to proceed. The plenary will proceed to 
vote again on the recommendations of the committee. It is possible that the Parliament will accept the 
Council’s first reading position ending the process. The Council’s position will, also, be seen as 
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accepted if there is no EP plenary vote within the 3(+1) month time limit. In both cases the legislative 
act will be adopted and published in the OJ (Council Secretariat 2010). The second outcome, 
however, at this second reading stage would be that the Council’s position is not accepted by an 
absolute majority of the members of the European Parliament. A rejection of the Council’s position 
by an absolute majority of the Parliament would end the legislative process. This would finish the 
likelihood of adoption of the proposed act unless the Commission made a new proposal to begin the 
process again. It is rare for an act to be blocked completely by the Parliament as this stage; it is more 
likely that the EP will propose amendments via the responsible committee to the Council’s position. 
The amendments requested are sent to both the Council and the Commission. The Commission having 
received the EP amendments has to issue an opinion on the amendments proposed by the Parliament. 
This is referred to the Council before it concludes its second reading. 
After the Council receives the Parliament’s amendments it has a 3(+1) months’ time limit on its 
second reading. The Council has the option at this stage to adopt or reject the amendments proposed 
by the Parliament. If the Commission has reacted positively to the EP’s proposed amendments, the 
Council will vote on the amendment using qualified majority voting (QMV). If the Commission has 
responded by opposing the EPs amendments, the Council will have to pass a unanimous vote in 
favour of the EP amendments for them to be accepted (Council Secretariat 2010). If the Council does 
accept all the parliamentary amendments the act is adopted and published in the Official Journal. 
However, if the Council does not accept all parliamentary amendments a ‘conciliation committee’ 
will be convened (this is often referred to as a third legislative reading). If the process reaches the 
conciliation stage it has 6(+2) weeks for any outstanding issues between the Council and EP to be 
resolved. Once again, the extension of the 2 further weeks can be requested by the EP or the Council. 
Before the conciliation committee has its first meeting it is common for the informal process of 
trialogue to take place where the three institutions meet and exchange information to facilitate a 
successful conciliation. During trialogue the Council will be represented by the chairman of the 
COREPER and members from the Parliament’s relevant policy committee. 
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While this section has largely accounted for the formal process involved in the OLP, the informal 
processes are of equal importance within the EU decision-making process. Many key decisions and 
outcomes result from informal interactions occurring in parallel to formal decision making 
procedures. The so called ‘trialogue procedure’ has become central to all decision making within the 
EU, despite having no formal basis within the EU treaties. Trialogue follows the formal legislative 
procedure, potentially operating over all legislative stages. The objective of trialogue is to increase the 
efficiency of decision making, by organizing regular informal meetings between a selected group of 
relevant policy actors from the Commission, Council, and the EP committees’ relevant policy actors. 
Actors from each institution meet in seclusion to discuss how compromise can be reached regarding a 
report. It has been the expansion of trialogue that has led to an increased number of early agreements, 
which end the legislative process before all legislative readings are required. 
If the conciliation committee meetings do commence, because an early agreement has not been 
reached or agreed upon in informal trialogue, it will consist of 27 members each for the Council and 
the EP. The majority of those MEPs selected to attend the conciliation committee will be, similar to 
trialogue, members from the committee responsible for producing the EP’s original dossiers on the 
legislation in question (Council Secretariat 2010). The Commission will be represented on the 
conciliation committee by the Commissioner responsible for the legislative proposal. The 
Commission has very limited influence during conciliation; its role is to attempt to facilitate 
compromise between the EP and Council. 
Within the conciliation meeting a working document will be drawn up which is divided into two 
sections, the first containing points already agreed upon by the Parliament and the Council, and the 
second containing the current outstanding issues dividing the institutions and the respective position 
of each institution (Council Secretariat 2010). When conciliation does commence each meeting of the 
committee will be held alternatively between the Council and EP premises. Whichever institution 
holds the first meeting will have the responsibility of writing the compromise text that the conciliation 
committee attempts to reach. If a joint text is agreed between the two institutions at this third reading 
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it is sent to the EP, and the Council, to be voted upon. If the joint text is voted on, successfully, by 
each institution it is adopted and published in the OJ becoming law. If no joint text is reached in 
conciliation, or the time limit is passed, the proposed legislation fails. Furthermore, if a joint text is 
agreed but does not reach the number of votes needed within the Council (by qualified majority) or 
the Parliament (by majority) the act also fails. 
This overview of the workings of the OLP places the EP committees within the European decision 
making process, the outcomes of which can vary depending on the committee involved and their 
comparative influence. 
1.8 Overview of Thesis Structure 
This first chapter has introduced the puzzle and presented the research question, which will be 
answered over the ‘sources of committees influence’. It has, in addition, laid out how the research 
project has been conducted to generate original findings, to determine how sources of influence may 
operate, and as a result how some committees may establish greater influence than others. An account 
of the methods, qualitative elite interviews and document analysis, has been made, and the 
justification behind the approaches discussed for their merits and potential drawbacks from their use. 
The chapter has also placed the committee system of the EP into a proper context within the decision 
making process of the EU. 
Chapter two introduces the conceptual framework, drawing upon a number of studies from 
comparative politics, mainly from the US congressional systems, where research on committee 
influence has been extensive. A concept of influence and of committee influence is discussed, placing 
the EP committee systems in context with other comparative systems where legislative influence has 
already been empirically observed. The chapter discusses each of the previous perspectives proposed 
concerning different potential sources of committee influence. From these perspectives, the 
‘informational’, the ‘partisan’ and the ‘public policy’, four hypotheses are generated, each of which in 
turn is tested within the case studies. 
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Chapter three comprises the first case study. The ENVI committee first formed in 1979, during the 7
th
 
term, covers the competency areas of environment, public health and food safety policy, acting as a 
full co-legislator in all its remit areas. Examples of legislation such as the ‘plastic bag’32 directive are 
examined as representative of the committee’s legislative involvement. The data collected examines 
the direct role of members, their use of specialization and the effect of turnover on committee 
influence. Claims over the negative impact of turnover in the case study are disputed, suggesting that 
turnover had a positive effect on the influence of the ENVI committee despite expectations to the 
contrary. Furthermore, the role of unity between party groups on the committee is questioned for its 
positive effect on committee influence. 
Chapter four focuses on the BUDG committee. This committee operates as the main budgetary actor 
of the EP, being formed at the point the European Parliament became an elected parliament. The 
committee, in effect, acts as a co-legislator, alongside the Council in agreeing Union budgets. 
Previous assumptions over the role of membership retention and its effect on committee legislative 
outputs are questioned within the chapter. The functioning of partisan support and the impact of 
public policy type is, also, examined in the context of their effect on the BUDG committee legislative 
outputs during the period and in the example of select ‘Annual Budget’ procedures and financial 
framework agreements. These findings contributed to an original perspective on the way in which the 
BUDG committee was able/or unable to have its policy preferences reflected in legislative outputs. 
Chapter five examines the role of the INTA committee. Established in 2004 as an independent 
committee the International Trade committee deals with trade agreements and regulations surrounding 
their implementation. The committee is placed within the context of the new powers it received after 
Lisbon, with the extension of co-decision and new veto powers over trade agreements. A number of 
key legislative examples are examined, such as the INTA committee’s involvement in the 
‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’33 (TTIP) negotiations and the fractures ‘conflict 
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 ‘Packaging and packaging waste: reduction of the consumption of lightweight plastic carrier bags’ 
(2013/0371(COD)). 
33
 A major free trade agreement (FTA) proposed between the European Union and The United States. 
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minerals’ report. The perspective that expertise was not present in significant levels within the INTA 
committee is challenged, and previous assessments of the INTA committee’s source of influence are 
questioned. 
The final chapter presents and analyses the collective findings that have been generated within the 
case studies. A number of original findings are presented within this concluding chapter that provide 
contrary evidence to current conventions on committee influence, with regard to the role of committee 
specialization and unity. These intriguing results are discussed in detail before engagement is made 
with the potential impact of the findings on the wider field of both legislative influence and committee 
systems, beyond the EU. Discussion focuses upon the thesis’ contribution towards the field, which 
furthers current understanding of the EP committee system, committee influence in a wider context, 
and provides the potential groundwork for the beginning of a unified theory that will allow for the 
patterns of different sources of influence, which this thesis has empirically identified within its 
selected cases. 
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Chapter Two Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the sources of committee 
influence in the European Parliament (EP). This chapter will establish a theoretical framework by 
drawing upon different strands of the current literature and the various explanations of what may 
constitute committee legislative influence. EP committees have influence over legislative outcomes: 
this is an identifiable phenomenon that has been established in a number of studies (Bowler & Farrell 
1995, Kreppel 2002b, Farrell & Héritier 2004, Ringe 2005, 2009, McElroy 2006, Corbett et al 2007, 
Yordanova 2009a, 2009b, 2013, Whitaker 2011). However, as stated in the opening chapter, 
committees are not equally influential legislators, and despite operating under uniform legislative 
rules with the same powers (the Ordinary Legislative Procedure) since the Treaty of Lisbon, it 
remains the case that some committees have clearly more influence than others. To address this 
puzzle, and answer the research question, the thesis looks at the potential different range of ‘sources 
of influence’ that a committee may have access to draw upon in order to establish its influence. Thus, 
in the first instance the ‘dependent variable’ (‘committee legislative influence’) will be established, 
along with the ‘independent variables’ (‘sources of influence’) that may potentially impact upon the 
‘dependent variable’. 
This chapter will be structured as follows. First, the concepts of ‘influence’ and of ‘committee 
influence’ will be discussed. Discussion will further focus upon how previous studies have measured 
committee influence within the European Parliament, as this will help to establish how high influence 
can be, and has been empirically recognized as significant in some EP committees. This study’s focus 
on the 7
th
 EP will allow us to disregard formal rules, and solely focus on the ‘informational 
perspective’, the ‘partisan perspective’ and the ‘public policy perspective’, in that order, and from 
these, different hypotheses will be formulated. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the 
important points that have been identified. 
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2.2 Concepts of Influence 
Exactly what constitutes legislative influence within parliamentary systems has been a topic of 
significant theoretical conjecture ever since the inception of legislative parliaments. With the 
expansion of parliamentary systems to deal efficiently with the increasing need for specialist technical 
competences, which occurs over time, greater significance has been placed on the role of committees 
in the legislative process (Blondel 1969). With the expansion of committees within many parliaments, 
the debate as to what comprises legislative influence has intensified; however, a consensus among 
scholars has yet to be reached. The growth of committee influence as defined by Blondel (1969) is not 
a uniform phenomenon. Committees evolve to deal with non-general legislation in areas that 
governments identify as needing devoted specialists and, as a result, committee members become area 
experts if they spend extended periods of time on a committee (Krehbiel 1991:171). Committees, 
being born out of the necessity to increase legislative efficiency, have been observed in many systems 
as actors fundamentally important to the legislative process. While they are often established as 
influential actors within their own legislative processes, being often the only direct official route for 
elected members to influence legislative outcomes (Mattson & Strøm 1996, 2006, Longley & 
Davidson 1998), the actual concept of ‘influence’ remains, however, to be clearly defined. 
Pivotal to the discipline of political science is the study of both ‘influence’ and ‘power’. However, 
clearly defining and differentiating these two concepts is not a simple task (Dahl 1984). Defining 
what comprises influence is difficult as there has been no consensus among scholars over a theoretical 
definition of ‘influence’. Too often ‘influence’ has been defined in terms that would be more 
appropriate to indicate an actor’s ‘power’, and in many cases the terms have been used 
interchangeably (Dahl 1957: 202). In order to have a clear understanding of ‘influence’ this thesis 
draws upon the concept as it is presented by Dahl (1957, 1961) and others (Blondel 1967, 1995, 
Bachrach & Baratz 1970) from a general comparative context, and previously applied by selected 
studies in the case of the EP (Bowler & Farrell 1995, Scully 1997a, Marshall 2010, Costello & 
Thomson 2013). 
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The simplest definition and separation of the terms ‘influence’ and ‘power’, suggested by Bachrach 
and Baratz (1970), is that influence is when actor ‘A’ gets actor ‘B’s’ compliance without having to 
use threats, either overt or tacit. This definition of influence is different from that of power where 
actor ‘A’ is able to make actor ‘B’ acquiesce by the use of an explicit or implied threat (Cairney 
2012). This is, however, only one simplistic mechanical view of influence and power. As Dahl (1957: 
202) advocates, saying ‘A’ has influence over ‘B’ is not particularly informative in understanding 
what comprises ‘influence’. The statement that ‘A’ has power or influence over ‘B’ may be true but 
does not explain the full relationship of ‘influence’ between the two actors and what decision making 
processes are taking place to generate the ‘influence’ of an actor. The influence of an actor, however, 
can be understood by the resources (for example ‘expertise’) that are available to him/her to exploit in 
their relationship with others (Dahl 1957, Bowler & Farrell 1995), and identifying from where these 
resources originate to establish what influence is within the unique system (Scully 1997a). 
‘Influence’, therefore, can be defined as the ability of an actor, by the active application of identifiable 
resources, or as they are termed here ‘sources of influence’ at their disposal, to move a position 
towards their own desired preferences by the time of the final outcome (Blondel 1995). Utilising this 
definition, focusing on potential committee resources to determine the origins of committee influence, 
implies that as outcomes are not uniform for all committees, by extrapolation (supported by previous 
empirical studies (Tsebelis 1995)) not all committees have the same levels of influence as resources 
differ. There are a number of possible factors determining the outcome that two different actors can 
gain from a third (Dahl 1957). 
2.3 Measuring Committee Influence 
Empirically, committee influence has been measured and established in a number of different ways. 
Some studies have adopted a ‘legalist’ approach, which focused primarily on formal rules, to ascertain 
which committees are influential, or not; these have, however, been discounted for reasons discussed 
above and elaborated on below. This thesis favours the so-called ‘bargaining success’ approach as a 
more appropriate way of establishing committee influence. Blondel (1995) has stated that the ability 
of a committee to alter and amend elements of a policy proposal towards its preferences is an 
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intermediate level of influence, while alteration of broad policy areas would equate to the highest 
level of influence. Similar ‘bargaining success’ definitions of influence have been recommended in 
other studies such as those of Kreppel (1999, 2002b) and others (Crombez 2000, Crombez et al 2000, 
Costello & Thomson 2013), who state that (EP) influence can be seen as the ability of an actor to gain 
outcomes favourable to their own position. The ability to draw an outcome towards a preference has 
been cited in a number of EP committee cases as exemplifying high levels of influence (Judge 1992, 
Bowler & Farrell 1995). A number of different practical measurements of committee influence have 
been proposed. 
A committee’s prestige (defined as its perceived standing among actors) could indicate a level of 
legislative influence, as can a level of familiarity with the application of legislative procedures that 
allows the development of an institutional memory, and understanding of how procedures work in 
practice (Corbett et al 2007). Actors, from spending extended periods of time dealing with a 
procedure, learn how to use it to maximise their own benefits. Institutional memory is, however, only 
a route to influence, not influence itself.
34
 Similarly, a committee’s prestige is more of an esoteric 
concept. To say that a committee is influential as a result of its prestige is a cyclical argument. While 
a committee can use its prestige to its advantage, high prestige is an outcome of already possessing 
influence and not a direct cause. The example of the AFET committee clearly highlights this point as 
it carries a very high level of prestige but completely lacks legislative influence (Corbett et al 2007). 
Neither prestige, nor institutional memory can truly help to empirically measure a committee’s 
influence. 
Within the EP framework the committee’s role is to draft rather than reflect the plenary of the 
Parliament’s position in any particular area of legislature (Tsebelis & Kalandrakis 1999, Ringe 2005, 
2009). It is, therefore, the ability of a committee, as a result of ‘bargaining’ with other actors, to have 
its preferences reflected in the final legislative outcome that can signify relative levels of legislative 
influence. Change can be observed in the draft policy, often in the form of legislative amendments, 
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 ‘Policy making expertise’ is cited as a potential source of committee legislative influence below, which does 
apparently derive from membership experience with legislation.  
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from its original proposal until its final outcome, and can be measured by how far, and towards which 
institution the legislation has orientated (Crombez 2000, Crombez et al 2000). When there is 
convergence between an actor’s preferences35 and a legislative outcome this can be denoted as 
influence (Bailer 2004, Arregui & Thomson 2009, Costello & Thomson 2013). This measurement has 
been applied in studies attempting to understand the influence of the EP as a whole (with the 
exception of Costello & Thomson (2013) who do acknowledge the role of committees); it is, also, 
relevant in the context of EP committee influence. 
It is important to identify when committee influence is actually evident rather than an actor being 
‘lucky’, as an actor who gains a favourable outcome in line with their preferences in a single 
interaction may simply be fortuitous in achieving said outcome rather than being truly influential or as 
Costello & Thomson (2013: 1026) term it, ‘powerful’. Therefore, the ability of a committee to shift a 
proposal towards its preferred position must be exhibited in a number of repeated interactions rather 
than on a single ‘one-shot’ interaction. Therefore, rather than taking a ‘one shot approach’ which 
examines isolated and often singular examples of legislation as indicative of the whole process, this 
thesis will examine multiple interactions within the 7
th
 term (2009-2014), with some notable examples 
where legislation was extended to carry over into the 8
th
 parliamentary term. 
Studies attempting to establish EP committee influence have commonly measured the number of 
successful legislative amendments proposed by the Parliament (the distinction between committees 
was often not made, rather policy area was the unit of measurement, which individual committees 
cover) (Tsebelis 1994, Garret 1995, Moser 1996, 1997, Tsebelis & Garrett 1997a, Scully 1997a, 
1997b, Tsebelis & Kalandrakis 1999, Kreppel 1999, 2000, 2002b, Crombez 2000, Tsebelis et al 2001, 
Kasack 2004). It was viewed that through the success of EP amendments this would demonstrate a 
committee’s legislative influence. The more consistent a committee is in achieving amendment 
success, and thus amending proposals towards its own preferences, the more influential it was deemed 
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 An actor’s preferences can be judged by assessing the consistent amendment position of that actor in repeated 
interactions. For example the ENVI committee is seen as an outlier with an observable preference for furthering 
environmental protection (Kaeding 2004). 
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to be. Importantly, as identified by Kreppel (1999, 2002b), all EP amendments are not of equal 
significance, a fact that many previous studies had overlooked. Simply stating that a committee which 
has more amendment success is more influential would be incorrect on its own. In fact, it would be 
more appropriate to state that a committee is influential when it has a high amendment success rate, 
which includes a significant proportion of important amendments (amendments which make broad 
policy alterations) rather than taking the total volume of amendments as an indicator. 
While amendment success rates have been the main process used to establish committee influence, 
some studies have adopted interesting variations on this theme. The division of committees by 
Yordanova (2009a: 256) into two types, ‘more powerful committees’ and ‘less powerful committees’, 
is  useful , as it is one that involves a policy output dynamic, which was first identified by Lowi 
(1964, 1972) as a comparative factor in committee (levels of) influence. What defines a ‘more 
powerful committee’ and a ‘less powerful committee’ according to Yordanova (2009a) is the number 
of co-decision reports drafted by an EP committee: the more significant reports adopted, the ‘more 
powerful’ that committee. While Yordanova’s (2009a) distinction between powerful and less 
powerful committees may be less relevant now, due to the extension of co-decision
36
 with the 
Ordinary Legislative Procedure, it still provides a potential baseline to establish a committee’s 
legislative influence. Committees do display different levels of report adoption (Figure 2-1). 
Nevertheless, some committees, while not processing a high volume of reports, deal with highly 
important and complex singular reports. So while the volume of reports may be a useful indicator in 
attempting to gauge the influence of a committee it is not a definitive measurement. 
In addition to an examination of amendment success rates, the stage of legislative agreement has been 
assessed as signifying the dependent variable of this research, that of ‘committee legislative 
influence’. Studies such as those of Rasmussen (2011) and others (Rittberger 2000, Shackleton & 
Raunio 2003, Hage & Kaeding 2007, Rasmussen & Toshkov 2011, Toshkov & Rasmussen 2012, 
Rasmussen & Reh 2013) have examined the importance of the legislative agreement stage as a 
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 Committees which may have used other legislative procedures would have been considered less influential as 
they simply did not draft co-decision reports at the same level as committees which used co-decision by default. 
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sign/potential measure of committee influence. In most parliamentary systems with strong 
committees, amendments to legislation will occur. However, there are often variations at what stage 
of the legislative process committees actually become involved and this in turn could affect a 
committee’s influence (Shepsle & Weingast 1987, Blondel 1995). 
 
Figure 2-1 Co-decision file adoptions (CODs) by each of the committees of the European Parliament, and illustrating 
the percentage of these reports adopted by the Council at different reading stages of the legislative process. Source: 
Pittella et al 2014 
 
Statistical publication on report adoption within the EP (Figure 2-1) clearly indicates that there is a 
disparity between the stages at which agreements are concluded across different committees. Early 
agreement has been an increasing trend over recent years (Figure 2-2). The rationale according to 
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Rittberger (2000) behind an actor making early, or waiting for, a later agreement is based upon the 
premise that actors are driven by their levels of impatience with the length of the legislative process. It 
has been suggested that patient actors have a greater remit to influence legislation while impatient 
actors give greater concessions in order for a conclusion to be reached at an early stage (Rittberger 
2000). The more patient an actor, the more confident it would appear that said actor is, in expecting 
the proposed legislation to move closer to their position as time progresses. The impatient actor will 
often offer concessions at an early stage to avoid a drawn-out process which conversely, they perceive 
as only disadvantaging them the longer it continues (Rittberger 2000). The reason for this is that the 
‘patient’ actors have more ‘resources’ to exploit in a drawn-out process, while ‘impatient’ actors will 
seek to end the process as they have less ‘resources’ to utilise/spend as time progresses (Rasmussen & 
Reh 2013). This understanding, however, is somewhat disputed by Yordanova (2013: 107-112) who 
supplies evidence to claim that committees which reached an early agreement without extended 
trialogue negotiations are actually weaker in influence. Evidence supplied by Yordanova (2013: 107) 
demonstrates that if an early agreement is reached ‘it is not uncommon to see all the committee 
amendments rejected’. Influence, therefore, could simply be measured by what stage agreement was 
reached and which actor pushed for this, in repeated interactions. However, the findings of Yordanova 
(2013) do not heavily impact upon this study, as figure 2-1 demonstrates each of the committees 
selected as a case study has a similar rate of early adoption. 
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Figure 2-2 Rates of legislative adoption stage. Source: Pittella et al 2014 
 
Many more complex ways of understanding influence have been proposed, as comprehensively 
reviewed by Krehbiel (2004), and many have been applied in the EP (see Kreppel 2002b). This thesis 
avoids adopting these modelling approaches for the particular reason that they do not always lead to 
greater clarity, or generate useful empirical results. As discussed above many different alternative 
models of EP influence have been proposed, which have not always lead to a better understanding of 
EP influence (Kreppel 2002b: 785)
37
, and often focused on the impact of legislative rules. While 
similar assumptions, that actors are trying to get the best outcomes over potentially multiple rounds, 
have been adopted to those indicated in Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) ‘dividing the dollar’ game38, this 
thesis focuses on a better empirical understanding of committee influence rather than testing 
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 ‘The weakness of the existing empirical data has long allowed various theoretical models of EP influence to 
coexist, competing for dominance without the ability to effectively test their relative veracity. The result has long 
been an inability to move beyond the generalized theoretical arguments about procedure. This has left 
significant aspects of the legislative process and many crucial variables largely unexamined’ (Kreppel 2002b: 
785). 
38
 All actors want the biggest share of ‘one dollar’ and vote on how to distribute the dollar in repeated rounds 
(legislative readings); the value of the dollar depreciates with every round until a final agreement ultimately 
dividing up the dollar is agreed. Agreement is seen as often being quick as actors will seek agreement before the 
dollar has depreciated too much in value.  
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(complex) theoretical perspectives based on quantitative analysis. This thesis does prefer the approach 
of focusing on the adoption rates of significant amendments (Kreppel 2002b), as amendments best 
demonstrate bargaining outcomes. While the different possible ways of measuring committee 
influence, as discussed above, deviate to an extent from each other in their methods of establishing 
influence, they do not deviate from the general consensus that committees of the EP are influential 
when they are able to gain legislative outcomes favourable to their preferences. Furthermore, there is 
a consensus that the ‘resources’ a committee draws upon define its comparative level of influence 
(Dahl 1957, 1961, Blondel 1967, 1995, Bachrach & Baratz 1970). 
2.4 Sources of Committee Influence 
Before tackling the hypotheses a level of engagement with the literature surrounding legislative 
committees and their influence is required to establish for the reader the current level of understanding 
upon which this thesis seeks to expand. The initial strand of research on committee influence, 
originally applied to the US Congress, placed significant focus upon formal indicators of influence 
with the application (or disproportionate application) of formal rules (and procedures) as defining 
committee influence, i.e. how legislative bodies, such as committees, are organized, defines the 
influence of that actor within the institution (Gilligan & Krehbiel 1989, Krehbiel 2004).
39
 This focus 
upon formal procedures was largely driven by political economists, and social choice theorists, who 
determined to understand the legislator in the same way markets are understood, despite the 
difficulties of predicting the actions and outcomes of a political actor compared with predicting 
markets (Riker 1980, Weingast et al 1981, Krehbiel 2004). Formal rules are not a focus of this thesis, 
however, it is important to show an understanding of their effect as much for the literature focusing on 
committee influence had previously used them as an indicator of influence. 
Different legislative rules can empower committees (manifest influence) in different ways such as 
granting some select actors with the right of ‘veto’, or others with the right to ‘agenda setting’ 
(McKelvey 1976, Romer & Rosenthal 1978, Shepsle 1979, 1986, 1989, Riker 1980, Shepsle & 
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 For a detailed and excellent review of the different concepts of ‘legislative organization’ see Krehbiel 2004. 
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Weingast 1987). The concept of ‘agenda setting’ (Romer & Rosenthal 1978), taken from the US 
Congress, was seen as defining influence, as a committee with this power, in theory, would better 
control the final outcome, setting the legislative agenda closer to their preferences and, therefore, not 
having to fight for its position at later stages. Committees with identifiable agenda setting powers 
would be considered influential actors (Shepsle & Weingast 1984, Riker 1986, Tsebelis 1994). 
However, the role of agenda setting has been questioned in its ability to explain a committee’s 
influence, as the link between agenda and outcome has not always been well established. Rather, 
according to Shepsle & Weingast (1987: 929) ‘committees are disproportionately influential on 
legislative outcomes because they possess an ex post veto’. What this means is that committees when 
imbued with a veto at the very end of a legislative process (ex-post) are able to bring outcomes 
towards their preferences with legislative amendments, by threatening to reject the act completely if it 
does not meet their most basic preferences. 
These different formal perspectives, derived from studies of the US Congress, heavily influenced 
studies on the EP, and informed many of the assumptions held over how committee influence was 
established. Thus the highly cited studies of Tsebelis & Garrett (Tsebelis 1997, Garrett & Tsebelis 
1997, Tsebelis & Garrett 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2001) and others (Moser 1996, Scully 1997a, 1997b, 
Crombez 2000) attempted to comprehend influence within the EP as a whole between the 
implementations of, firstly, the cooperation procedure and, latterly, the ‘co-decision i/co-decision ii’ 
procedures. Each of these procedures has been applied to different committees at different times. As a 
result it had been claimed that the EP, or more precisely the committees operating under the 
cooperation procedure, had disproportionately more power under cooperation, gaining ‘conditional’ 
agenda setting powers, than when a number of EP committees gained ‘veto powers’ with ‘co-decision 
i’ superseding cooperation (Garrett & Tsebelis 1997, Tsebelis & Garrett 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2001). 
This viewpoint has been challenged as being too simplistic, and notably Scully (1997a: 98) suggested 
that a number of factors including, importantly, the roles which EP committees play in the legislative 
process and what resources/information committees have access to, must be understood in order to 
determine what shapes the patterns of committee influence. This important point, that committee 
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influence is defined by the resources a committee can mobilise, was elaborated upon in more detail by 
Bowler & Farrell (1995), as discussed above. A more detailed account of this early debate 
surrounding differing EU procedures can be found in Tsebelis & Garrett (2001). What can be drawn 
in the context of this thesis is that, while formal rules when they differ do affect levels of influence, 
committee influence is, however, fundamentally about how effectively a committee can scrutinize 
legislation, with the ability to impact upon final outcomes. Where a committee sources its influence 
from is of vital importance when attempting to understand committee influence. This is especially true 
when formal legislative rules are uniform as they are with few exceptions after the ToL.  
One way to further our understanding of Committee Influence is to examine comparative examples of 
influential committees, which have already been identified empirically. All democratic western 
European parliaments have committees which play a role in their systems, whether this role is either 
extensive or limited in legislative involvement differs between parliaments depending on how the 
system is organised, both formally and informally. The EP, as a recently developing institution, may 
have more in common with a young parliament than it would with a mature debating parliament such 
as that of the British Westminster model, where practices are well entrenched and committees are 
perceived as weak (Krieger 2009). No parliamentary system, at least within Europe, is identical to 
another (Bergman et al 2005); however, within the field of comparative politics the EP does have 
more in common with the parliaments of the Nordic countries and their strong legislative committee 
systems. Many of these Nordic examples have in equal part established their committee system’s high 
legislative as a result of formal rules and a number of, identifiable, informal resources. 
The Nordic model of parliamentary government and committee systems encompasses a number of 
countries including Norway, Sweden, Denmark (the Scandinavian parliaments), Iceland and Finland. 
These Nordic countries are highlighted because, largely, all contain highly significant standing 
committees which have grown in power, alongside their individual increasingly powerful parliaments 
(Elder et al 1982) and are, therefore, useful in placing committee influence and the EP’s committee 
system in an appropriate equivalent context. The governing style of the Nordic countries has been 
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termed ‘committee parliamentarianism’ (Hague & Harrop 2010: 310). As their parliamentary systems 
expanded so did the Nordic committee systems. Committees have been used for many years in the 
Swedish Riksdag and the Norwegian Storting and display significant independence, from their 
executives, and efficiency of operations in their respective systems (Elder et al 1982). The raison 
d'être of committees according to Blondel (1969) is that they maximise the efficiency of parliaments 
by being small working groups. The Nordic committees exemplify this concept, containing a large 
number of small committees, thus maximising efficiency by their numbers and their specialist 
knowledge (Arter 1984). Small committees are perceived as more likely to have legislative influence 
than large committees.
40
 Within Nordic countries the small nature of committees has developed a 
culture of membership expertise generation.
41
 It is from this generation of expertise, and operational 
efficiency, that many Nordic committee systems have established their high influential roles, within 
their parliamentary systems. EP committees generally operate as small legislative units, while not as 
small as the Swedish example they are somewhat comparable. 
Committees in, for example, the Swedish Riksdag are involved in all stages of the legislative process, 
and are formally able to propose legislation (something the EP cannot do), amend, and scrutinize, 
legislation (something the EP committees can do) while maintaining an independence from the 
executive (Arter 2008). This essentially summarises what ‘committee influence’ is; the ability of a 
committee to scrutinize and amend legislation towards its own ideal outcomes.
42
 The ability to 
scrutinize results in equal part from the formal powers of the committee and the informal generation 
of expertise, which members are identified as developing in the Swedish system. This would be why 
committees promote the acquisition of information by their members to be able to fully scrutinize 
legislation and propose realistic alternative solutions (Krehbiel 1991). In Sweden, committees are 
experts in their respective policy areas and membership is heavily weighted towards past expertise or 
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 The reasons for this can be observed in the example of the early French assembly where committees were 
large and unwieldy, which consequently discouraged all but some members from developing policy expertise 
(Arter 1984).  
41
 Similar circumstances have been proposed as occurring within the US congressional committees and are seen 
as a significant source of influence in that system and something which occurs naturally in small active 
legislative committees (Krehbiel 1991). 
42
 Setting the agenda could be considered committee influence in a comparative context however, because EP 
committees do not have proposal powers, it cannot be considered in this study. 
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training in the appropriate disciplines (Arter 1990). Many new Riksdag members will, in fact, serve 
apprenticeships as committee substitutes to build ‘policy expertise’, before becoming full members of 
a legislative committee able to fully exercise formal powers (Arter 2008). Studies (Arter 1990) have, 
also, suggested that informal contacts between the committee and outside groups, such as civil 
servants, have developed, with time, beyond the formal rules of the legislative process. As a result of 
these informal contacts there has been an increase in the flow of information between the different 
actors in the legislative system of Sweden, increasing the committee’s overall ability to scrutinize and 
amend legislative proposals (Arter 1990). 
Similar practices to this are, also, observed outside of Northern Europe in, for example, the important 
committee systems of Italy. Within the Italian systems junior members have commonly been placed 
on ‘technical committees’ in order to build up experience before moving to ‘political committees’ 
when they become ‘senior’, and more effective legislative actors (Della Sala 1993: 177). This again 
highlights that it is not simply the formal powers which drive a committee’s influence but, also, 
identifies that informal resources help to establish influence in these empirical examples. 
Within the EP, all committees are formally equal under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) 
since 2009. A disparity of rules, which has previously been the focus of studies of legislative 
influence in the EP (Tsebelis 1994, 1995, 1997, Garrett 1995, Moser 1996, Tsebelis & Garrett 1997a, 
2000, 2001, Garrett & Tsebelis 1997, Scully 1997a, 1997b), can, therefore, be clearly ruled out as a 
potential source of influence in the case of the Parliament. All EP committees have veto powers over 
legislation and, in all but some limited cases, have the right to propose legislative amendments. As 
noted above, however, committees such as the ENVI and BUDG have both been seen as more 
influential than other committees for a range of reasons surrounding the different sources of influence 
upon which they could draw. Beyond the very limited areas where consultation still applies (as 
outlined in chapter 1), no disparity between the legislative rules exists. It is, therefore, unlikely that 
adopting any perspective that only focuses upon the formal powers, as has been done in past studies 
on US congressional committees (Krehbiel et al 1987, Shepsle & Weingast 1987, Weingast 1989), 
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would be of use in elucidating answers to the research question. A committee’s influence is best 
defined as resulting from the different resources it can utilise to be influential (Dahl 1957). To claim, 
however, that solely having a formal power (which previously has been the main focus of literature as 
a source of committee influence) to do something, such as setting the agenda, equates to influence 
would be incorrect, an actor must have the resources to turn a potential to be ‘influential’ into 
practice. It is the sources of influence which a committee draws upon which turn the formal potential 
to be influential into reality. 
Studies, largely based on the US congressional committee system, have identified three different 
perspectives to account for the origins of committee influence, namely the ‘Distributive’ (Shepsle & 
Weingast 1981, Baron & Ferejohn 1989), the ‘Informational’ (Gilligan & Krehbiel 1989, 1990, 
Krehbiel 1991) and the ‘Partisan’ (Cox & McCubbins 2007a, 2007b). The ‘distributive’ committee 
model can be disregarded from the present study as it focuses on formal rules, which do not 
essentially differ between EP committees, and strong electoral links between elected officials and 
their constituents that are generally considered weak in the EP (Yoshinaka et al 2010). 
2.4.1 Informational 
The Informational perspective (Gilligan & Krehbiel 1989, 1990, Krehbiel 1991, 2004) proposes that 
committee influence depends upon the level of pertinent remit related information
43
 contained within 
a committee. However, importantly, information by its very nature is not symmetrical or ever 
‘complete’44 for all actors but asymmetrical: no two actors will have the same level of information on 
the same policy issue (Gilligan & Krehbiel 1989, 1990, Krehbiel 1991). Committees will inevitably 
be asymmetrical in their legislative influence over policy outcomes, in part, as information is 
asymmetrical and a committee’s influence will be defined, under the informational perspective, by the 
level of information it has acquired. Consequently, committees that have specialist knowledge and 
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 Information which is relevant to the policy making progress; this may involve information on technical 
aspects of policy making or information on political preference towards different proposals. 
44
 All actors knowing what all others actors know and knowing how all other actors will act. While some 
(Tsebelis & Garrett 1996) have suggested that information between actors is complete, this thesis does not adopt 
that viewpoint but accepts that all actors do not know 100% of what all other actors know and have ‘incomplete 
information’. 
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information that other legislators do not have will have a bargaining advantage. A committee will, 
therefore, attempt
45
 to use the knowledge it has acquired strategically to increase its influence over 
legislative outcome (Krehbiel 1991, 2004). The success or failure may, however, depend on the 
relative number of members experienced enough to use the information successfully (turn potential 
into practice). 
The informational perspective is strongly related to the concept of the specialization of a committee’s 
membership and the ability of that membership to collect and utilise pertinent expert information. 
Under the informational model, in order to deal with the need to create specialist legislative policy 
proposals, committees are designed to facilitate data collection and the dissemination of information 
by its members with the object of increasing legislative efficiency (Krehbiel 1991, Costello & 
Thomson 2010). Uncertainty inevitably exists within policy-making and no actor can guarantee the 
position they support will successfully address the policy issues at hand. Members by acquiring 
specialization can reduce uncertainty and seemingly propose better solutions avoiding unforeseen 
costs that no member wishes to incur (Krehbiel 1991: 66-67). While it has been identified that actors 
within committees are encouraged to gain information, there has been a focus on studying how actors 
who have this information can use it strategically (Krehbiel 2004). In order for the informational 
levels of its members to be increased, committees are set up in such a way, within the institutional 
systems that create them, to incentivise members to gain expert and specialist information of their 
respective policy areas by keeping the costs to do so low (Krehbiel 1991, Kaeding 2004). 
A selected number of studies, largely within US state legislators and Congress (Feller et al 1979, 
Sabatier & Whitman 1985, Gilligan & Krehbiel 1989, 1990, Krehbiel 1991) but, also, within some EP 
examples (Bowler & Farrell 1995, McElroy 2006), have attempted to elucidate what specialization 
and expertise actually entails, but as of yet a clear definition remains elusive. According to Krehbiel 
(1991: 67), information, which creates specialization with its progressive acquisition by members, can 
take the form of ‘political’ or ‘policy’ (the term ‘technical’ has, also, been used in place of ‘policy’) 
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 Success is never guaranteed in real world circumstances for many reasons such as an actor may end up not 
taking full advantage of the information they have. 
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information. ‘Political’ information is described as an actor acquiring knowledge on the political 
process and the decision making [political preferences] of other actors. ‘Policy/technical’ information 
involves actors understanding ‘what policies result in a desired outcome’ (Krehbiel 1991: 67), or as it 
could be described, developing a deeper understanding of the technical implications of policy impact. 
While some work has been conducted to create a definition between types of expertise, within the US 
and EP contexts (Feller et al 1979, Sabatier & Whitman 1985, Krehbiel 1991, Bowler & Farrell 1995, 
McElroy 2006, Whitaker 2011), a greater degree of academic clarity is needed which this thesis aims 
to provide. What Krehbiel (1991) and others (Feller et al 1975, Sabatier & Whitman 1985) term as 
‘political’ and ‘technical’, this thesis conceptualises as ‘policy making expertise’ (political) and 
‘professional expertise’ (technical). This study builds upon and expands the concepts proposed by 
Krehbiel (1991). 
‘Policy making expertise’ is the collection of information as a result of the political experience that 
members acquire through the process of making policy. With the acquisition of ‘policy making 
expertise’ over time, committee members seek to reduce the uncertainty of policy making. It is this 
desire to reduce the risks of the ‘unknown implications of policy’, which drives the necessity of 
members to gain specialist knowledge (Krehbiel 1991). Learning from past experience what 
legislation could be passed in a system and what would be unacceptable to the other legislative actors 
who have formal veto or amendment rights, enables members to develop an ‘institutional memory’ 
which benefits the overall influence of the committee they serve (Krehbiel 1991). This process of 
institutional learning, and understanding the limitations of different political policy options as a result 
of generated ‘policy making expertise’ will only occur over time with greater institutional experience 
and the development of institutional relationships. When members who have built up policy making 
experience and institutional memory leave a committee, normally via the natural turnover of elections, 
the years of policy experience they have accumulated are lost from the committee (Krehbiel 1991, 
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Mattson & Strøm 2006, Costello & Thomson 2010), and as a result ‘policy making expertise’ is 
perceived as adversely influenced by membership turnover.
46
 
‘Policy making expertise’ can only be gained if membership is stable; in other words when members 
spend extended periods on the same policy committee or policy area with low turnover so as to build 
policy information and ‘policy making expertise’ (Mattson & Strøm 2006). If committee turnover is 
high, this is perceived as having an adverse effect on committee influence with a concomitant loss of 
experienced members who retained the committee’s ‘policy making expertise’ (Mamadouh & Raunio 
2003). For this reason, some (e.g. Daniel 2013: 836) have asserted seniority (as a collection of ‘policy 
making experience’) as lending a committee greater influence over legislative outcomes. The greater 
the resources of information a committee has, the greater deference the plenary will grant it due to the 
better policy alternative it can propose with specialist knowledge (Costello & Thomson 2010). The 
current convention maintains that with a high turnover, a committee will undergo a reduction in its 
‘policy making expertise’ and, as a result, be a weakened legislative actor (see Brady 1978, Weingast 
& Marshall 1988, Krehbiel 1991 on the US Congress; Scarrow 1997, Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, 
Benedetto 2005, Daniel 2013 on the European Parliament; Shaw 1998, Mattson & Strøm 2006 on the 
comparative perspectives). The seemingly adverse effect of turnover has been cited in the context of 
the European Parliament; however, the assertions made by these studies have lacked significant 
empirical evidence to support it. While historically turnover in the European Parliament has been 
significantly high (Westlake 1994, Scarrow 1997), recent studies have indicated a trend towards 
higher rates of membership retention, which have, in turn, been associated with the growing influence 
of EP committees and a maturing of the Parliament overall (Whitaker 2011, 2014). 
The impact of turnover on the committee system of the EP has been discussed in the context of 
previous (before the 7
th
 term) legislative terms by Whitaker (2011), who examined its potential role 
with data sets starting in 1979 and continuing to the end of the 6
th
 legislative term in 2009. It is 
important to briefly discuss this empirical work, as it potentially allows for comparisons over time 
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 It is possible that some experience is retained within the committee staff, something which is, also, tested 
within empirical chapters. 
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between the Whitaker study and data collect in this study for the 7
th
 legislative term. Whitaker (2011: 
48-49) found that as the Parliament established its self, the general trend of committee membership 
turnover declined over the 30-year time period between 1979 and 2009, and committee incumbency 
increased. Some variations were noted with committees such as Agriculture (AGRI) undergoing a 
lower than average turnover due to members seeking to establish themselves on that committee 
related to a higher salience of the issue to their particular home-state. According to Whitaker (2011: 
39) this trend is consistent with the institutionalization of the committee system. As the Parliament 
and in particular its committees have increased their powers, members that have gained experience of 
these powers have tended to be maintained on committees leading to membership becoming more 
stable over time. The data generated by Whitaker (2011) would indeed indicate that there had been a 
potential link between both influence and turnover in the EP before the 7
th
 term. By highlighting this 
data, it allows for a more forensic consideration of the causal relationship between influence and 
turnover in the context of this studies in-depth examination of turnover in the 7
th
 term. 
From the literature reviewed, it can be safely assumed that committees will gain influence in 
proportion to the degrees of ‘policy making expertise’ and specialist knowledge possessed by their 
respective members, and with this collective knowledge they will be able to achieve greater levels of 
bargaining success (Gilligan & Krehbiel 1989, 1990, Krehbiel 1991, Bowler & Farrell 1995, 
Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, Costello & Thomson 2010). However, as has been discussed, information 
is not spread evenly and high committee turnover of members reduces collective ‘policy making 
expertise’ and, as a result, committee influence can be adversely affected (Mamadouh & Raunio 
2003). Thus, under the informational model all committees do not have the same levels of ‘policy 
making expertise’ as a result of the different relative levels of committee turnover (Krehbiel 1991). If 
the informational model does accurately reflect the origins of committee influence, then the higher the 
level of ‘policy making expertise’ within a committee, the greater the influence of that committee. The 
following, therefore, can be hypothesised: 
H1. A committee with high membership turnover will have a weakened level of legislative influence. 
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Elements of the concept of ‘policy making expertise’ have, however, often been confused with what 
could be better termed as ‘professional expertise’, which results from a committee member’s previous 
professional training or background. As well as focusing on different elements of expertise, 
‘professional expertise’ is not affected by the same factors as ‘policy making expertise’, such as 
turnover, and this creates different potential patterns of committee influence, which can be tested.   
‘Professional expertise’ can be understood as the knowledge and technical specialization which 
members have from a former professional or training background, obtained prior to joining a 
legislative committee. This specialization will inform actors of different technical policy options 
(Feller et al 1975, Sabatier & Whitman 1985) which would not be apparent to non-specialist actors 
who have to rely on internal institutional sources of information or possibly information from 
lobbying groups (Chalmers 2013). Actors who possess a professional and, or, an educational 
background,
47
 linked to the remit of the committee of which they are a member, will often have their 
own informational network of contacts in order to collect information not accessible to others, and to 
further extend their ability to propose and develop policy and amendment options. Actors will 
generally be attracted to the policy areas with which they have previous professional experience 
(Krehbiel 1991). For example, committees dealing with agricultural policy will generally attract 
members with a professional agricultural background and some technical knowledge of the area 
(Krehbiel 2004). This professional attraction of members to certain committees has been 
demonstrated in the EP (Yordanova 2009b, Whitaker 2011).
48
 
Beyond work on epistemic communities which cites its potential importance to policy making (Hass 
1992, Radaelli 1999), a limited number of studies have attempted to assess the general role of 
‘professional expertise’ on EP committees (Yordanova 2009b, Whitaker 2011, Daniel 2013). 
‘Professional expertise’ has been shown to be a major factor in a committee’s selection of rapporteur 
positions (Yordanova 2009b, Daniel 2013). The rationale behind the correlation of rapporteur 
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 An example would be an ENVI committee member who has a PhD in chemical engineering. 
48
 ‘Clearly, relevant expertise and experience count for much in the EP’s committee system’ (Whitaker 2011: 
127). 
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positions selection and ‘professional expertise’ has been associated with the level of informational 
expertise (specialization) a member would bring to the rapporteur position (Yordanova 2009a, 
2009b).
49
 Daniel (2013: 834), in particular, postulated that a committee member’s aptitude could be 
assessed by examining their educational and professional history.
50
 The greater the collective 
professional aptitude (technical expertise) of a committee the more influence it will have, if, indeed, 
‘professional expertise’ is a source of committee influence as has been suggested (Yordanova 2009a, 
2009b, Whitaker 2011, Daniel 2013). The professional networks that a member has developed can be 
advantageous for acquiring significant levels of information but, also, a technical understanding of a 
policy proposal would put this individual at a distinct advantage to someone lacking such expertise. 
While turnover will inevitably result in members with ‘professional expertise’ leaving their relevant 
committees, new members with appropriate backgrounds are generally attracted to such committees, 
bringing their own directly related professional experience, and consequently replacing any 
aggregated loss (Yordanova 2009b
51
). Thus a committee that is already evident as attracting a 
membership with ‘professional expertise’ will continue to attract similar expertise to fulfil its remit. 
This has been demonstrated empirically and is assumed as true within this study (Yordanova 2009b). 
Consequently, there should be no major professional or technical loss in expertise within a committee, 
only any accompanying institutional memory and ‘policy making expertise’ will be lost as a result of 
membership turnover. ‘Policy making expertise’ and ‘professional expertise’, however, are not 
mutually exclusive concepts; while being different, there is no reason why a member of the committee 
could not possess both. 
Different dynamics may determine to what extent a committee could utilise each as a source of 
influence. ‘Policy making expertise’ is significantly affected and seemingly undermined by turnover 
(Scarrow 1997, Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, Benedetto 2005, Daniel 2013), ‘professional expertise’ 
                                                          
49
 Especially, according to Yordanova (2009a), on committees where informational resources and understanding 
are seen as key to the committee’s overall influence. 
50
 Committees will, in theory, select a rapporteur based on their ability to maximise committee influence as a 
result of the skills they have.  
51
 Yordanova (2009a) and Whitaker (2011) demonstrates that ‘professional expertise’ is often a major driving 
force in assignment to an EP committee. 
73 
 
should, however, be present at similar levels, with slight variations, within a committee over time, 
according to the best current evidence supplied by Yordanova (2009a). Levels of ‘professional 
expertise’ are, however, affected by the aggregate levels of relevant professional and educational 
qualifications of its members. ‘Professional expertise’ is therefore quantifiable by an examination 
(when available) of the members’ professional/educational backgrounds. A lack of professional 
expertise will undermine any committee’s ability to influence outcomes. A committee lacking in the 
ability to scrutinize and propose alternative workable solutions will have a weaker legislative 
influence as result. A second hypothesis can, therefore, be formulated:  
H2: A committee with low levels of professional expertise will have low levels of influence. 
2.4.2 Committee Unity 
The partisan perspective focuses upon the role of party politics as an important facet of committee 
influence. The role of parties and their effect on committees has been a significant area of study most 
notably as proposed by Cox & McCubbins (2007a, 2007b) in the context of the American Congress. 
The classical view of the political parties’ effect upon committees had been that party and committee 
cannot both be powerful at the same time within a legislative parliamentary system, as one would look 
to have dominance at the expense of the other, often seeing it as a zero sum game over who does hold 
the executive to account (or does not as the politics may dictate) (Lees & Shaw 1979, Weingast & 
Marshall 1988). However, the partisan perspective, which does view members of committees as 
agents of their parties, refutes the argument that for one to be strong, the other has to be weak 
(Deering & Smith 1997, Cox & McCubbins 2007b). This ‘partisan perspective’ suggests that it is the 
parties that define the influence of the committees by controlling the selection of key committee 
positions, empowering the policy committees in which they are most interested. In addition, a party 
could, in theory, insert loyal party personnel on to committees they perceive as important (Yordanova 
2009a). Parties can, also, act in unity in opposition against the executive to influence outcomes
52
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 As the EP does not contain a governing party, such as would exist within a national parliament, all parties 
may potentially unite against the Council, or Commission.   
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(Kreppel 1999), something highly relevant within the EP due to the multi-party system which it 
operates.
53
 
Within the general partisan perspective the links between party and committee members are strong to 
the point that committee recommendations can be, and often are, constrained by political party 
leaderships (Deering & Smith 1997). Therefore, the partisan perspective can explain why the 
influence of some committees can be curtailed in a particular system. Many of the studies that have 
adopted a partisan perspective have drawn significant attention to the disproportionate influence of 
rapporteurs from large party groupings (Benedetto 2005). Follesdal & Hix (2006) suggest that as the 
EP has grown so, indeed, has the power of the partisan political parties to influence policy outcomes. 
It has, in fact, been postulated that as the committees have evolved in influence over time the control 
that the parties have over the committees, and the resources required to influence legislative 
outcomes, has expanded dramatically (Follesdal & Hix 2006). Parties do have a significant impact on 
the allocation of rapporteurs and chair allocation, and, therefore, control key positions and resources. 
Studies such as those of Benedetto (2005) and Høyland (2006) have examined the reasons for 
rapporteur selections and their impact on legislative influence. Both gauge the importance of 
rapporteurs to the legislative systems, with Benedetto (2005) going as far as to label rapporteurs as 
‘legislative entrepreneurs’. Both Benedetto (2005) and Høyland (2006) suggest that there is a clear 
correlation between the number of reports a MEP will receive (becoming a rapporteur) and the party
54
 
to which they belong. The importance of key committee positions must be taken into account for their 
effect on the legislative process. As noted above, it is possible that parties identify and target 
committees that are most closely associated with areas that they deem as important in order to 
influence policy towards their preferred outcomes (Yordanova 2009a, 2011). It is, however, more 
likely that those partisan groups on committee define legislative influence by their ability to work 
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 To avoid any confusion, what is being observed is the unity between party groupings on a committee rather 
than the internal unity of individual party grouping. While it is assumed some dissent may often be present, EP 
partisan groups have classically been seen as mostly cohesive actors (Hix et al 2005). Any examples of disunity 
internal to individual party groups would be an interesting result even if it is not the main focus of study. 
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 Both, also, highlight the importance of the nation state, i.e. members from the big member states are more 
likely to gain reports. This does not deeply factor in this study, but it is important to acknowledge all elements 
which have driven selection that are known. 
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together, across party lines, to unite committee members, regardless of political group affiliation, 
behind a single committee legislative position, creating broad ‘committee unity’  (Kreppel 1999, 
2002b). 
The level of unity displayed between party groupings on a committee has been suggested as a 
significant factor in the success of a committee to influence legislative outcomes (Kreppel 1999, 
2002b, Nugent 2010, Hagemann & Høyland 2010, Costello & Thomson 2013, Burns 2013b). A 
committee will have greater influence if its members present a united front to other actors, most 
notably the Council (Kreppel 1999: 533). When unity is absent, the committee is less likely to have its 
amendment positions reflected within the final legislative outcome (Kreppel 2002b, Costello & 
Thomson 2013). When a committee is able to present a united front it can claim to represent the only 
negotiating position that the EP will accept and as a result it maximises its influence in negotiations 
with the Council (Kreppel 1999, Costello & Thomson 2013). Therefore, the level of unity can 
establish a committee as influential as it directly assists the committee’s overall bargaining power. 
Committee unity, the concept that committee members across the partisan divides could unify on a 
single legislative position, has often been previously overlooked when assessing legislative influence 
in parliamentary systems according to Kreppel (2002b). A number of studies (Bowler & Farrell 1995, 
Kreppel 1999, 2000, 2002b, Nugent 2010, Hagemann & Høyland 2010, Costello & Thomson 2013, 
Burns 2013b), with varying degrees of empirical support, have highlighted the possible impact of 
‘committee unity’ on committee influence. Research on the powers of the EP, as a whole, observed 
that the Parliament, while still establishing itself during earlier terms, acted in unity to increase its 
overall legislative powers (Tsebelis 1994) but, as it was never guaranteed, it had to manufacture this 
unity (Bowler & Farrell 1995). Thus, different party groups must actively work with each other 
towards unity rather than it being a natural state of affairs within the EP. 
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Table 2-1 Party Groupings of the European Parliament 7th Term (2009–2014) 
European Parliament Grouping Political Ideology MEPs 7
th
 Term (2009-
2014) 
Group of the European People’s 
Party (EPP) 
Christian Democrat 274 
Group of the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats in the European 
Parliament (S&D) 
Social Democrat 195 
Group of the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe (ALDE) 
Liberalism/Centralist 85 
Group of the Greens /European 
Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) 
Green/Regionalist 58 
European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group (ECR) 
Conservative/Euro-sceptic 56 
Confederal Group of the 
European United Left/Nordic 
Green Left (GUE/NGL) 
Socialist/Communist 35 
Europe of Freedom and 
Democracy Group (EFD) 
Populist Right/Euro-sceptic 33 
Non-Attached Members (NI) N/A  30 
Source: European Parliament Website 2014 
Table 2-1 show that party breakdown of the EP during the timeframe of this study. The EP in the 7th 
term (2009–2014) was made up of 7 different party groupings with diverse political ideologies. The 
different parties are represented in all committees based upon their relative size within the EP plenary. 
Party groups have formed into increasingly cohesive and competitive (between different groupings) 
actors as the EP has developed (Hix et al 2005). With an increased cohesive nature the interactions of 
partisan groupings has merited significant attention over when, and if, coalitions form or if 
competition prevails. The range of ideologies in the EP represented on committees covers a wide 
political spectrum (Table 2-1), possibly more than in many domestic European parliaments. Previous 
research has shown that coalitions do form around ideological lines over the left – right spectrum 
(Kreppel & Tsebelis 1999). While coalitions form and party groups work together on a regular basis, 
the formation of coalitions between groups is not consistent and has been seen as fluctuating 
depending upon the policy issue at stake (Kreppel & Tsebelis 1999). Debate has surrounded the level 
of cohesion between party groups, with some (Hix et al 2005) asserting that greater politicization is 
taking place as the EP gains enhanced legislative powers. Evidence indicates that the rate of coalition 
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forming depends upon the policy area (or to be more exact the committee) at stake during the 7
th
 term 
(Hix & Høyland 2013). During the 7
th
 term, while it has been suggested that partisanship has grown 
on some committees, in other committees, grand coalition forming between the groupings has actually 
increased in frequency (CEPS 2012). 
A significant correlation has been established, empirically, between the amendment success and unity 
between parties on committee in the EP (Kreppel 1999). Amendments, coming from the Parliament, 
are adopted more often by the Council when unity has been achieved within committees and the EP 
plenary. Using committee unity as a unit of analysis had been seen as problematic in previous 
quantitative studies as voting data on individual amendments in committee has not always been 
available (Kasack 2004). While a link has been suggested between the internal ‘unity’ of a 
committee’s membership and its relative legislative success (Kreppel 1999), greater empirical 
evidence is required in order to verify this claim. ‘Committee unity’ has been suggested as differing 
notably between EP committees during the 7
th
 term (CEPS 2012) with some potentially displaying 
consistently more or less unity between the party groups represented. It is therefore appropriate to 
propose a third hypothesis to be tested within the case study chapters: 
H3. The lower the degree of unity on committee, the lower the level of influence. 
2.4.3 Policy Output 
The final perspective that has been identified from the literature as a potential source of committee 
influence is that of ‘public policy output’. It has been postulated that some committees have greater 
influence than others simply because of the policy field in which they are working (Kreppel 1999, 
Burns 2005a).
55
 For instance, Shackleton (2000: 337) argues that ‘outcomes are issue-specific: some 
are more likely to lead to the Parliament having [more of] an influence than others’. According to 
Judge and Earnshaw (2003), different policy types do create ‘different patterns of decision making’ 
which affect the influence of different actors. 
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 ‘The EP may simply have more influence in some areas of legislation than others, even holding legislative 
procedure constant. It may be that certain areas are more likely to be influenced by the EP because they are 
viewed as less important or more effectively dealt with at the supranational level’ (Kreppel 1999: 524). 
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Individual committees have often been classified according to the types of output they create (Lowi 
1964, 1972). According to Lowi (1964) ‘policy affects politics’. The type of policy choice that a 
committee makes will affect the political systems that are in operation. With different political 
motivations the type of policy output will be different between committees. Lowi (1964, 1972) has 
proposed that there are four different public policy types that affect the influence of an actor 
(committee) when attempting to create legislation. Of the four policy types that have been proposed 
by Lowi (1972) the most important to this study are the ‘distributive’ and ‘regulatory’ policy types, 
while the other two policy types, ‘constituent’ and ‘redistributive’ policy types are much less relevant. 
The reason for this is that ‘constituent’ policy deals with the setting up of new agencies and is dealt 
with at intergovernmental conferences (Burns 2005b). The Parliament does have some minor 
involvement in intergovernmental conferences but it is limited, and the EP committees play no role 
and, therefore, these processes are not relevant to the present study. With respect to redistributive 
policy this would largely be defined by the ability to tax one actor and redistribute the gains to other 
actors. Tax policies as well as other types of redistributive policy remain closely controlled by the 
member states and the committee’s formal role in policy areas which would deal with them are very 
much limited (Burns 2005b). However, it is important to note there is some overlap between 
distributive and redistributive policy, and that some redistributive policy proposals will be produced 
by the committees. 
Lowi (1972) divides different types of policies by the level of coercion a policy will generate on one 
level to force an actor to follow the policy, and on a second level the sanctions which may be adopted 
to change a group or an individual’s behaviour. Regulatory policies do involve a high level of 
coercion towards a group or individual (Dodds 2013). As proposed in their simplest form, they are 
legislative constraints to stop procedures or actions deemed bad practice and promote other more 
appropriate activities (Lowi 1964, 1972). Understanding the impact of different types of policy in 
their implementation is not relevant for the present study, but rather, what is important is discussing 
the effect the process of creating different policy appears to have on the legislative influence of 
committees. Indeed, no actor is able to foretell the complete implications of the policy they wish to 
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produce and understanding the practical impact of policy is not the objective of this study. 
Importantly, the application of regulatory policy can inflict both costs and benefits on different actors 
(Wilson 1984). An example of a regulatory policy would be the plastic bags directive
56
 that sought to 
regulate the consumption of plastic bags within Europe. Distributive policies are different from 
regulatory policies in both their focus and means of changing behaviour. Distributive policies assign 
resources to a specific group or area (Dodds 2013). Legislators will decide, often based on their 
political preferences, which identifiable groups will benefit by the allocation of resources, generally 
funding. A practical example of a distributive policy in the European context would be the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) where resources from member states’ contributions are directed towards a 
specific group. 
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 ‘Amending Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste to Reduce the Consumptions of Lightweight Plastic 
Carrier Bags (2013/0371(COD))’ 
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Table 2-2 Classification of different committee driven policy outputs and levels of power pre-Lisbon Treaty  
 ‘More Powerful Committees’ ‘Less Powerful Committees’ 
‘Information- driven 
committees with predominantly 
regulatory outputs’ 
 Budget (BUDG) 
 Transport and Tourism 
(Tran) 
 Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection 
 Legal Affairs 
 Foreign Affairs (AFET) 
 Development (DEVE) 
 International Trade 
(INTA) 
 Budgetary Control 
(CONT) 
 Constitutional Affairs 
(AFCO) 
 Petitions (PETI) 
‘Interest-driven committees 
with predominantly distributive 
outputs’ 
 Employment and Social 
Affairs (EMPL) 
 Agriculture (AGRI) 
 Fisheries (PECH) 
 Regional Development 
(REGI) 
‘Mixed Committees’  Economic and 
Monetary Affairs 
(ECON) 
 Environment, Public 
Health and Food Safety 
(ENVI) 
 Industry, Research and 
Energy (ITRE) 
 Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs 
(LIBE) 
 Culture and Education 
(CULT) 
 Women’s Rights and 
Gender Equality 
Source:  Yordanova 2009a: 256. 
According to Yordanova (2009a: 256) (figure 2-4) some committees such as the ENVI committee can 
be classed as ‘mixed’ in terms of their policy output. ‘Mixed’ committees, depending on the policy 
being discussed, are both ‘information-driven’ and at times ‘interest-driven’ (Yordanova 2009a). 
Furthermore, as a result of this mix in driving forces the policy output of some committees can be 
both regulatory and distributive in nature depending on the policy being dealt with. Some committees 
may deal with each type at somewhat equal levels but it is highly possible that ‘mixed’ committees 
will deal with one policy type more than another. This is significant for a number of reasons, as 
according to Yordanova (2009a) policy type does affect committee assignments and possible 
influence. 
Lowi (1964) and others in the context of the EP (Judge et al 1994, Shackleton 2000, Burns 2005b, 
Yordanova 2009a) state that the type of public policy that an actor attempts to produce as a legislative 
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output is a determining factor of that actor’s influence. This can be seen in the example of the ENVI 
committee. Judge et al (1994) has stated that the ENVI committee, in large part, is in fact dealing with 
regulatory policy. As a result of this focus on a regulatory output, Judge et al (1994) believe that the 
committee is more influential. They assert that, through the use of regulatory policy, the ENVI 
committee exerts influence because, although the costs of the regulation are concentrated on a 
targeted actor, the benefits are transparent and dispersed between numbers of different actors. While 
the original assessment of Judge et al (1994) lacked for supporting empirical data, the assertion that 
‘policy type’ affects influence has been reported in other literature (Burns 2005b) as a potential source 
of committee influence. 
From the evidence supplied by Yordanova (2009a) it would appear that committees can be divided by 
the outputs that they produce. As a consequence of the different circumstances that drive the different 
policy outputs identified, it would be intuitive to suggest that there would be asymmetry in influence 
between distributive and regulatory committees. Indeed, there are some indications that this is the 
situation for the committees of the EP. Burns (2005b), while focusing largely on the costs and benefits 
of different legislative decisions, has suggested that the Parliament via its committees does have 
greater influence in the field of regulatory policy than in the area of distributive policy. The rationale 
behind this is that the EU member states have been comparatively less willing to allow supranational 
institutions input as to how their contributions are allocated and how taxes are spent. They have, 
however, been willing to let supranational bodies work on their behalf when creating regulatory 
policy which focuses costs on industrial, rather than state actors (Shackleton 2000, Burns 2005b). 
Regulatory committees will face less resistance from the Council and have greater remit to attempt to 
influence policy towards their own preferences. Committees wishing to produce more distributive 
policy would appear to be significantly more likely to encounter resistance from the Member States. 
From the evidence available it is, therefore, possible to hypothesise that: 
H4. Committees with distributive policy outputs will exercise lower levels of influence over legislation 
than committees with regulatory policy outputs. 
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2.5 Summary 
Based upon strands of literature derived particularly from the committee system of the US Congress 
but, also, from other pertinent committee systems, four hypotheses have been formulated. A number 
of different assumptions have been made about committee influence, where it comes from, and how 
an individual, or mix of sources, may establish an EP committee as having evidential legislative 
influence. Within the next three chapters each of the hypotheses will be tested sequentially against the 
data collected from interview and document sources pertaining to each of the three case studies. This 
chapter have put together an analytical framework for the study of legislative committee influence, 
which considers influence as a result of the confluence of a number of factors rather than related to 
one single factor (source). Within the EP, despite the prevailing procedural equality of the OLP since 
Lisbon, a number of committees have been identified as having a disproportionate amount of 
influence over legislature compared with their counterparts. Consequently, it is appropriate that a 
number of salient case studies of perceived influential EP committees be examined,
57
 with the aim of 
further understanding and identifying the different possible sources of legislative influences manifest 
within committees. 
                                                          
57
 As noted above each cases selected within this thesis is seen as maintaining an equally and concordant high 
level of legislative influence. 
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Chapter Three Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food 
Safety 
3.1 Introduction 
A committee that is widely acknowledged as having significant levels of influence over legislation, 
and according to some, one of the highest levels of legislative influence in the Parliament (Burns 
2005a, Judge & Earnshaw 2011), is the ‘Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food 
Safety’ or ‘ENVI’ committee. Previously the high influence of the ENVI committee has been 
attributed to a significant level of ‘expertise’ and ‘political understanding’ contained within the 
committee (Bowler & Farrell 1995, Weale et al 2005, Lenschow 2012). However, this opinion is not 
universally shared as some question the actual use of ‘expertise’ on the committee, as a source of 
influence (McCormick 2001). This chapter will test some of these previous claims, with an aim to 
further understanding of the potential sources of committee influence. 
This chapter, therefore, in the first instance comprehensively reviews the literature on the origins, 
development, and current remit of the ENVI committee, and from where its potential sources of 
influence may derive. Thereafter, previous claims involving sources of influence will be tested, along 
with the hypotheses as outlined in the theoretical framework, with original empirical data, in order to 
understand how the ENVI committee has, in reality, established its influence. The empirical findings 
question many perceptions held over the sources of ENVI committee influence, in particular the 
current understanding of expertise, unity, and the ‘negative’ effects of membership turnover. 
3.2 ENVI Committee Outline 
The ENVI committee has a particularly wide and prominent policy remit and has been perceived in a 
wide range of studies as constituting a highly prestigious committee with significant legislative 
influence (Kaeding 2005, Weale et al 2005, Burns 2005a, Corbett et al 2007, Hurka 2013).
58
 Indeed, 
members, themselves, believe it to be ‘one of the most influential committees’.59 In terms of 
workload it has been one of the most active legislative committees in the EP (Lenschow 2012). The 
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 The formal powers and responsibilities of the ENVI committee can be found in appendix IV 
59
 Interview with ‘Group Coordinator’ Member of the ENVI Committee. 7/1/15 SKYPE Interview 
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ENVI committee throughout the EP’s development has, to a large extent, attempted to emulate the 
comparative European example of the highly powerful and prestigious Bundestag committees (Weale 
et al 2005). By the end of the 7
th
 Parliament (2009 – 2014) the committee had processed 221 
procedures, 78 of which were co-decision acts falling under the OLP. By way of contrast the total 
number of legislative proposals the committee system of the EP dealt with between 2009 and 2014 
(7
th
 term) was 629 legislative files. It is due to this legislative workload and wide policy remit that 
Burns (2005a: 89) has suggested that the ENVI is the ‘most powerful’ EP committee. Numerically the 
ENVI committee was the most active legislative committee during the term; it handled 12.4% of the 
total co-decision reports in Parliament (ENVI Activity Report 2014). This percentage is, however, 
less than that processed by the committee during the 6
th
 term. This is as a consequence of the 
introduction of the OLP in to other EP committee policy areas, which has resulted in a larger spread 
of co-decision reports, with more committees reaching the same level of legislative involvement as 
the ENVI committee (ENVI Activity Report 2014). In total some 24,761 amendments were tabled and 
voted upon by the committee during the 7
th
 term (ENVI Activity Report 2014).
60
 
Historically, the EP and its members have had a special interest in the area of environmental policy. 
The ENVI committee has been assessed as participating significantly, being an active advocate, and 
comparatively more assertive compared with other committees, in the policy areas under its remit 
(Westlake 1994, Burns 2005a). Starting in the earliest days of the EP, as one of the smallest 
committees in terms of members (Bowler & Farrell 1995), at the end of the 7
th
 parliamentary term the 
ENVI was the largest legislative committee in the Parliament having 71 members (with an equivalent 
number of substitutes) (ENVI Activity Report 2014).
61
 In context with the other EP committees, the 
non-legislative ‘Foreign Affairs committee’ (AFET) is larger (7th term) containing 78 members. The 
legislative committees closest to the ENVI in terms of membership were ‘Industry, Research and 
                                                          
60
 This number of amendments is the total number proposed within the committee, and not the number of 
amendments which were successfully adopted, and included in the final legislative output. Unfortunately, the 
ENVI committee does not provide this statistical information. 
61
 For the 8
th
 term (2014 – 2019) the membership numbers of the ENVI committee are down slightly to 69, this 
is a return to the number of members on committee before the accession of Croatia, which took place during the 
7
th
 term. 
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Energy’ (ITRE), with 60 members, and ‘Economic and Monetary Affairs’ (ECON), with 50 members 
(ENVI Activity Report 2014). The larger the number of members a committee has, or requires, the 
greater importance is attributed to that committee due to the resources that will be required to be 
mobilised to successfully fulfil its remit (Bowler & Farrell 1995). Consequently, the large 
complement of members reinforces the importance that is placed on the ENVI committee. 
While the ENVI committee has been acknowledged to have significant influence over environmental 
legislative output (Weale et al 2005), the mechanisms and sources it utilises to be influential are, 
however, subject to debate and the literature can be conflicting. The main assumption within the 
literature is that the ENVI committee’s influence stems from high levels of expertise and institutional 
memory (Bowler & Farrell 1995, Weale et al 2005, Lenschow 2012). This supposition, over the role 
of expertise as the main source of the ENVI committee’s significant influence, has been tested below. 
Before empirically testing this assumption, and others, an understanding of the processes under which 
the committee operates and the decisions it can make, or shape, is discussed. 
3.3 The Decision Making Process 
The Environment committee was created in 1979, in tandem with the EP becoming a directly elected 
body for the first time. The Environment committee is, therefore, one of the oldest and best 
established in the EP with seemingly a strong institutional memory, which has helped develop 
relationships with other legislative actors (Judge & Earnshaw 2003, Burns 2005a). The Single 
European Act (SEA) (1986) would formally codify the policy area (environment) with a constitutional 
basis subject to EU law (Judge 1993, Lenschow 2012). The ENVI committee’s importance had its 
watershed, however, once it acquired more extensive formal powers, which in turn further extended 
its informal powers as a result of its capability to develop institutional links (Judge 1992). This 
development finally culminated with the Maastricht treaty’s (1992) introduction of co-decision, which 
placed the ENVI committee formally as an equal legislative partner with the Council. 
The competencies of the ENVI committee are extensive, covering, unsurprisingly, the areas of EU 
environmental, public health and food safety standard policy. The committee has to oversee some 
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distinctively different policy areas, and as a consequence the sphere of activity of the committee is 
significantly larger than other comparative EP committees. The committee exists to scrutinize and 
amend policy proposals falling under its remit. These different areas require different informational 
skill sets and contain divergent expert policy solutions. Consequently, it is important to highlight the 
distinction between these different areas, as the dynamics of influence may be different when 
comparing public health policy making, against, for example, that of environmental policy. Each area 
would entail different policy considerations and solutions, and it is of significance that different 
committee members do specialise in particular areas, with some only involved in the areas of public 
health or food safety because that is where their particular area of interest, or ‘professional expertise’ 
lies (Hurka 2013). What is important, however, is that all legislative files dealt with by the ENVI 
committee in the 7
th
 term fall under the OLP. 
Under the OLP the ENVI committee has the right, codified in treaty law, to propose amendments at 
the three different reading stages of the legislative process, and finally it has a veto over legislative 
files at the end of the decision making process. Consequently, as full co-decision makers, a position 
coming from the Council cannot be forced upon the committee. The ENVI committee has clearly 
displayed its willingness to use this nuclear option and exercise its veto right, with the main example 
that of the vetoed ‘Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients Regulation’62 (Burns 2005b). Both of 
these formal legislative powers (amendment and veto rights) are highlighted as being significant in 
defining how influential a legislative committee is overall from a comparative context (Shepsle & 
Weingast 1987).
63
 Furthermore, the ENVI committee has had many more years of experience dealing 
with the co-decision powers it obtained after the Maastricht treaty (1992) than most committees, that 
only gained these powers during this study’s focus on the 7th term. As a result of these formal powers 
and a possibly entrenched institutional memory, the ENVI has developed its legislative expertise 
significantly over time. 
                                                          
62
 The regulation aimed “to introduce Community-wide safety assessment and notification procedures for the 
marketing of foods with no established history of use, genetically modified (GM) foods, or foods that had been 
produced by processes that had changed their composition or nutritional value” (Burns 2005b: 496).  
63
 This comparative perspective is drawn from studies of the US congressional committee system. 
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The ENVI committee has gone through an extensive developmental phase in acquiring legislative 
powers. As the committee has developed it has been granted new areas of responsibility, and as a 
consequence in some respects it has had to change to adapt (Burns 2005a). In 1994 its remit expanded 
to include the area of public health and consumer protection
64
, and in 1999 its sphere of activity was 
again expanded to include the area of food safety (Burns 2005a). A number of studies have identified 
the adoption of co-decision by the ENVI committee as a watershed moment (Judge & Earnshaw 1994, 
Burns & Carter 2010, Ripoll-Servent 2012). While it is clear where the committee is involved during 
the decision making process, its ability to influence legislative outcomes is an area of significant 
debate within a number of studies (Judge & Earnshaw 1994, Bowler & Farrell 1995, McCormick 
2001, Weale et al 2005, McElroy 2006, Burns & Carter 2010, Ripoll-Servent 2012, Hurka 2013). 
3.4 Informational Perspective 
The importance of expert specialization as a key source of ENVI committee influence over legislation 
has been an area of focus for a number of studies (Bowler & Farrell 1995, McCormick 2001, Hurka 
2013). A committee with high levels of specialist information will have a potentially significant 
ability to influence legislative outcomes (Krehbiel 1991). As discussed in the theory chapter, two 
types of expertise exist, ‘policy making expertise’ and ‘professional expertise’. Elements of both 
‘Policy making expertise’ and ‘professional expertise’, have been identified as potential sources of 
ENVI committee influence previously, however, a consensus has yet to be reached within the 
academic literature over how expertise does in practice, or if it does, establish ENVI influence. 
3.4.1 Policy Making Expertise 
The significance of ‘policy making expertise’ towards the ENVI committee’s influence has been a 
subject of debate (McCormick 2001, Weale et al 2005). A number of studies (Judge 1992, Judge et al 
1994, Bowler & Farrell 1995, McCormick 2001, Weale et al 2005, Burns 2005a, Corbett et al 2007) 
have attempted, previously, to pinpoint the rationale behind the ENVI committee’s legislative 
influence, and have often draw conclusions identifying many factors underlying this influence, which 
                                                          
64
 Consumer protection would, however, be removed from the ENVI committee’s competency and placed under 
the remit of the Committee on Internal Markets and Consumer protection, which was established in 2004 
(Whitaker 2011) 
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would fall under this thesis’ definition of ‘policy making expertise’. The committee, according to 
current literature, potentially as a result of containing members who have served for extended periods 
of time, and having developed an understanding of how the decision making process works, possesses 
extensive ‘policy making expertise’, and has been shown as able to exploit the decision making 
process at many different stages. 
Since its creation the committees of the EP have had the ability to draft non-binding ‘own-initiative 
reports’. ‘Own-initiative reports’ that are successfully adopted in committee and plenary will be 
passed onto the Commission (Burns 2005a). Weale et al (2005) states the important role which the 
Parliament’s generated ‘own-initiative’ expert reports have had on the ability of the ENVI committee 
to ‘pursue a proactive policy role in agenda setting’, reinforcing a similar observation found in an 
earlier study by Judge et al (1994: 32). It is important to emphasise that these reports do not formally 
compel the Commission to draft any legislation. The ability to propose legislation has been and 
remains the sole right of the Commission. The own-initiative reports have, however, been a useful 
political tool for committees to signal what they are more willing to accept in the event of legislation 
being proposed by the Commission, and thus further enhancing communication and understanding 
between the actors. Indeed it has been reported that a select number of directives were in fact based on 
reports that were drafted and presented by the committee to the Commission (Judge 1992). Also, in 
order to communicate its standpoint, beyond presenting a report to the Commission, the committee 
would often conduct hearings with external experts and invite the other institutions to attend. 
According to Burns (2005a) the ENVI committee became very skilled at using these meetings to 
highlight precise policy areas in which it wished the Commission to develop a proposal. 
Consequently, the ENVI committee has demonstrated significant ‘policy making’ acumen in 
attempting to informally shape policy proposals and setting the agenda as a result of developing an 
understanding over time of how these reports can be efficiently employed (Judge 1992). The ability to 
successfully draft an own-initiative report will, to a great extent, rely on the level of ‘policy making 
expertise’ which is contained within the committee. 
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The extent of the active engagement of the ENVI committee in influencing the early legislative 
process has, however, been questioned. According to McCormick (2001) the committee is less 
involved in policy formulation, which is the right of the Commission, but rather focuses more on 
amendment proposal which, also, relies on ‘policy making expertise’ (and to an extent professional 
expertise) in order to develop successful amendments. More satisfactory amendments will result from 
a committee that’s members understand what was politically acceptable to other legislative actors in 
past interactions (‘policy making expertise’), and what proposals would not be rejected in technical 
groups (‘technical expertise’). Due to this lack of participation by MEPs at the formulation stage of 
policy proposal their ability to influence policy is ‘marginal’ according to McCormick (2001). This, 
of course, is contrary to the position of Burns (2005a) who suggests that the ENVI committee has 
utilised, as this thesis would term it ‘policy making expertise’, to influence early policy proposal, 
developing strong links between the Commission and the committee. The ENVI committee has, 
indeed, been seen as a forerunner for the sort of informal policy interactions with the Commission and 
the Council that are now perceived as more common with the use of trialogue by other committees 
(Burns 2005a). Over subsequent years the Environment committee developed a close relationship 
with the Commission due, it has been reported, in part to the continued presence of long term 
members experienced in policy making (Corbett et al 2007). Informal negotiations between ENVI 
members and the Commission were perceived in previous legislative terms as the deciding factor in 
the committee’s ability to achieve outcomes closest to its policy preferences (Burns 2005a). When the 
Commission and the committee are in coordination, studies have shown that the committee is more 
likely to be successful (Kreppel 2003) in gaining preferred results. This highlights ‘policy making 
expertise’ as a particularly significant source of legislative influence. If ‘policy making expertise’ was 
lost as a result of high turnover of members, this would, supposedly, have a marked negative impact 
on the relationships with the Commission that are vital to the committee’s success. 
The impact that long-standing chairs, such as Ken Collins (79-84 and 89-99, see table 3-1), have had 
on the committee cannot be overemphasised. It is common practice in most EP committees to have a 
regular turnover of chairs (Corbett et al 2007) accompanying a reasonable general membership 
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turnover. This can deeply and negatively affect committee resources, such as the lowering of 
collective memory of legislative practices at a senior level. This, of course, can also happen within the 
general committee membership with the level of ‘policy making expertise’ potentially adversely 
affected by high turnover (Judge & Earnshaw 2003). It is general practice on the ENVI committee for 
a senior committee member to become the new chair when one is required, thus ensuring a significant 
degree of policy continuity, a practice not adopted by many other EP committees. Both Carolyn 
Jackson (1999 – 2004) and Karl-Heinz Florenz (2004 – 2007) (table 3-1), who succeeded Collins, 
despite representing different political ideological backgrounds, have been identified as helping the 
ENVI committee to retain its influence due to their previous experience of the committee (Lenschow 
2012, ENVI Activity Report 2014). Interestingly, over part of the 6
th
 term the committee was not 
chaired by an experienced committee member
65
, the result of which was seen as a significant drop in 
influence (O’Donnell 2007, Burns 2013), emphasising the importance of the chair incumbent. The 
selection of a chair evident as lacking in ‘policy making expertise’ was largely driven by political 
consideration.
66
 Partisan party groups do seemingly have an effect on the potential level of expertise 
contained within a committee. McElroy (2006) does, however, suggest that parties within the ENVI 
committee, in past terms (before the 7
th
 term), did tend to select their own members who possessed 
‘policy making expertise’ (and ‘professional expertise’) on to senior positions due to the overall 
benefits that this would bring. 
                                                          
65
 The member, while having ‘professional expertise’, was new to the committee, and relatively new to the 
Parliament. 
66
 The member was selected as chair as a result of being the senior member from their member state in the EPP 
grouping.  
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Table 3-1 Chairs of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 
Date Held Chair Chair Person Party Grouping 
1979 - 1984 Ken Collins SOC (S&D) 
1984 - 1989 Beate Weber SOC (S&D) 
1989 - 1999 Ken Collins SOC (S&D) 
1999 - 2004 Caroline Jackson EPP 
2004 - 2007 Karl-Heinz Florenz EPP 
2007 - 2009 Miroslav Ousky EPP 
2009 - 2012 Jo Leinen S&D 
2012 - 2014 Matthias Groote S&D 
2014 -  Giovanni La Via EPP 
Source: ENVI Committee Website 2015, Corbett et al 2007 
The ENVI committee has been identified as one of the main EP committees prioritized by the 
different competing party groupings within the EP (Judge & Earnshaw 2003). The committee appears 
dominated by members from northern European states who significantly prioritize environmental 
issues, and as a consequence prioritise the acquisition of ‘policy making expertise’. This has been 
attributed to the partisan party group coordinator positions on the ENVI committee being held 
predominately by members from similar Northern European countries, and who in turn have allocated 
positions to other like-minded actors (Kaeding 2004). With the accession of new member states from 
Eastern Europe, the dynamic of the ENVI committee appears to have changed, however, and this has 
been attributed to different policy priorities within these member states. As a direct result of these new 
member states accession to the EU there has been a drop in the aggregate number of Green MEPs, and 
from making up 7.7% of the committee in the 6
th
 term they now comprise 5.4% (Lenschow 2012). 
Notably no Green MEPs were elected to the EP in the 7
th
 term from the then 12 most recent accession 
member states (Carter 2010). Lenschow (2012) attributes this to the different policy preferences of 
these member states towards areas other than environmental issues. This would possibly be a 
reflection of the general shift in the Parliament towards the political right, before the 7
th
 term (Burns 
2013a, 2013b). This may, also, affect how different parties attempt to support their own committee 
members on the ENVI committee, and the potential level of ‘policy making expertise’ on the 
committee; however it is unclear within the literature what impact this observed dynamic has had. 
Kaeding (2004) suggests that experience of working for an EU institution or EU party grouping, and 
understanding how policy is made, does have a significant effect in the allocation of co-decision 
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reports in the ENVI committee, and has boosted the committee’s influence. This increased influence 
does not, however, come as a result of technical expertise gained from working in related areas, but 
has more to do with the connections or networks that can be developed as an EU insider (Kaeding 
2004). It is clear that parties on the ENVI committee recognise the importance that a ‘policy making 
expertise’ could bring. It is still not clear, however, how ‘policy making expertise’ has been used in 
the 7
th
 term to affect outcomes. 
Empirical Data 
The level of ‘policy making expertise’ and its relevance as a source of ENVI committee influence has 
been an area of intense debate. ‘Policy making expertise’ has previously been reported as being 
deeply affected by committee membership turnover (Mattson & Strøm 2006, Costello & Thomson 
2010); therefore an examination of the relative membership turnover rates within the ENVI committee 
entering into, and at the end of the 7
th
 term should provide an indication as to whether it is an 
important contributor to influence. As hypothesized (H1), a committee with a comparatively high rate 
of membership retention between terms should be more influential than if it had a higher turnover 
rate, as a result of it maintaining institutional memory and retained ‘policy making expertise’. It is the 
general consensus that if turnover is high institutional memory is lost from the committee as 
experienced members are replaced with members who lack ‘policy making expertise’. The relative 
rates of membership turnover and retention on the ENVI committee are presented in figure 3-1 for the 
7
th
 parliamentary term. This data is presented alongside information in figure 3-2 that demonstrates 
the turnover and retention rates at the end of the 7
th
 term and the start of the 8
th
. 
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Figure 3-1 Membership turnover rates of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 6th to 
7th term. Source ENVI committee website (2014) 
 
Figure 3-2 Membership turnover rates of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 7th to 
8th term. Source ENVI committee website (2014) 
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The membership retention rate going into the 7
th
 term (the focus of the present study) is comparatively 
high for the ENVI committee (41%) compared with the other case studies comprising the thesis. By 
comparison the BUDG committee had a 32% (into 7
th
 term), and the INTA committee a 26% (into 7
th
 
term) membership retention. Overall, the data collected on membership turnover reveals that the 
ENVI committee retained relatively high levels of experience within the committee during the 7
th
 
term, and this could be a potential source of influence (figure 3-3). In addition interview evidence 
supported the particular importance of institutional memory in influencing desired outcomes. 
However, as is discussed below, the original empirical data did not indicate, that with the higher 
levels of turnover in to the 8
th
 term (figure 3-2) there was a concomitant reduction in committee 
influence, as would have been expected.  
 
Figure 3-3 Rate of EP committee system experience entering ENVI committee 7th term. Source: ENVI committee 
(2014). 
 
In terms of membership turnover, the committee has been described ‘as not entirely unique, but [it 
has] a special place within the Parliament’s system because inevitably people tend to stay on the 
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[ENVI] committee for years and years’.67 The retention of ENVI committee members has been cited 
as significant, as consequently members utilise retained ‘policy making expertise’ to make significant 
contributions to the ENVI committee’s overall standing. The interview evidence does, however, 
further our understanding and the significance of ‘policy making expertise’ as a source of ENVI 
committee influence. Thus, due to the retention of members, ‘the environment committee obviously 
already had members who had been co-deciding for a long time, and were pretty much ahead of the 
game on that, and the understanding of the processes’.68 Thus, the ENVI committee is in part more 
influential than other committees due to the experience of its members in understanding what is 
achievable under co-decision and what would be harder or unachievable, as a result of developed 
policy making experience. ‘I have been working in that [ENVI] committee [for] 15 years now and it 
has always been co-decision during my time’.69 This is highlighted by members, as one of the main 
reasons for the ENVI committee being perceived as the ‘most influential committee’.70 ‘Policy 
making expertise’ is beneficial as it is ‘a real political game in which you have to have some 
experience’71 in how the decisions and policies are made in practice. Most experienced members will 
try to ‘meet with a mix of people72, and get all views onboard’73  to understand the political issues at 
stake, which may prevent the committee from getting what it wants. 
‘Policy making expertise’ is, of course, not only contained with members but, also, often with their 
assistants. ENVI committee assistants are ‘having to negotiate and be political’ when carrying out 
much of the policy ‘legwork’ for their members and, therefore, have to have a level of ‘policy making 
expertise’, which many have ‘developed over the years’. ‘You have to understand the complicated 
politics of the European Parliament and be able to gain the majority for your point of view’74 which 
                                                          
67
 Interview with ‘Group Coordinator’ Member of the ENVI Committee. 7/1/15 SKYPE Interview 
68
 Interview with ‘Group Coordinator’ Member of the ENVI Committee. 7/1/15 SKYPE Interview 
69
 Interview with Member of ENVI Committee. 6/11/14 Brussels BE 
70
 Interview with Member of the ENVI Committee. 6/11/14 Brussels BE 
71
 Interview with Assistant to Member of the ENVI Committee. 7/11/14 Brussels BE 
72
 It is interesting to note, however, when members refer to contacting NGOs they are contacting, in most cases, 
only ‘the NGO offices based in Brussels’. The rationale for this is that the NGOs in Brussels understand the 
political systems of the EU whereas outside groups do not. Members often find that time is not efficiently spent 
if they are to bring in outside groups or NGOs into the Brussels bubble. 
73
 Interview with Assistant to Member of the ENVI Committee. 7/11/14 Brussels BE 
74
 Interview with Assistant to Member of the ENVI Committee. 20/3/14 Brussels BE 
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only comes with a developed level of ‘policy making expertise’. The role of the committee secretariat 
has, also, been evident as vital to the ENVI committee in the drafting policy due to its own well 
developed level of ‘policy making expertise’ which is evident as supplementing the ENVI 
committee’s expertise. ‘We have the secretariat for all the formal things’.75 The secretariat’s role can 
be to compensate for any lack of ‘policy making expertise’ contained within the committee. Indeed 
according to the ENVI committee secretariat ‘it is rare’ that a rapporteur will draft a report with their 
assistants in total ‘isolation’ from the secretariat, as they will not generally have the expertise to 
create a ‘coherent piece of legislation’.76 
‘What is more common is that we [secretariat and MEPs] work together. The rapporteur, or the 
political group staff who come up with ideas very often ask us to help them, as the secretariat, to 
turn those ideas into legislative text because this is something we are doing very often, especially in 
a busy committee like the environment committee, we have lots of reports for which we are 
responsible running in parallel’.77 
Members will use the committee secretariat as a source of ‘policy making expertise’, ‘sometimes they 
ask us simply “please send me/prepare for me a briefing”, and then we are writing report briefings 
for them’78 on a policy proposal. This is on a case by case basis, however, as some members are 
clearly able to rely on their staff to collect the policy information they require according to both senior 
secretariats
79
 and MEPs assistants.
80
 It is important to note, however, that the ENVI committee’s 
secretariat was ‘under staffed’ during the 7th term with, according to senior members of the 
secretariat, only ‘11 secretariat’81 covering the whole committee’s brief; this is a ‘lower number’ 
comprising the secretariat than many other committees which have ‘significantly less demanding 
legislative workloads then the ENVI committee’.82 The use of the committee secretariat is, therefore, 
                                                          
75
 Interview with Assistant to Member of the ENVI Committee. 7/11/14 Brussels BE 
76
 Interview with Member of the Secretariat for the ENVI Committee. 19/3/2014 Brussels BE 
77
 Interview with Member of the Secretariat for the ENVI Committee. 19/3/2014 Brussels BE 
78
 Interview with Member of the Secretariat for the ENVI Committee. 19/3/2014 Brussels BE 
79
 Interview with Senior Member of the Secretariat for the ENVI Committee. 20/3/14 Brussels BE 
80
 Interview with Assistant to Member of the ENVI Committee. 7/11/14 Brussels BE 
81
 Interview with Senior Member of the Secretariat for the ENVI Committee. 20/3/14 Brussels BE 
82
 Interview with Senior Member of the Secretariat for the ENVI Committee. 20/3/14 Brussels BE 
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undermined by ‘force mobility rules’ which move administrators to positions in different areas every 
few years and as a result weaken area specific ‘policy-making expertise’.83 While some ENVI 
committee members do recognise the secretariat as a source of ‘policy making expertise’ other 
members do not according to secretariat members as; 
‘they [MEPs] have their own assistants, they have their political advisors because the political 
groups have their own staff, and so they will deal pretty much with them, and just ask the 
secretariat to make sure that the formalities are in order’.84 
Overall therefore, any lack of ‘policy making expertise’ on the ENVI committee can be supplemented 
somewhat by the committee’s secretariat, many of whom simply remember what proposals have been 
successful in the past; however, as the data collected attests, the ENVI committee already draws its 
influence largely from its own members and their retained ‘policy making expertise’ which has been 
facilitated due to comparatively low turnover. While this would appear to support hypothesis (H1), 
and the current understanding of the source of ENVI committee influence, subsequent evidence does, 
in fact, question the positive nature of high membership retention. While many highly experienced 
members may have knowledge of what was successful for the ENVI committee in the past, they are 
not always open to new innovative policy solutions. 
Within the ENVI committee the continued residency of some highly experienced members has been 
observed as potentially detrimental to the committee’s continued and overall influence. Members 
interviewed who were retained on the committee 8
th
 term did not confirm that the relatively high 
turnover entering into that term had weakened the committee’s overall influence, as convention would 
have expected, but had in fact lead to a positive revitalisation of the committee. ENVI members are 
often dealing with highly technical, controversial, and evolving policy matters; however, ‘there is 
always a sell-by [date] for everything and, sometimes, members who have been there for too long 
can provide blockage’.85 This does negatively impact upon the ENVI committee’s influence, with 
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some older experienced members acting as a hindrance to, rather than being facilitators of legislative 
progress. The observation as stated is that while ‘it is always good to have people who are 
experienced [in policy making] in doing it for a while, unfortunately, everything does go off after a 
while’86 and the membership must be periodically ‘refreshed’ if the committee is not to stagnate and 
lose influence. Committee turnover is, therefore, not necessarily perceived by members as a negative; 
‘it is good to have new people [on the committee]’, and when considering the overall influence, a 
‘balance is needed between experience and fresh heads’.87 Thus low turnover in membership may be 
important, but need not be a fundamental prerequisite for high levels of committee influence as 
current prevailing convention has ascertained (Mamadouh & Raunio 2003). ‘Policy making expertise’ 
may indeed have a saturation point, once reached it no longer provides actual benefit. A more subtle 
understanding of membership turnover and its impact on influence must be considered, such as the 
regenerating effects of an influx of ‘new blood’ membership on a committee, bringing fresh ideas. If 
similar findings become evident in other selected cases this would mark a truly significant result 
within the research field of legislative politics, and potentially question current convention. 
The empirical evidence collected, also, shows that party groups do impact upon the level of ‘policy 
making expertise’ in the committee. EP party groups and national parties, as a result of their greater 
ability to organise information more efficiently than individual members, do supply their members 
with invaluable policy making information, such as the negotiating position of other legislative actors, 
which increases the ENVI committee’s overall influence. Within the Parliament ‘every [political] 
group has its own secretariat’, and on each of the ‘committees there are a few people from the 
[political] group secretariats who work on these [committee] issues’88 assisting group members. 
‘Some [ENVI] members let the group’s secretariat draft pretty much everything’.89 Support staff 
from party groups assists the members in a similar way to the non-political committee secretariat by 
supplying them with technical and procedural information, ‘but are more political, because they have 
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to guard the lines and position of their groups’.90 So, while these political support staff attempt to 
increase the influence of the ENVI committee with increased efficiency, and the supply of policy 
making information to members with the ‘developed institutional memory’91 they possess their focus 
is always on the political outcomes. Of course, the use of party sources to benefit a committee’s 
influence is expected to be common on most committees, however, somewhat unique points are 
observed on the ENVI committee, which may affect its overall influence. 
The level of support members receive is starkly different depending on the specific political group 
within the ENVI committee. ‘The smaller groups such as the Greens or the ALDEs’ have within the 
committee ‘political secretariats even more powerful and important than seen in the bigger groups’. 
The rationale for this is that in the ‘smaller groups there are only a small number of MEPs, so their 
secretariat is usually better informed than the offices of the MEPs, and sometimes more 
professional’. This is ‘especially true’ as may be expected ‘with the Greens’ grouping secretariat; 
‘they are very active and proactive’92 in the ENVI committee. The bigger groups are somewhat less 
reliant on the assistance that could be provided by the political secretariat to increase overall 
influence, as ‘we have a lot of MEPs and a lot of offices of MEPs who follow the files along with 
the secretariat’ and possess higher levels of ‘policy making expertise’ and retained institutional 
memory. Nevertheless the political secretariat assistants are still valued as ‘certain individuals in the 
bigger groups
93’ are just as ‘proactive and productive’ as their ‘Green’ counterparts, providing a 
good level of ‘policy making expertise’ and contributing retained institutional memory. ‘There are 
political advisors which I work with a lot and we have a really good relationship’.94 While similar 
mechanisms are used by all committees of the EP, and this is not exclusive to the ENVI committee as 
a source of influence, there are evidently different dynamics between these staff actors depending on 
the committee; ‘there are committees where the relation between committee staff, the secretariat 
staff, and the political group staff, are not that good’. There has been evidence on some committees 
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that ‘jealousy between political group’s staff or assistants, and the secretariat exists’95 and this has 
been detrimental to the influence of those committees. In the example of the ENVI committee, 
according to staff, however: 
‘For all of my colleagues, and for all of our counterparts in the political groups, it’s a good 
working relationship. I think we on the secretariat respect that it is them [the political staff] who 
are the political drivers and they accept that we [the secretariat] have the technical knowledge and 
also most of us here are lawyers who really know how to draft legislative text’.96 
The ENVI committee, therefore, does benefit from a better working relationship between the various 
associated staff, more so than may be evident in other committees, which consequently enhances its 
influence. 
Party groups do play a formal role within the ENVI committee by supplying policy information and 
organising resources (facilitating contacts with NGOs or other expert stakeholders). In addition the 
political groups are useful in keeping members in touch with their national constituents’; as they are 
best placed to help members better understand the ‘political impact’ of legislature on those they are 
representing. Furthermore, the political groupings provide their own ENVI members with external 
expertise by putting them in contact with ‘independent experts’ as well as helping to facilitate contact 
between ‘experts from the Commission, experts from home governments, experts walking around 
Brussels’ and interested ‘stakeholders’.97 So the parties do play a very significant role in supplying 
ENVI committee members with informational contacts in addition to any they may have formed 
themselves independently. 
In addition to the party group acting as an extra source of ‘policy making expertise’, some members 
have identified that, alongside their own groupings/national party, ‘member states governments can 
be useful as well’98 as a source of information on the drafting of policy as they will ‘know what is 
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happening within the Council’.99 ENVI committee members can, and do, make use of national 
contacts as, ‘most MEPs do orientate towards their own national institution if they have an issue’100 
and wish to gain vital information on both technical and political elements of policy making. Such 
sources do assist the committee’s overall influence, supplementing the ‘policy making expertise’ 
available from group sources. However, MEPs on the ENVI committee, not only contact their own 
national home representative to acquire vital information on policy making, but are also known to 
contact the representatives of other member’s states, regardless of their position in the political 
spectrum, as one senior MEP stated; 
‘I will speak to the Germans and the Dutch [for example], the government representatives in 
Brussels, particularly if I know those governments and member states have a particular issue with 
something, to understand what it is’.101 
Experienced members on the ENVI committee understand the benefits that national state actors can 
contribute towards their understanding of a policy issue, ‘learning what [amendment] proposals a 
Council member [may have] objections over’102 and what the committee needs to propose to be 
successful. However, as would be expected, the ability of ENVI committee members to effectively 
gain ‘policy making expertise’, by utilising national state resources, can depend on the MEPs own 
individual enterprise and experience: 
‘It’s easy to think sometimes if you are dealing with something like shale gas, the French already 
have banned it so there would be no point talking to them. I would, however, say if the French have 
banned it they already have a very strong view, and I need to speak to them and find out why they 
have this view, and what is the motivation behind it’.103 
The evidence shows that members will develop networks with committee experience, and better 
utilise national contacts (in both their own state and in other member states) for relative policy making 
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gains. Most experienced members will attempt to develop ‘a lot of contact with the different member 
states’ in order to gain further ‘policy making expertise’. This will not only help them to better 
understand the technical issues at stake, but also to gain a better understanding of the possible 
different attitudes and negotiating positions of the different actors involved. It is useful for the ENVI 
committee to know which states have the ‘strong position’104 over the issues discussed.  
While member are not solely reliant on their own member states, for many MEPs, however, their first 
contact, when becoming involved in the policy process, will be their own national governments; ‘I 
have a lot of contact with my government on every file I work on, and I am the political coordinator 
for my political group so I work on almost everything’.105 While members do use national resources 
to benefit them individually as well as the committee as a whole, they are quick to stress that on a 
national political position ‘I don’t always agree with it [the national position], and I don’t always 
vote their way, but you know what the national position is, which is important’.106 This is significant 
information when dealing with the Council during negotiations, as policy positions of member states 
are not always explicitly made clear to all ENVI committee members, but often communicated 
through personal ‘political’ contacts. So ‘all member states, do inform their own MEPs’107 and 
supply their members on the committee with some level of informational knowledge on their 
positions. However ‘very often national states fight for their own interests in the Council and try to 
force their MEPs to support that position’108 which would not benefit the ENVI committee’s 
influence, unless its preferences were already aligned with the Council, which is unlikely. 
While all members are able to gain information from their political groups, members from different 
states will, as is evident, have some advantages over other members in the acquisition of information 
due to the greater prominence that their national parties place on the issue. ‘That is our special 
situation here, as MEPs, we have to go ourselves in detail [with the researching for reports], but 
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how deep you can go in details depends a little bit on the nationality of the members’.109 Different 
states prioritise different policy areas; this can mean that they are less interested in the areas such as 
environmental policy during their presidency. ‘I have not had anything from the Latvian presidency, 
I’ve seen nothing in the post, or been invited to any meetings or receptions by them, it’s very 
unusual. I imagine they are going to be pretty low-key in ENVI’.110 The reason for the understated 
nature of the Latvian presidency in environmental policy is that ‘they are interested in one or two 
other things, foreign affairs [Ukraine conflict and Russia] and Energy. That may affect me a little 
bit in ENVI but not much’.111 Different states do prioritise areas of interest. Germany, like many 
other northern European states, has a long tradition of environmental legislation and as a result has a 
great interest in its outcomes in the EP. ‘German members are very active [in the ENVI] because 
they know that they have the best chance to influence the legislation to make it feasible in the 
member states’.112 This is in contrast to NMS such as Latvia which have a less developed tradition of 
environmental policy, with more concern focused on other policy areas. 
Different ENVI committee members from different member states often do have diverse positions on 
what would be considered an acceptable amendment or successful policy outcome. Many of the issues 
dealt with by the ENVI committee have classically been controversial due to the political divide 
between the left and the right, over environmental issues. While party groups (which can act as 
sources of specialized information) and national contacts do help to account for the ENVI 
committee’s high level of influence, previous studies do indicate a level of conflict between the party 
groups and between the priorities of member states. The level of unity has been hypothesised (H3) as 
an important possible factor in determining the influence of committees, which is discussed after the 
impact of ‘professional expertise’. 
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3.4.1 Professional Expertise 
General consensus has been that those practitioners attracted to becoming members of the ENVI 
committee would, in all likelihood, have some form of environmental, medical, or professional food 
safety, expertise covering the areas within the committee’s remit (Bowler & Farrell 1995, Hurka 
2013). An early examination of the composition of the ENVI committee by Bowler & Farrell (1995) 
suggested that during earlier terms, the committee was largely composed of members who did have 
strong ties or backgrounds with environmental groups. Consequently, the ENVI committee was 
seemingly composed of members who did appear to have working knowledge of the area or able to 
access outside sources of specialist information due to professional networks (Bowler & Farrell 
1995). So potential ‘professional expertise’ was identified as establishing the ENVI committee’s 
influence. McElroy (2006) supports this viewpoint, and suggests that the nominations of political 
groups, for positions on the ENVI committee, are driven by the prospective member’s relevant 
expertise. However, the perspective that the ENVI committee contains a high level of specialised 
technical members has been challenged in some studies (McCormick 2001), questioning the 
consensus over its role as a source of influence. 
McCormick’s (2001) position on the level of ‘professional expertise’ contained within the ENVI 
committee is not consistent with the view that the committee is able to use this form of expertise as its 
main source in helping to establish its influence. In broad terms he suggests a lack of technical 
expertise within the ENVI committee, as a member is more likely to join the ENVI committee coming 
from a professional background, which, while highly interested in environmental issues, is not in 
reality technical in nature. Kaeding (2005) confirms the importance of specialist, often non-technical, 
interest group affiliation as being a significant factor in committee assignments and membership of 
the committee. McCormick (2001) supports this view, of a lack of technical specialization, by 
highlighting that the Council and the Commission apparently perceive many elements of 
environmental policy outside of the competency of the ENVI committee and direct certain legislature 
towards the ‘Agriculture’ (AGRI) and ‘Internal Market’ (IMCO) committees. The reason for this 
observation is that McCormick (2001) states that the ENVI committee does not contain the same level 
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of specialist understanding as the Commission. As a result the Commission does not extensively 
consult with the ENVI committee, as it perceives that the committee will ‘offer little constructive 
input’ on technical matters (McCormick 2001: 114). According to Weale et al (2005) many members 
of the ENVI committee do concentrate in more emotive areas of environmental issues such as climate 
change policy without personally having a technical background. This is contrary to the 
Commission’s position, which would rather focus on ‘technical harmonization’ between the member 
states (Weale et al 2005). It is, therefore, not always clear to what extent the committee utilises 
‘professional expertise’ as a source of its influence. However, with the assistance of empirical 
evidence collected for this thesis it is possible to test the role of ‘professional expertise’ as a potential 
source of ENVI committee influence. 
Empirical Data 
The perspective of Weale et al (2005) does appear correct, in that the ENVI is a committee of ‘mixed’ 
professionalization. Within the committee there is a divide between professional members who have a 
level of expert technical knowledge, and members who come from a less technical, professional 
background, which are interested in the policy area, but not overtly technical in their understanding. 
‘The ENVI committee it is a bit different’, from other EP committees, ‘there are quite a lot of 
colleagues with a good will, who want to do something good for the world’ who do not have any 
level of technical ‘professional expertise’. This, however, is compensated for by ‘quite a lot of 
colleagues with professional backgrounds, which suits them to their ENVI committee work’.113 This 
evidence confirms that the ENVI committee does consist of both non-professional members, who are 
motivated by ideological (often environmental) concerns, and professional members who possess a 
technical understanding of the policy areas. From the evidence provided members of the committee 
do ‘sort themselves into the committees they have a professional background within’.114 To 
accompany this interview data, evidence has been collected examining the relative level of committee 
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member’s ‘professional expertise’ by extensive examination of the MEP’s past 
experience/career/training backgrounds. 
 
Figure 3-4 Professional expertise in the ENVI committee at the end of the 7th term. Source: Collective Curriculum vitas of 
committee members. 
 
If ‘professional expertise’ were a major source of the ENVI committee’s legislative influence, this 
would have been reflected in the makeup of the committee, and the interview evidence. Figure 3-4, 
however, reveals that less than half (39%) of ENVI members had any relevant previous professional 
experience within the policy remit of the committee. Due to the wide competency of the committee, 
‘professional expertise’ was accredited to members that had training or a previous professional career 
in engineering, agricultural engineering, chemical engineering, environmental law or any similar 
technical field applicable to the area of environmental policy. ‘Professional expertise’ was also 
accredited if a member had a background in medicine, chemistry or food manufacturing/production 
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and safety, and consequently covered the other policy areas within the committee’s remit.115 
Interestingly, out of the 28 members assessed as having clear ‘professional expertise’, 12 (43% of the 
28 deemed to have ‘professional expertise’) originated from professional medical backgrounds, while 
the remainder came from a mix of different relevant, but largely environmental, backgrounds. This 
does show that on a committee with 71 members, ‘professional expertise’ is almost equally 
concentrated between the areas of health policy and environmental policy. As figure 3-4 
demonstrates, however, there are more members of the committee (54%) who do not have a 
professional level of expertise than those who have a clear degree of ‘professional expertise’ (39%). 
Therefore, it is demonstrated that the ENVI committee has a mixed level of ‘professional expertise’, 
which, while contributing some clear benefits from its presence, as discussed below, does not wholly 
account for the ENVI committee’s significant legislative influence. 
Despite a relatively lower rate of ‘professional expertise’ compared with other committees,116 its 
presence is important and does have an impact on the committee’s work, as stated by a senior ENVI 
committee member; 
‘I’m an agricultural scientist and I know a lot about agricultural production and how to produce 
food, and in addition I did my PhD in production of food so that fits very well together and helps 
me to work on this legislation’.117 
Members of the ENVI committee acknowledge the significance of ‘professional expertise’ as a 
potential foundation of influence as there is ‘no scientific services in the European Parliament’118 
where vital technical information could be sourced on legislative proposals internally. This is a 
detriment when considered against the highly technical nature of the policy dealt with by the ENVI 
committee. Members must rely on their own informational networks (often derived from professional 
contacts) to gain technical/specialised information. Significantly, however, even when members 
‘know quite a lot because that is their profession, there are other technical things you cannot 
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know’.119 The usefulness of ‘professional expertise’ can only extend so far in many highly technical 
areas. This could be expected as within most policy proposals there will be spill-over from one 
diverse technical area to another when a report is drafted. As a result of the wide technical nature of 
much of the policy dealt with by the ENVI committee, this does have a limiting factor on the overall 
impact of ‘professional expertise’. ‘It is impossible to become an expert on the content [within the 
ENVI committee] as an MEP or assistant’. One of the main reasons for this is that ‘it’s pretty 
difficult to get the time to even read the proposal of the Commission in its entirety’.120 While 
members with a professional background would have a significant advantage over those who have no 
specialist knowledge in being able to process information more efficiently, the informational benefits 
brought by ‘professional expertise’ can only act as a form of compensation rather than a dramatic 
enhancement as a source of committee influence.  
Interestingly, further evidence indicates that it is not, always, the ‘acquisition of information’ which 
is important or indeed problematic, ‘the difficulty I think is processing the information, 
understanding it, [and] coming to conclusions on it, more than actually getting it’.121  It can be 
difficult even for ‘professional experts’ to assimilate the required technical information efficiently. If 
specialist/technical information is abundant, the impact which ‘professional expertise’ could make is 
curtailed, without becoming fully redundant as evidence shows. Thus, even when ‘professional 
expertise’ is contained to a degree within a committee, this does not necessarily mean a member is 
able to process or prioritise all the information available on a subject area, in order to use it 
appropriately to maximise the committee’s influence. ‘It’s not difficult to get information, but it’s 
difficult to get qualified impartial advice’122 which can be fully relied upon, as most information 
comes from a self interested perspective. ‘Certain political groups get a lot of help from NGOs’, or 
alternatively ‘other groups get help from industry’; others still ‘acquire technical understanding [on 
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policy] from their parties’123 when drafting reports. As a result of a large degree of external 
information, committee members without ‘professional expertise’ are not significantly disadvantaged 
or have to incur extra costs to actively participate in decision-making. Even when members do not 
already possess ‘professional expertise’, technical information on policy is still widely available to 
ENVI committee members. 
Although ‘professional expertise’ is not contained to a significant degree within the membership of 
the ENVI committee, as the information provided above would suggest, it does not account for the 
ENVI committee’s perceived high levels of influence and, therefore, the question arises as to whether 
a compensating level of expertise may be provided by assistants and committee staff that have 
professional backgrounds within the policy area. To understand the overall role of expertise in the 
committee the potential involvement of committee staff much be factored into the study. While ‘each 
case is different’, experienced assistants are normally employed by members to support their 
technical policy making and ‘some MEPs really rely heavily on their assistants with the [technical] 
policy work’.124 It will often, also, be the case that an assistant to an MEP ‘will chair the technical 
trialogue meetings on a report’, while the ‘MEP [as rapporteur] will chair the political trialogue’.125 
This signifies the important role which is placed upon assistants in the ENVI committee. The 
technical trialogue is portrayed as ‘really intensive’ and to be successful an assistant must have a 
strong ‘level of technical policy knowledge, you have to understand the piece of legislation inside 
out, every line and every paragraph’. The responsibility of an assistant is ‘supplying background 
policy information and very technical information to your MEP’.126 While assistants do appear to 
play an important role dealing with many of the ‘highly technical sides of committee policy’, 
assistants do also attest that it is ‘impossible’127 to become an expert in your policy area, and will 
often ‘not possess prior professional backgrounds’ in that policy area.128 Member’s assistants ‘are 
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not real experts in policy’ but often ‘generalists’ having to work on different ‘committees and 
areas’129 over time. Assistants are still often ‘given responsibility over highly technical areas despite 
often possessing no professional expertise’; despite this they are still perceived as acting to the 
benefit of the committees in important areas. Again it is ‘not seen’ on the ENVI committee ‘as a 
significant disadvantage’130 to not possess ‘professional expertise’. This evidence further 
demonstrates that ‘professional expertise’ does not constitute a significant source of ENVI committee 
influence. It is, however, important to note that there is a growing trend, which has become evident 
from the collected data, within the ENVI committee, of a drive to develop and have assistants who are 
policy experts, rather than only generalists with ‘a high level of professional expertise’.131 This is, 
however, only happening outside the timescale of the thesis, within the 8
th
 term. 
In a similar manner, as attested to by a senior member of the committee secretariat, ‘practical 
professional policy knowledge is lacking’132 in many of the new members of the committee 
secretariat. The ‘recruitment policy’ of the secretariat ‘is to hire well educated persons’ who, 
however, are ‘often lacking in practical policy area experience’, with no professional background 
within the ENVI committee’s remit. While some ENVI secretariat members ‘do possess professional’ 
expertise, as a result of their ‘heavy workload, understaffing and forced mobility’133 the secretariats 
are not able to act as a significant substitute for a lack of ‘professional expertise’ within the ENVI 
committee. The application of forced mobility, where every few years a member of the secretariat will 
move to a new committee, has ‘impacted’ upon ‘[our] expertise on the [ENVI] committee 
secretariat’.134 ‘After certain years your next assignment [after mobility] does not necessarily relate 
to the knowledge you have, in your first job, and often what you have learned in one area’.135 The 
data collected would indicate that in the past the committee secretariat did offer a level of technical 
expertise (while political party contacts and MEP advisers offer more ‘policy making expertise’) 
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which, as shown above, members do utilise, however, this support has diminished in depth with time 
as a result of policies surrounding the forced mobility and hiring of new administrators. 
The evidence collected demonstrates that while overall
136
 ‘professional expertise’ does play a mixed 
role in assisting the committee’s overall functioning, the degree to which it is beneficial to the 
committee’s total influence is not overtly significant, being outweighed by non-professional elements 
within the committee, and is low compared to the comparatively higher rates of ‘professional 
expertise’ contained within other committees.137 The cost of not possessing ‘professional expertise’ is 
not high enough to prevent ENVI members from being active in legislative decision-making. A 
heightened level of ‘professional expertise’ would no doubt benefit the committee’s influence, but is 
not a causal factor for that, already established, high legislative influence. It is highly likely that other 
sources of influence underlie the ENVI committee’s established high standing. 
3.5 Committee Unity Perspective 
3.5.1 Political Dynamic of the ENVI Committee 
The ENVI committee has been noted for the longevity and continuity of its committee chairs 
(O’Donnell 2007, Corbett et al 2007, Burns 2013a). The position of committee chair has so far been 
held consistently by political parties of the centre right (EPP), or the centre left (S&D/SOC
138
) (table 
3-1), and has displayed a noteworthy level of practical continuity (similar approaches to policy 
making, despite potential differences over desired outcomes and priorities) despite alternating 
between the S&D and EPP groupings. As a consequence of this consistency of leadership, the ENVI 
committee has been viewed as developing its own distinctive culture and approach to furthering its 
own influence over legislative outcomes (Judge 1992, Corbett et al 2007). During the 7
th
 term, the 
committee consisted of a chair from the centre left S&D and four vice chairs from the ALDE, the 
EPP, S&D and the Greens, representing a wide spectrum of the ideologies contained within the 
                                                          
136
 Factoring the information on MEPs expertise and what the evidence indicates on member assistants and 
committee secretariat. 
137
 A detailed comparison of the levels of ‘professional expertise’ within the three case study committees is 
contained within the Conclusions chapter. 
138
 The Socialist Grouping has had a number of different name iterations without changing its centre-left, social 
democratic standing.   
112 
 
Parliament. It should be noted that the chair alternated between two different S&D members during 
the second half of the 7
th
 term (Jo Leinen (2009 – 2012) and Matthias Groote (2012 – 2014)) (ENVI 
activity report 2014). The role of the chair can be significant, not only for the organizational skills that 
are brought to the table but, also, for the associated contacts that have been or will be developed. 
Committee chairs are exceptionally important positions, and it is common practice for the party 
groups to negotiate over the allocation of chairmanships. The seats on a committee were divided by 
grouping size after the last election with the largest group getting the first selection (Judge & 
Earnshaw 2003). In the 7
th
 term seven different political groups were represented on the committee
139
 
with the largest bloc being the EPP with 26 seats. Thereafter, the S&D (17) and the ALDE (8) made 
up the next largest blocs. The Greens/EFA had 6 seats on the committee, while the European United 
Left/Nordic Green Left had 3 seats.
140
 The final seats were taken by the ECR (6), the EFD (2) and 3 
non-attached members (ENVI activity report 2014). 
 
Figure 3-5 Political breakdown of party groupings within the 7th term Committee on Environment, Public Health 
and Food Safety. Source: ENVI activity report 2014. 
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EP political groupings prioritise the committees on which they wish to be most represented. The 
ENVI committee has been selected as first choice by different groupings on a number of occasions 
(Judge & Earnshaw 2003), due to its perceived influence and potentially high impact on policy. For 
example, in 1999 the EPP was the largest party in the Parliament and selected the ENVI committee as 
its first choice, nominating an EPP member who had extensive knowledge of the workings of the 
committee before becoming the chair (Judge & Earnshaw 2003).
141
 The committee is also highly 
prioritised, perhaps unsurprisingly, by the Green groupings.  
With respect to the inter-party dynamics, according to a Centre for European Political Studies (CEPS) 
(2012) special report looking at the ‘legislative activity and decision making dynamic’ of the EP, the 
committee has undergone significant partisan shifts during the 7
th
 term. The report states that the level 
of partisan cohesion has dropped on the ENVI committee. There has been a growing trend for the 
main party groupings, the S&D, the ALDE and the EPP, to be less likely to vote in unity over a policy 
proposal (CEPS 2012). The report suggests that the centre-left
142
, as of the end of the 7
th
 term, was the 
dominant partisan force on the ENVI committee, with a voting coalition being three times more likely 
to form around the S&D position than one that could be characterised as being centre-right
143
, despite 
the EPP being the largest single bloc and prioritising the committee (CEPS 2012). While not 
discussed in this CEPS (2012) report, evidence collected for this study does help to elucidate the 
almost paradoxical position of the EPP. While being the largest party, and thus having the greatest 
potential to form a voting bloc, it has not been as successful as the S&D in having its position 
reflected. From evidence collected it is apparent this situation is a consequence of the unique political 
dynamics of the EPP within the ENVI committee, which has had an overall knock-on impact on the 
unity of the ENVI committee. 
If committee unity had been less stable on the ENVI committee during its 7th term this may have had 
an impact on the committee’s overall influence. Committees are at their most influential when all 
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political actors are united behind a proposal (Kreppel 1999, 2002b). All committees no matter the 
field or policy area have the ability to use unity as a source of legislative influence: its absence from 
the ENVI committee would, therefore, be significant. The current partisan dynamic, within the 
Parliament, has been viewed in some studies as moderating the ENVI committee’s overall influence 
(Burns 2013a). With the dominance of the EPP in the Parliament, and simultaneously a perceived 
shift by this group away from environmental preferences it has become harder for the committee to 
make more radical proposals on environmental matters (Burns 2013a). Also, in general, it is the 
consensus that the average ENVI committee member is considered as an outlier in terms of policy 
preferences, being more radical than the plenary equivalent, and whose consent is required before any 
action can be taken (Burns & Carter 2010). As a result of this dynamic the ENVI committee’s 
influence may have become curtailed, and evidence of political disunity may now be more apparent 
within the committee. 
3.5.2 Committee Unity 
The political dynamic of the ENVI committee is vital to it being successful in gaining preferential 
outcomes in legislative proposals. A disunited ENVI committee would not have as strong a 
negotiating mandate as a united one. The issues, however, with which the ENVI committee are 
dealing are highly ‘political’ (or ideological) in their nature, and this may affect the committee’s 
political dynamic. As shown in figure 3-5, the committee political grouping breakdown in the 7
th
 term 
revealed the EPP as the ENVI committee’s largest grouping. While ‘it was easier during the last 
years because we [the EPP] managed to often have a majority, the ENVI committee political 
majorities were changing at that time too’ during the 7th term. A united political position depended, 
very much ‘on the topic and issues debated, and depending on the ALDE; the Liberals sometimes 
lean very green in the ENVI’ committee. So it is evident that ‘it’s not so very easy to build majorities 
in this committee’.144 With the reduction in EPP members on the committee in the ‘new [8th term] 
term it will be more difficult than before because no political side in the Parliament has a majority 
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with its ‘Socialist green wing’ on one side and the ‘Christian democrat wing’ on the other side’.145 
While it would appear that conflict has increased in the 8
th
 term, and the focus of this study is the 7
th
; 
this evidence does reveal that conflict was present in the 7
th
 term, and has only increased with time. 
The ENVI committee (7
th
 term) is dominated by the two largest political groupings in the EP, the EPP 
and the S&D. ‘The truth is on the really important legislative files if the two bigger groups want it 
they will get it as they can always out bid you [the ECR, GUE/NGL…..], and at the end of the term 
they always have points left over [to buy ENVI legislative reports]’.146 With the important policy 
reports, dealt with by the committee, according to members from smaller groupings ‘the only way for 
a small group’ to gain a prestigious or important report is ‘if there is conflict between the two big 
groups. We [as a small party] can support one or the other, and then they will support you in 
turn’.147 This suggests a fluid interaction between the party groups on the ENVI committee, 
underlining why different studies have examined the allocation of reports to understand the partisan 
dynamic: 
 ‘Internal group dynamics matter. It does also depend on the Committee. In the ENVI, for the EPP, 
for example, it is basically the coordinators deciding amongst themselves [assigning reports]. It was 
the two coordinators who decided the files [who get a rapporteur-ship]; it’s very un-transparent’. 148 
However to other actors, while the party ‘coordinators play a vital role’ when it comes to ‘organising 
compromises’ and unity between the political groups ‘the most important role is the Parliament’s 
rapporteur and the shadow [rapporteurs] from the other groups’ they ‘are the ones who negotiate 
on compromises’149 for any given file.  
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The selections of rapporteur on the ENVI committee are often hotly contested, which does help to 
elucidate the dynamics of unity, as it is the rapporteurs who attempt to facilitate compromise and 
unity. This highlights that it is important to the committee’s influence to reach a unified position but 
reaching it is far from easy. It is evident that politically driven perspectives within the committee are 
deeply entrenched, and divergent, even internally within the party groupings. This is made apparent 
by evidence from the smaller ECR centre right party group ‘I would be considered by most people to 
be not very green even though my conservative colleagues think I’m very green, that’s the range of 
politics’.150 Even within the groups there is careful consideration over who gets a report and what their 
perspective is in a wider political tradition. ‘Even for the ECR and for the EPP we have had 
members that are a bit more progressive [towards green issues] than their groups are’,151 and this 
has lead to some internal tensions. While opinion may differ within the political groups the divides 
between the groupings can be pronounced and impact significantly on committee influence. 
According to one senior centre right MEP; 
‘There would be some files that the Greens and far left would not want me to have as they would 
think “oh they will compromise with industry”. On our side conversations will take place saying no 
we can’t let the Greens have this because it won’t get anywhere, they will come up with something 
so idealistic that the Council will never negotiate’.152 
Striking a balance can be difficult for the committee and it must be unified if it is to have a strong 
negotiating mandate. However, practical evidence demonstrates that this is not always achieved on the 
committee, much to its detriment. ‘Often it is possible to reach compromises but in other issues it is 
impossible’.153 There is a wide range of views within the EPP and ECR groupings. In effect many 
EPP and ECR members find themselves split between the outlier status of the ENVI committee and 
the shift towards the right in the plenary (Burns et al 2012, Burns 2013a). It is for this reason that the 
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centre right has more trouble than the centre left in creating a voting bloc, which helps to explain the 
CEPS (2012) report demonstrating such. 
While unity has been identified by members as being a vital source of the committee’s legislative 
influence, the political groups are evidently in competition. As discussed above there are tensions 
between the groups, and sometimes even within groups, due to the nature of the policy dealt with by 
the ENVI committee. Understanding of political conflict that exists can be expanded with further 
interview evidence that examines the interactions of the ENVI committee during trialogue. The ENVI 
committee has been noted for its expert use of informal interactions to further its legislative influence 
(Corbett et al 2007). It is, however, within these informal negotiations that partisan conflict has been 
apparently most evident during the 7
th
 term. Different political groups within the ENVI committee 
have attempted to speed up or slow down the legislative procedure to their own benefit ‘there are 
different interests there at stake’. Within the committee it is recognised ‘that for the Greens it’s very 
good there is informal trialogue’ which attempts to ‘speed up’154 the process. This benefit for the 
Greens, however, does not mean an increase in overall influence for the ENVI committee. 
The rationale behind the Greens’ drive to speed up the informal process is that they are attempting to 
set the agenda towards their own preferences. If the Greens wait for the formal process to continue 
‘they would lose a vote in the plenary as they are outnumbered’ and would be unable to have their 
preferences represented. However, if the Greens are able to set the agenda in informal trialogue, they 
will be in a stronger position to have their preferences represented before the plenary stage: 
‘It’s very beneficial to start as early as possible [for the Greens] with the trialogue so that it’s on the 
basis of their text and not the plenary text. They have much more power in the committee text 
because they are part of the processes’.155 
Within the trialogue process the Greens ‘sit at the same table as the rapporteur’. As a result of this 
you ‘have only one person for the ECR or the EPP or the Greens getting the same influence there 
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at the table’. So despite the marked difference in numbers between the Greens and the other groups, 
each are equal in the trialogue, which has become the main decision making mechanism in many 
cases. This, however, does not benefit the committee overall as ‘if you draft a report that is only 
good, for say, the ECR or the greens, it’s going to be voted down in the committee immediately’.156 
These smaller groups are outliers to the ENVI committee’s own preferences, which itself is an outlier 
from the plenary preferences. If Greens preferences are reflected with the same standing as the main 
party groups, the committee’s influence suffers as a result. The ‘plenary will amend and reject 
proposals’157 which are beyond their median preference. The ENVI committee does, however, attempt 
to operate in a way to avoid this situation as detailed above in order to create a unified position which 
is not fully unpalatable to the plenary. 
Unity on the ENVI committee is not consistent, even between the largest political groups. Off the 
record conflict was observed between ENVI members during trialogue, to the point where ‘quite 
intense discussion’ occurred ‘in front of the Council’s delegation’ which was a ‘shock to them’ as 
‘this shouldn’t happen’ as all outstanding issues ‘should have been sorted out in committee’. A 
point was reached, where the Council asked if the EP delegation wished to take some time out of the 
room to sort their position out. The Council was concerned that the committee members were in effect 
undermining their own position and did not want to take an overt level of advantage.  
3.6 Public Policy Perspective 
The final perspective proposed as having consequences for influence is that of the public policy type. 
To summarise its main points, the rationale of the policy perspective is that the different types of 
public policy, which are proposed by a legislator, will affect the legislative standing of the committee 
proposing that policy. As has been conjectured, an EP committee more focused on producing 
regulatory policy than one producing distributive/redistributive policy outputs will be less likely to 
face stringent opposition from the Council (H4). While member states resist supranational actors 
distributing their contributed funds, they have been, historically, more amiable in allowing 
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supranational actors to draft and implement regulatory policy (Burns 2005b). Committees producing 
regulatory policy will be more influential than those dealing with distributive/redistributive outcomes 
(H4). 
To understand if policy type is a source of the ENVI committee’s influence it first needs to be 
established what the committee’s policy output most closely resembles. According to Yordanova 
(2009a :256) the ENVI committee can be classed as mixed in terms of its policy output. Depending on 
the policy being discussed, the committee is both ‘information-driven’158 and at times ‘interest-
driven’.159 More importantly, however, the policy outputs of the ENVI committee have been assessed 
as being both regulatory and distributive in nature (Yordanova 2009a). By contrast, an earlier study by 
Judge et al (1994) asserted that the ENVI committee is to a great extent only dealing with regulatory 
policy. As a result of this focus on a regulatory output Judge et al (1994) believed that the committee 
was more influential. Judge et al (1994) asserted that through the use of regulatory policy the 
committee exerted influence, as although the costs of the regulation were concentrated on a targeted 
actor, the benefits were seen and dispersed between different actors. The issue with Judge et al (1994) 
assessment was that it was not fully tested or substantiated (Burns 2005b). While the committee 
potentially is producing more distributive outputs (Follesdal & Hix 2006), the policy areas which it is 
dealing with are still largely regulatory in nature (Burns & Carter 2010, Jordan et al 2015). The costs 
of producing regulatory outputs may, however have increased over time for the ENVI committee, 
weakening its overall influence. 
Studies that have examined the policy output of the committee have often examined the main 
competency area of environmental policy and found that the type of policy the ENVI committee is 
producing has changed over the years, possibly in correlation to the accession of new member states 
from Eastern Europe who have resisted the expansion of regulatory policies (Burns et al 2012). In the 
past the committee has been viewed as an environmental champion in a Parliament and Union that 
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placed environmental issues as highly salient (Judge 1992), drawing influence from its regulatory 
outputs (Judge et al 1994). As well as being prestigious the ENVI committee has been viewed as 
being progressive, or even radical, in its desired environmental policy outcomes. As discussed in 
relation to the committee unity perspective the new member states (NMS) of Eastern Europe place 
the salience of environmental issues at a lower order than the early accession northern European 
member states. The reason for this is that the cost of implementing environmental legislation was 
higher in the NMS who often lacked the resources or organisational skills in the area (Börzel 2009). 
Despite their lower salience of environmental policy the NMS accessions did not greatly impact the 
policy output of the ENVI committee in as negative a way as may have been expected but has still 
seemingly mediated the committee’s regulatory ambitions (Burns et al 2012). Whereas in previous 
years the ENVI committee’s policy proposals had been more radical in nature, pushing for stronger 
environmental controls, after the NMS accessions policy proposals became more moderate, although 
overall the adoption rate of amendments actually increased (6
th
 term) (Burns et al 2012). Seemingly 
countries with higher regulatory costs are undermining the ambition of ENVI committee’s regulatory 
proposals. The ENVI committee does appear to continue to be a regulatory committee; however, its 
proposals are less ambitious in their imposition of regulatory burden.  
Empirical Data 
Even with the moderating factors placed on the committees with the accession of the NMS the ‘ENVI 
committee is not a representative group for the entire Parliament [7
th
 term], it is much greener and 
it is much more to the left’ than the plenary as a whole, a committee rapporteur will therefore ‘need 
to come up with a text [report] which will have support in, first, your committee but after that also 
in the entire house [plenary]’.160 With the political shift towards the centre right (and the EPP) in the 
7
th
 term environmental policy preferences have become more moderate, moving away from their 
radical origins (Burns et al 2012, Burns 2013a). The ENVI committee does, however, still prefer more 
environmentally stringent policy outputs than the plenary as a whole. ‘No ENVI text gets through the 
                                                          
160
 Interview with Assistant to Member of the ENVI Committee. 7/11/14 Brussels BE 
121 
 
plenary without amendments because’ the committee’s membership ‘is not a representative group 
of MEPs’.161 This evidence therefore indicates that the ENVI committee appears to have its influence 
weakened as a result of the constraints placed on it by the plenary, potentially as a result of a shift by 
the plenary to the right on environmental issues, and a divergence in preferences, confirming Burns 
(2013a) assertions. The committee cannot rely on the plenary to support its position against the 
Council as ‘the Parliament in plenary moves closer to the Council [in negotiations] than the 
committee especially when it comes to the ENVI [committee]’. The repeated rationale for this 
situation is that the ‘ENVI is rather green and it is not a representative group for the Parliament’.162 
It must be made clear that while many members of the committee want to see outputs more radical, 
where costs are most likely imposed in order to achieve environmental goals, they will avoid negative 
implications for their own member states. ‘A lot of these targets at European level may seem very 
objective, and really well founded, but if it’s going to cost a lot of money in your member state you 
are not going to vote for that’.163 The ENVI committee and the member states do share the preference 
to not impose unpalatable costs on their constituents. This sentiment, reflected by EPP members, is 
that ‘you have to get legislation which doesn’t unnecessarily burden your own constituents, of 
course that’s what everyone does here’.164 Conflict over policy output does still occur, however, even 
unexpectedly between the ENVI Committee and the Commission. 
The policy situation for the ENVI committee was exacerbated by the attitudes of the Environment 
Directorate-General (DG) towards the committee in the 7
th
 term. ‘My experience is that the DG very 
often tries to work against the Parliament, they try to fight for their own policy ideas’.165 This is 
surprising to an extent as it is expected convention that the Commission and the ENVI committee are 
on good terms with similar policy preferences (Judge 1993). It is the cooperation of these actors, and 
the joint support they can give each other, which has often been cited for the ENVI committee’s 
legislative development in to an influential actor (Corbett et al 2007). It came as a surprise to 
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members during the 7
th
 term that ‘even from the out, the DG [Environment] started to do lobbying 
inside the Parliament for the Commission against the [committees] rapporteur’. To members this 
‘was [something] really strange, that goes too far and that should not be allowed’.166 Even after the 
Commission President had been contacted by the relevant rapporteur, the Commission’s lobbying 
continued unabated; 
‘It should not be allowed for the Commission, because the Commission is not the legislator. The 
Commission has to deliver a proposal, and if the Parliament or the Council want to change it, it’s 
their job to do so, but it’s not the Commission’s job to fight for the ideas of a single civil servant’.167 
To some extent the normal support from the Commission was lacking as a result of its desire to see its 
own policy preferences adopted by the Parliament. Even internally in the areas of environmental 
policy the Commission have had ‘massive fallings out with itself, it doesn’t necessarily agree across 
it own political [spectrum], just on an individual basis the tone is set by the DG or commissioner 
and that can be very different from one to the other’.168 This evidence should, however, not be taken 
for a disregard of the importance of the Commission/ENVI committee’s close relationship. All elite 
actors interviewed stated that the relationship and exchange of information between institutions was 
seen as ‘being important’ to the ENVI committee’s continued ‘legislative successes’.169 It is with the 
Council, rather than the Commission, that the major policy conflicts occur. To understand this in 
terms of the policy perspective some practical examples of significant policy proposals have been 
examined over their progression. These examples illuminate the impact that different types of 
amendment proposals have on the ENVI committee’s legislative influence. 
In terms of legislative output it is interesting to note that for the 7
th
 term the ENVI committee dealt 
with 79 Commission proposals falling under the OLP, 61 of which were finished in the 7
th
 term. The 
ENVI committee, with regards to report adoption, has been notable as favouring first reading 
agreements; in fact 84% of all its cases were agreed and completed at first reading. 14% were agreed 
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at second reading, and only 1% of reports required a conciliation meeting. The only case which did 
reach conciliation, the ‘Novel Food’ codecision act170, was ultimately rejected before completion 
(ENVI Activity Report 2009-2014). 18 outstanding legislative files were carried over to the 8
th
 term. 
Out of the completed files an important file to better appreciate the ENVI committee’s relative 
influence is the ‘Amending Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste to Reduce the 
Consumptions of Lightweight Plastic Carrier Bags (2013/0371(COD))’. This co-decision file was 
‘small [in terms of pages], but controversial’ and, as a legislative proposal, the ‘content [of the file] 
was explosive’.171  It is, therefore, an excellent case to examine. A controversial file will be 
enlightening in terms of understanding the ENVI committee’s relative influence, more so than a file 
that was not controversial, and no evidence of actors exerting influence was displayed. Despite being 
cited as an ‘explosive’172 file, agreement was reached at an ‘early stage’ within the 2nd reading of the 
report, and did not require a full formal second reading.  
The file concerned the relative reduction of plastic bag consumption within the member states, due to 
the associated environmental impact. The objective of the Commission’s original proposal was to 
‘promote similar reductions of the average consumption level’ (Commission Proposal COM 
(2013)0761) and seek harmonized standards across the EU. The Commission’s proposal stated that 
member states should seek to reduce their national consumptions; however, the mechanism by which 
this would be achieved was not explicitly outlined within the Commission’s proposals leaving it to a 
member state’s discretion how they would comply within a two year deadline (Commission Proposal 
COM (2013)0761). The Commission proposal did, therefore, not originally place any burden or 
binding targets on the member states. 
After the original proposal, at the committee stage, 43 amendments in total where adopted by the 
ENVI committee, which would become the Parliament’s position on the file. Of the amendments 
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introduced two significant amendments stand out. Both involved introducing binding targets 
obligating member states to reduce consumption. These targets looked to reduce plastic bag 
consumption by 50% in 3 years and 80% in five years. The second provision involved the total 
phasing out of plastic bags in food packaging (ENVI committee first reading 2013/0371(COD)). 
These proposals went further than the Commission’s own proposals which had not stated any binding 
reduction targets. Both these proposals were significant amendments within their remit of extending 
the scope of the legislation; however, both amendments can be classed as regulatory in nature as they 
seek to curtail the actions within member states by proposing a cost to promote improved actions. 
The ENVI committee’s proposals were sent to the Council in conjunction with the commencement of 
informal trialogue (ENVI committee ‘first reading position’ (2013/0371(COD)). The response from 
the Council was not to accept the entirety of the ENVI/EP proposed amendments at first reading. This 
is evident as of the commencement of the second reading stage. A full second reading of the file was 
not required as an agreement was reached during informal trialogue. As trialogue is an informal 
process no formal record exists detailing the discussion which took place between the ENVI 
committee and the Council, apart from interview evidence which indicated the ‘difficult’173, but 
ultimately successful, nature of the negotiations. It was possible to observe the outcome of 
negotiation, however, as this was evident in the final draft of the legislative report. The final draft of 
the plastic bags report included two alternative obligations which member states could meet in order 
to be in compliance with the amended directive. The first stated the relative rates by which the 
member states must reduce consumption, while leaving it at the discretion of the member states as to 
how they would meet these targets. The alternative provision was to introduce charges (costs) on the 
consumption of plastic bags. Monitoring provision was also included within the file to assess member 
states’ progress (Official Journal of the European Union 2015). 
The ENVI committee, and the EP, were successful in having these extra regulatory provisions 
included, placing cost on actors, despite reservations being raised, surprisingly, by the Commission 
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(European Commission 2015). This report is, therefore, an example of the ENVI committee being 
influential and successful when proposing regulatory amendments to what had originally been 
perceived as a controversial act. The committee and EP were able to get the Council to sign up to 
requirements more stringent than first proposed. This case demonstrates that the ENVI committee got 
its way on a key policy proposal, with regulatory outputs, against the Council. The reason for this 
success was associated with the fact that the outcome of the proposal was seen as burdening the 
consumer rather than being placed on the state. While this is a single example it appears to be 
indicative of the interactions between the ENVI committee and the Council. Out of the 62 files, dealt 
with by the committee, only one failed that of the Novel Foods regulation (ENVI activity report 2014) 
over the political point of cloned meat labelling. The committee did largely draft regulatory policy 
outputs, with little evidence of files containing significant distributive outcomes. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The ‘Committee on the Environment, Public health and Food Safety’ has been denoted as one of the 
most powerful committees in the EP, as a result of its wide policy remit and significant legislative 
influence. However, the sources of its significant influence have yet to be fully understood within the 
current body of literature. This study has sought to comprehend the different sources which the ENVI 
committee is drawing upon to reach its significant levels of legislative influence. Three different 
perspectives accounting for legislative influence were applied to the ENVI committee, and as a result 
a better comprehension of the sources of the committee’s influence was gained. With a better 
understanding of these sources of influence, as a result of the original data collected by this study, 
evidence contrary to current conventions on committee influence has been highlighted, and new 
observations on the influence of the ENVI committee have been generated. 
With regard to the first perspective applied to account for committee influence, the informational 
perspective, it was discovered that ‘professional expertise’ is a limited source of ENVI committee 
influence. It was revealed that technical information is widely available within the committee and 
while members with ‘professional expertise’ are able to assimilate this information better than non-
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professional members, due to its ready availability, the overall impact of ‘professional expertise’ on 
overall influence was relatively weak. Thus, the costs of not possessing technical expertise are low for 
ENVI committee members. Understanding the political dynamics of the European Union institutions 
was seen in the empirical data as critical to the committee’s success. Retention rates in the 7th term 
were relatively significant, being higher than many other EP committees during the same time period. 
The ‘policy making expertise’ of members was deemed as important as a source of the ENVI 
influence; however current convention was questioned over the actual impact of membership 
retention. Evidence indicated that a level of turnover, rather than consistently harming the committee, 
can actually boost the committee’s standing and influence by the introduction of ‘fresh blood’ with 
new members replacing long term members who often have become blockages to further progress. 
This is a significant result, casting major doubt over the fundamental nature of retention of members 
as a prerequisite for committee influence. Evidence showing a similar dynamic taking place within the 
other selected case studies would be a significant new finding within the area of legislative 
organization. 
Party unity was demonstrated as having a significant impact on overall influence. While evidence 
suggested that unity fluctuated to an extent on the ENVI committee during the 7
th
 term, members 
testified that on the whole unity was a positive to the committee, and it was generally achieved. 
Political competition does, however, occur, which does affect the committee’s overall influence. 
Different political actors will attempt to use committee procedures to their own ends, often shifting 
the policy proposals away from the committee’s own median preference. This weakens the ENVI 
committee’s overall standing, as the committee’s mean preference is already perceived as being an 
outlier within the plenary. While unity is often achieved there are some issues where partisan 
preferences differ to such an extent that agreement cannot be reached, and this fundamentally 
undermines influence. The final perspective applied to the ENVI committee examined the effect of 
public policy and its function as a possible source of influence. The ENVI committee has evolved 
from a committee largely dealing with regulatory policy into becoming a committee dealing with 
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more mixed policy outputs. It was demonstrated, with the use of a key example of legislation, that the 
committee was largely successful when proposing significant regulatory proposals. 
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Chapter Four Committee on Budgets 
4.1 Introduction  
A political institution cannot exist without some form of continuing financial mechanism, or simply 
put, a budget (Ippolito 1978, Crain & Muris 1995). As a result of the fundamental importance of 
budgets to governmental systems, budgetary committees have often established themselves as vital 
legislative actors in a comparative context (Ippolito 1978, Wehner 2007). It is for this reason that the 
Committee on Budgets (BUDG) of the European Parliament is an interesting case to examine, due to 
the overarching consequences its policy remit has for the EU. The BUDG committee is the main 
parliamentary actor dealing with budgets,
174
 an area acknowledged as of major significance for the 
EP, and many studies have identified a significant level of legislative influence held within the 
committee over this key EU policy area (Burns 2006, Corbett et al 2007). Formally it is the 
Parliament (and the Council) who have the direct authority over the budget according to the treaties; 
however, the responsibility for dealing with the practicalities of the policy area, within, and for, the 
Parliament, are delegated to the BUDG committee. The BUDG committee, due to the formal 
legislative powers it possesses, acting on behalf of the Parliament within the budgetary procedure, has 
been labelled by several investigators as an influential (Whitaker 2005, 2014, Burns 2006, Corbett et 
al 2007) and highly prestigious (Burns et al 2012) committee in its own right. Furthermore, while the 
BUDG committee has not been directly named in some studies, a number of reports in the literature 
have noted the EP’s important potential for influence in relation to the budget (Duff 2009, Buonanno 
& Nugent 2013, Crombez & Høyland 2014). However, beyond the formal powers, the sources of 
influence of the BUDG committee are a subject of debate as understanding is lacking at an empirical 
level (Benedetto & Milio 2012). As noted in the theoretical framework a ‘catalyst’ (a source of 
influence) is needed to turn a potential to be influential into reality. A number of studies (Westlake 
1994, Corbett et al 2007, Kauppi & Widgren 2008) have cited the rationale behind the BUDG 
committee’s high influence as a result of the committee possessing an institutional memory which 
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developed as a result of gaining involvement in budgetary decision making at an early stage. ‘Policy 
making expertise’ has, indeed, been suggested as a main source of BUDG committee influence and as 
a result the level of turnover of committee members has been implicated previously as adversely 
affecting the committee’s overall influence (Lindner 2006). It is claims such as these concerning the 
role of ‘policy making expertise’ as a source of committee influence which this chapter will look to 
empirically test, to ascertain how the BUDG committee has established its influential standing.  
This chapter will address how the BUDG committee has established itself as a significant legislative 
actor and what sources the committee draws upon to gain preferential outcomes, and thus 
demonstrable influence when dealing with budget and legislative reports. Indeed, in a similar way to 
assessing a committee’s influence through how successful it has been in gaining a policy outcome 
close to its preferences in a legislative act, the BUDG committee’s influence can also be gauged by 
how successful it has been in gaining an outcome closer to its political preferences in the budgetary 
procedure’s final outcome. The BUDG committee has a significant decision making role and potential 
to affect the final budgetary outcome. Previous studies (Settembri & Neuhold 2009: 133) that have 
assessed the influence of the EP, have accepted both legislative and budgetary files as generally of 
equivalent value, as both follow similar procedures. It would, therefore, be constructive to begin by 
placing the BUDG committee’s role in context with the budgetary decision making process before 
testing the validity of the hypotheses. 
4.2 The Decision Making Process 
The EU, as with most political institutions, creates a budget that sets out its funding priorities on a 
regular basis. However, the EU budget does not operate within the same basic framework that 
comprises a typical national state budget. The EU does not raise funds via taxation, as would a nation 
state; rather the budget to be spent comprises national state contributions. The EU does, however, 
produce a binding budget framework setting funding priorities on at least a 5 year (quinquennial) 
cyclical basis along with an ‘Annual Budget’ each calendar year (Buonanno & Nugent 2013). The 
Parliament is one of only two bodies within the Union’s institutional structure which has formal 
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authority over the EU budget, the other budgetary authority being that of the Council (Arthuis 2014). 
In practice the Budget committee officially formulates the EP’s position on the whole EU budget prior 
to it being adopted by the plenary (TFEU 2014).
175
 A confirmation in plenary is largely a foregone 
conclusion; since obtaining a budgetary role, with its founding in 1979, the committee has reportedly 
turned gaining a majority in plenary into a ‘refined art’ (Westlake 1994: 194). The Budget committee 
will formulate amendments to the proposed budgets, and possibly recommend vetoing a budget if 
agreement is not reached with the other institutional partners, primarily the Council. Formally, the 
budget of the EU is agreed upon under the so-called ‘budgetary procedure’, in which the BUDG 
committee is a direct and formal participant on behalf of the Parliament. The budgetary procedure is 
notable for generally following the same basic parameters as the OLP, with the same amendment 
process although with some key differences as explained below (Duff 2009, Crombez & Høyland 
2014). It is important to note that the Committee on Budgets will operate formally, as the Parliament’s 
representative, to a great extent, as an equal partner with the Council, as the Council ‘has to get our 
[BUDG committee] consent; as long as we [BUDG] say no, there is no budget’.176 
The Lisbon Treaty, in addition, importantly removed the distinction within the budgetary procedure 
between so called ‘compulsory’ and ‘non-compulsory’ spending, and this as a consequence further 
consolidated the equality between the BUDG committee and Council (Roederer-Rynning & 
Schimmelfennig 2012). The importance of the abrogation of this distinction is highlighted by an 
elaboration on its impact. Expenditure was divided prior to the ToL between ‘compulsory’, in which 
the BUDG committee had no role, and ‘non-compulsory’, in which the committee and EP did have a 
direct legislative engagement. As a result of interpretation of treaty language, ‘compulsory spending’ 
was interpreted to involve ‘all expenditure necessarily resulting from the treaties, or from acts adopted 
in accordance with the treaties’ (Westlake 1994: 123). Compulsory expenditure related directly to 
issues such as member state refunds, resulting expenditure deriving from international agreements and 
important areas such as agricultural funds, which include the ‘Common Agricultural Policy’ (CAP) 
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(Westlake 1994). With the removal of any definition between these areas, the role of the BUDG 
committee has been greatly extended with the ability to be involved and propose amendments to all 
areas of EU spending, including those that were previously limited in areas in which member states 
had protectionist interests. The potential remit of the BUDG committee is therefore, after Lisbon, 
extremely significant with extension into the important distributive areas such as agriculture spending. 
The EU budget itself will determine where and what funding is not only allocated for different 
policies, ranging from the ‘CAP’ to the funding of the ‘European External Action Service’ (EESA) 
but, also, what funds are made available to the institutions and the everyday operations of the Union. 
In the past some areas were out of the BUDG committee and EP’s remit,177 but following the ToL all 
annual budgetary matters are subject to amendments coming from the committee. Therefore, the 
BUDG committee has an important role in determining the allocation of funds within the European 
structure of institutions and programmes, as any funds allocated must in practice be approved by the 
EP whose position in this regard is the prerogative of the committee (Westlake 1994). Political 
priorities are indicated by where an institution or an actor wishes funds to be allocated within a 
budget. Therefore, an actor is influential by the extent to which they are able to have their political 
priorities reflected within the budget. While the Commission, the Council and the EP will each have 
their own funding preferences,
178
 a review of the budgetary process will help to understand how the 
committee can have its position best reflected in the final outcome. If the BUDG committee is 
successful, the budget to some extent will result in the allocation of funding to policies and bodies that 
the committee wished to be funded, and possibly against the preferences of other Institutions. In the 
first instance it is necessary to understand the basic composition of the BUDG committee and what 
decisions it can, and does, make by discussing the two main budgetary elements that make up the 
budgetary process, the ‘Multiannual Financial Framework’ (MFF) and the ‘General Annual EU 
Budget’. 
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4.2.1 Multiannual Financial Framework 
The budgetary procedure is a rather complex mechanism that has to be broken down into a number of 
parts in order to understand its different elements and the BUDG committee’s relative involvement. A 
number of elements must be decided before a budget is turned into EU law; the first component that 
must be agreed upon is the development of the so-called ‘Multiannual Financial Framework’ (MFF). 
At least every 5 years a new MFF is negotiated and adopted, signalling the start of an on-going 
budgetary process which will last for at least a 5 year period until a new MFF is agreed. The last MFF 
extended from 2007 to 2013, with the new budgetary regime starting in 2014, following negotiations 
undertaken during the 7
th
 term. What the MFF actually comprises is a political agreement between the 
institutions determining the maximum EU expenditures for, at minimum, a five-year period. The MFF 
will set out the framework and parameters for future budgets. The MFF is not a budget in itself but a 
planning mechanism for creating a yearly budget to ensure European spending is consistent and 
capped over the framework’s 5-year (minimum) lifespan (European Commission 2015). The MFF 
will be used as a clear framework to facilitate the adoption of an ‘Annual Budget’ that is fiscally 
consistent over its lifetime. How the MFF works in practice is that different areas of EU policy are 
divided into 6 broad categories that are referred to as ‘headings’ (Table 4-1). 
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Table 4-1 MFF Headings (2007-2013) and Policy Breakdown as Promulgated by the European Commission (2015) 
Multiannual Financial Framework 
Headings (2007-2013) 
Outlines of Policy Areas Within Heading (European 
Commission 2015) 
1. Sustainable growth 1a. Competitiveness for growth and employment  
– ‘Research and innovation, education and training, 
trans-European networks, social policy, economic 
integration and accompanying policies’. 
 
1b. Cohesion for growth and employment  
– ‘Convergence of the least developed EU countries and 
regions, EU strategy for sustainable development 
outside the least prosperous regions, inter-regional 
cooperation’. 
2. Preservation and management of 
natural resources 
‘Includes the Common Agricultural Policy, Common 
Fisheries Policy, rural development and environmental 
measures’. 
 
3.  Citizenship, freedom, security and 
justice 
3a. Freedom, security and justice  
– ‘Justice and home affairs, border protection, 
immigration and asylum policy’. 
3b. Citizenship  
– ‘Public health, consumer protection, culture, youth, 
information and dialogue with citizens’. 
 
4. EU as global player ‘Covers all external action ("foreign policy") by the EU. 
Does not include the European Development Fund (the 
European Council and Parliament rejected a 
Commission proposal to include it in the EU budget)’. 
 
5. Administration ‘Covers the administrative expenditure of all the 
European institutions, pensions and EU-run schools for 
staff members' children’. 
 
6. Compensations ‘Temporary heading which includes compensatory 
payments relating to the latest expansion of the EU’. 
 
Source: European Commission 2015 
The MFF states how much total money, over the period, can be allocated to each of these overarching 
headings. The MFF does not distribute the funds directly paid to different areas but sets a ‘budgetary 
ceiling’. These so called ‘ceilings’ for the different ‘headings’ set the maximum which is committed, 
in effect the maximum which could be spent, in each heading for the life span of the MFF. Each year 
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an ‘Annual Budget’ is then negotiated which allocates the funds to different policy areas within the 
multi-year constraints of the MFF ‘ceilings’. Normally when the ‘Annual Budget’ is agreed it will be 
below the MFF’s area ‘ceiling’ to compensate for unforeseen expenditure or to reduce spending.179 
The MFF is highly significant to the working operations of the EU; as the Commission (2015) states 
that ‘the MFF translates the political priorities set by the EU and its Member States into financial and 
legal terms’. So, in effect, the MFF determines the funding priorities for almost an entire 
parliamentary term. A reduction in the ‘ceiling’ within one heading could have significant political 
ramifications over at least a five year period with the consequent reduction of funding to the policies 
falling under that heading’s area. The actually breakdown of the percentage of funding overall for 
2007-2013 reserved for each area can be seen in figure 4-1 from the Commission (2015). 
 
Figure 4-1 2007-2013 MFF headings and percentage of budget allocation to each heading. Source: European 
Commission 2015 
 
The formal involvement of the Budget committee in the area of the MFF, although significant, is 
more limited than its role in the ‘Annual Budget’, as discussed below. Formally the MFF falls under 
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the ‘consent procedure’, meaning that the EP can only approve or reject the official position of the 
Council. Thus, while the Parliament, acting on the recommendation of the BUDG committee, could 
veto the Council’s position by not consenting to approval, this would result in the whole MFF not 
being adopted. It is important to note that the Council, after the reforms of Lisbon, must adopt its own 
opinion by unanimity (Crombez & Høyland 2014). There is, therefore, not the flexibility for the 
BUDG committee to introduce formal amendments as in other legislative areas falling under co-
decision. The MFF is, however, only one part of the budgetary process that involves the BUDG 
committee, the other, of course, is the ‘Annual Budget’ where “real monies” are being allocated to 
different identifiable policy areas each year. 
4.2.2 General Annual EU Budget 
The ‘General Annual European Union Budget’ will define the amount of funding allocated by the 
MFF to different policy areas each year. This defines what money is actually available to be spent 
during the timescale of the budget. At the beginning of any annual budgetary procedure (Figure 4-2), 
and in a manner similar to other EU policy areas that have been examined, the Commission will make 
its budget proposal that will then be sent to the BUDG committee and the Council. Before the 
Commission makes its proposal the first step of the procedure involves it confirming budget estimates 
from all EU institutions (TFEU article 314).
180
 Once the Commission has these estimates it will create 
its draft annual budget and send this jointly to the Council and BUDG committee of the EP. On 
receipt of the Commission’s draft budget, the Council will adopt its own position towards this draft 
proposal, agreed by a qualified majority. Once the Council has formulated its position this will then 
be forwarded to the BUDG committee with justifications for its position attached. The Council is 
formally required by treaty law to provide such an explanation of its position (TFEU article 314.3). 
The normal format, according to BUDG members, is that the Council ‘makes cuts across the 
board’.181 When the Council’s position is received by the Parliament, it is the BUDG committee’s 
responsibility to set the EP’s formal position towards the proposed Council modified budget 
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(European Commission 2015). The EP and the Council are co-decision makers with regard to the 
annual budget (Buonanno & Nugent 2013) and, therefore, the BUDG committee can formally propose 
amendments to the Council’s position at this first reading stage. It is the general consensus according 
to BUDG committee MEP’s, that ‘at the Budget committee we [BUDG members] re-establish the 
figures of the Commission, not all the lines, most of the lines, with some political choices a bit 
different [from the Commission] to sometimes increase the figures even of the Commission’, while 
still, ‘abiding by the ceilings of the financial framework to offset any increases by also agreeing on 
some cuts from the Council’.182 So the general procedure followed is that, ‘the Council cuts and we 
normally restore the draft budget of the Commission, but slightly changing its focus’.183 The 
reasons for deviating from the Commission’s original proposal is to signify ‘a difference to the draft 
budget going back to the Commission; this would allow the Commission to see Parliament’s 
[BUDG committee’] priorities’.184 Normally these budgetary lines coming from the committee are 
designed to generally ‘increase funding’ 185 as this is the ‘preference of the committee to see more 
money distributed to prioritized areas’.186 The nature of the budget negotiations is somewhat fluid 
due to the formal procedure being undertaken. Interestingly, the Commission can amend its budget 
proposal, if it wishes, up until the conciliation stage of the process (TFEU article 314.2). This could 
be an interesting caveat with the on-going process of trialogue taking place behind the scenes which 
could lead to the Commission altering its proposals to match the developing negotiations. 
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 Commission  
A draft annual budget proposal 
must be made before 1 September 
for submission to the Council and 
European Parliament. 
Conciliation Committee 
This is convened between institutions, and 
has 21 days to set a compromise agreement. 
If agreement is not achieved, the budget 
fails. A new budget must be proposed by the 
Commission. 
  
European Parliament  
Following receipt of the Council’s position 
the EP has 42 days to either 
1. Approve or make no formal declaration: 
Budget is adopted 
Or 
2. BUDG committee proposes amendments 
to Council’s position, which must be adopted 
by absolute plenary majority. 
Council 
Adopts own position before 1 October 
for transmission to the EP. 
Council 
Following receipt of the EP position 
the Council has 10 days to either 
1. Accept all amendments: Budget is 
adopted 
Or 
2. Reject amendments: Conciliation 
will take place. 
After Conciliation, three final options are available:  
1. If an agreement has been reached in Conciliation, the Council and EP have 14 days to declare 
adoption or make no declaration: Budget is adopted.  
2. If the EP adopts, but the Council rejects the Conciliation outcome, the EP can reintroduce its original 
amendments, again within 14 days. If the parliament is able to achieve an absolute majority with a total 
of >60% of members the EP’s Budget is adopted. If the voting threshold is not met the conciliation 
budget is adopted (It is unlikely this second eventuality will apply as the Council is unlikely to reject a 
position it has agreed to earlier in Conciliation). 
3. If the EP rejects the budget by an absolute majority (>60%) it cannot be adopted, and, as a result, a 
new budget must be proposed by the Commission. The Council (unlike the EP in option 2) cannot force 
the adoption of the budget, even if it has approved the conciliation outcome. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Annual Budgetary Procedure. Source: European Commission 2016, Duff 2009 
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Before the Lisbon treaty two complex reading stages were involved in the process and the Parliament 
was limited to only amending ‘non-compulsory’ spending areas (Buonanno & Nugent 2013). Since 
the 7
th
 term there is a single reading and all areas of spending fall under the BUDG committee’s remit 
and are subject to amendment proposals. After the single reading, a 21 day conciliation period will be 
enacted. This is different from the OLP with its two legislative readings and its less draconian time 
constrains (see Chapter 1). The outcomes of the conciliation procedure are somewhat different also 
from that observed in the OLP. There are three outcomes that could take place as illustrated in figure 
4-2. In effect, however, the EP, at the recommendation of the BUDG committee, continues to have a 
clear veto over the annual budgetary procedure. It is, therefore, impossible for the Council or 
Commission to force the EP to adopt a budget of which it deeply disapproves. This would indeed 
highlight the significance of the BUDG committee, and this policy area for the Parliament. 
Nevertheless, there has been speculation over the impact of these reformed budgetary mechanisms 
that question their consequences on the BUDG committee’s influence (Benedetto 2013, Crombez & 
Høyland 2014). 
The BUDG committee can draw influence from its right to an ex-post (end of process) veto after 
conciliation negotiations have ended, and its amendment property rights over annual budgets. In 
addition there is, also, the BUDG committee’s formal engagement with negotiations over the MFF 
and its ability to recommend ‘consent’. Finally, there are the co-decision legislative reports that the 
committee deals with and involving the accompanying veto and amendment rights. Building on the 
existing account of comparative committees, a committee with ex-post veto rights over budgetary 
matters would be potentially a powerful actor, especially coupled with amendment proposal rights 
over draft budgets (Shaw 1979, Shepsle & Weingast 1987). The Budget committee of the EP would 
comprise an important actor under these guidelines. However, this is only a limited examination and 
the sources of the committee’s influence, as have been ascertained in the literature, are wider ranging 
most likely being as a result of what has been termed here as ‘policy making expertise’. According to 
Benedetto & Høyland (2007: 567) actors such as the BUDG committee are interested in bringing 
policy outcomes as close to their preferences as possible, and will therefore attempt to use formal 
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rules to ‘maximize their chance of obtaining favourable policy outcomes’. This can only be done if 
the committee has the resources to maximise its potential. There is, however, an ongoing debate 
within the literature as to how much of an impact the BUDG committee and Parliament had during the 
timescale of the present project (7
th
 term). Benedetto (2011), for example, suggests that the ability of 
the BUDG committee and the Parliament to amend the budget has in fact weakened following the 
reforms of the post Lisbon annual budgetary procedures. The initial failure of the ‘2011 Annual 
Budget’ has been seen as a possible indicator of this weakening of influence of the EP in budgetary 
matters (Benedetto 2011, Benedetto & Milio 2012). 
Benedetto’s (2013) assessment is that while the rules of the budget procedure appear to give the EP 
and BUDG committee more power in the 7
th
 term, they also give the Council a bargaining advantage 
(alternatively, and this will be examined below, the BUDG committee may have been lacking in 
‘policy making expertise’, weakening its ability to bargain successfully, leaving the Council with an 
advantage). This assumption is based upon the premise that the Lisbon Treaty increased the veto 
powers of the Parliament in budgetary matters at the expense of the agenda setting powers it 
previously possessed (Benedetto 2013). This proposes that reform in favour of the Parliament is 
unlikely as more veto players will lead to greater conflict, and ultimately as a consequence, a veto 
would not be used to reject a budget. According to Benedetto (2013), a veto of the budget (by the EP) 
would not be a return to the status quo, but in fact a retrograde step, and as a result would not be 
supported as a better alternative, by the EP, to accepting the budget that always improves the status 
quo, even if only marginally. 
While the ability to veto legislation according to Benedetto (2013) and others may be something of a 
redundant tool, its absence would significantly weaken the BUDG committee’s ability to resist having 
a position forced upon it. Interestingly, members of the BUDG committee have been reported as 
threatening to reject (vetoing) whole annual budgets if certain demands are not met, and thus 
effectively using the veto as a negotiating tool in other policy areas (Nielsen 2015). In a statement 
made by a number of MEPs officially representing all political groups, apart from the ALDE, they 
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indicated they would prevent the completion of the budgetary procedure unless there was an increase 
in transparency from the Commission, and in particular they required more information on the groups 
from which the Commission received advice (Nielsen 2015). This proposed amendment on 
transparency in the Commission was indeed adopted within the BUDG committee and EP’s 
negotiating positions.
187
 This would suggest that the EP is not short-sighted in its view of the budget 
procedure; possibly as a result of the institutional memory it has developed, but understands the long-
term impact it may have on affecting change in other policy areas and the potential to further the 
BUDG committee’s influence. This idea is supported by Benedetto (2013), in his study on the 
expansion of veto rights within the EP committee system as normal practice, in which he suggests that 
the EP will attempt with every extension of powers to further expand its influence beyond the 
intended remits. According to a leading member, the BUDG committee has expressed clear 
‘frustration’, with the Council and that ‘sooner or later we [the BUDG] will just say no to the budget 
[veto it] and fall back to a position when we can only have 1/12 the money per month’.188 The 
BUDG committee has made it clear that is it willing to use a veto in the future if the demands of the 
Council become too unpalatable. In a way the veto rights which the committee does have could be 
perceived as a shield protecting the BUDG committee’s influence from further Council pressure, 
while its amendment rights are used to actively exercise influence. Crombez & Høyland (2014) 
recently assessed the powers and influence of the EP in the areas of the budget and came to the 
conclusion that power derives from the ability, by the apparent use of ‘policy making expertise’, to 
make amendments to the budget rather than from any formal ex-post vetoes. 
4.3 Informational Perspective 
The success of amendments has been closely associated with the informational resources available to 
an actor (Krehbiel 1991, 2004). The ability to create good legislation depends on the informational 
specialization, ‘policy making’ or ‘professional expertise’, available and retained on a committee, that 
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facilitates it to be able to propose acceptable amendments. The expertises, which are required to make 
committee amendments impactful, are accumulated over time supposedly as a result of low levels of 
membership turnover that results in increased institutional memory (Krehbiel 1991). Significantly, 
due to the budgetary amendment rights of the BUDG committee, Crombez & Høyland (2014: 78) 
state that ‘the EP has become even more important in the budgetary process than the Council’. Thus 
the BUDG committee’s amendment rights are extremely important elements of this committee’s 
influence. Crombez & Høyland (2014) affirm that the budgetary procedure (in the 7
th
 term) follows 
the OLP, as it is understood in previous chapters, to the extent that the EP and Council are equal 
legislative partners, although, with notable and important differences. If the BUDG committee does in 
fact draw influence from amendment rights, informational resources, ‘policy making’ and/or technical 
(‘professional expertise’) are potentially highly salient to the committee’s level of influence. 
According to Kauppi & Widgren (2008) budgets were the very first area over which the EP, and 
consequently the BUDG committee, gained legislative influence that it could exercise formally with a 
clear basis in treaty law. The committee, therefore, as it was one of the first committees formed and 
imbued with legislative competencies, has a great deal of policy-making experience, and potentially 
significant institutional memory contained within. The significant institutional memory and the early 
attainment of formal legislative powers encouraged influence to become uniquely entrenched within 
the BUDG committee (Kauppi & Widgren 2008). As would be expected, and according to current 
convention, in a committee that has established its influential position seemingly as a result of ‘policy 
making expertise’ turnover and retention of members is a significant factor in determining the 
committee’s influence. Membership turnover, and how this would potentially impinge on both 
expertise and institutional memory, has been seen as a key variable affecting BUDG committee 
influence (Lindner 2006). The retention of members had previously been perceived as important in 
maintaining the committee as an influential actor; when members leave the BUDG committee they 
are perceived as taking their ‘policy making expertise’ with them, and thus removing a vital source of 
BUDG committee influence. 
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4.3.1 Policy Making Expertise 
In order to test hypothesis H1
189
 any investigation of a committee’s ‘policy making expertise’ as a 
potential source of influence must examine the committee’s turnover. According to current 
convention (Mamadouh & Raunio 2003) this will have a significant impact. Turnover is measured as 
the number of MEPs who left a committee at the end of, or during, a parliamentary term. The higher 
the level of turnover the less institutional memory and ‘policy making expertise’ retained within the 
committee under current understanding. If turnover is explicitly high in the BUDG committee, ‘policy 
making expertise’ would not be presumed to be a source of the committee’s significant influence, as 
the hypothesis
 
states. 
 
Figure 4-3 Breakdown of comparative BUDG committee members’ experience 6th term into 7th. Source: BUDG 
committee website (2014) 
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Figure 4-4 Rate of EP committee system experience entering BUDG committee 7th term. Source: Budget committee 
(2014)  
 
As figure 4-3 illustrates, 32% of the BUDG committee’s membership was retained at the beginning of 
the 7
th
 term. This would appear to have been a reasonable, but not high retention rate in comparison 
with the other committees, and while not as good as the ENVI committee (41% retention rate 7
th
 term) 
it is better than the INTA committee (26% retention rate 7
th
 term). This is also reflected in the rates of 
overall EP committee membership experience in the 7
th
 term (Figure 4-4). Importantly the retention 
rate within the BUDG committee was much higher during and entering into the 7
th
 term than entering 
into the 8
th
 term (figure 4-5).  
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Figure 4-5 Breakdown of comparative BUDG committee members’ experience 7th term into 8th. Source: BUDG 
committee website (2014) 
 
This is an interesting result as the BUDG committee’s comparative influence can be compared and 
contrasted between terms, where one maintained a reasonable retention against the other which saw a 
significantly lower retention rate.
190
 The impact of this on the BUDG committee, according to 
perceived wisdom, would be that as the committee retained a comparatively high level of institutional 
memory and ‘policy making expertise’ during the 7th term, this would positively promote the 
committee’s overall influence (Mamadouh & Raunio 2003) and certainly to a greater degree than 
going into the 8
th
 term. Consequently, during the 7
th
 term the BUDG committee should have had a 
comparatively heightened level of influence with a highly experienced membership, who had 
developed a strong understanding of the limits of what was achievable by the committee. It is, also, 
highly likely that over time members were able to develop strong relationships with the BUDG 
committee’s ‘natural ally’ the Commission as well as expanding other institutional connections. 
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 term ending and the 8
th
 beginning only 16% of the membership has remained in place on the 
BUDG committee. In total 84% of members left the committee at the end of the 7
th
 term with only 7 members 
remaining on the committee. 
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Members of the BUDG Committee do have ‘a commonly used expression that the two institutions 
[EP and Commission] are co-operating in opposition to the Council’.191 Knowledge of ‘how systems 
operate, along with the establishment of interpersonal relationships are’ generally perceived as ‘a 
direct positive’, to committee operations.192 On the other hand if turnover is high, as it was during the 
8
th
 term, a lack of ‘policy making expertise’ and institutional memory should negatively impact on 
influence, and it is likely that evidence would show a weakening working relationship with the 
Commission. According to the empirical evidence collected, however, and contrary to all expectations 
(and the hypothesis H1), the opposite was true; turnover did not negatively affect BUDG committee 
influence, but helped strengthened it. 
Interview Data 
Possessing a level of ‘policy making expertise’ is important to members of the BUDG committee. ‘It 
does assist members [and assistants]’ in better policy making, often simply as a result of ‘knowing 
who to contact from experience’ when ‘dealing with complex issues and extra information is 
required’193 to make acceptable amendment proposals. A level of [policy making] experience was 
indicated within all interview data collected as beneficial to committee members and the committee’s 
influence overall. However, both in forming relationships with other key actors and in the formation 
of new policy solutions, turnover did not operate in the direction the informed expectation and 
hypothesis (H1) indicated. In fact, as was evident in the data collected, low membership turnover was 
not a fundamental prerequisite for the BUDG committee’s influential standing. 
Evidence collected from senior BUDG committee members identified that while turnover ‘policy 
making expertise’ and institutional relationships were deeply linked, they did not operate in reality as 
current conventions concerning turnover would indicate. It was stressed that a ‘good relationship’194 
between the BUDG committee and the Commission is important as significant ‘[policy making] 
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information’ is readily exchanged ‘between the two institutions’195 as both have similar perspectives 
and preferences on outcomes. ‘The Commission is our [BUDG committee] ally’.196 However ‘a lot 
depends on the quality of relations between the persons’ and BUDG committee ‘members must 
develop relations with the Commission’197 in order to exchange and develop ‘policy making 
expertise’. It would have been expected that relationships would improve over time if members were 
retained on committee. This, however, was not confirmed in the data, and high turnover of members 
actually improved the committee’s standing and co-operation with the Commission in practical terms, 
contributing directly to an increased level of legislative influence in the long term. 
During the 7
th
 term, when turnover was comparatively low (figure 4-3), it would be have been 
expected that this would have resulted in a highly developed and fruitful relationship between actors 
as a result of institutional learning and the development of ‘policy making expertise’. However, the 
opposite was evidenced; ‘over the last five years [the 7th term] the working relations were not as 
good as they had been previously [during the 6
th
 term]’198 at senior levels. Despite low turnover ‘not 
much contact exists between’, rank and file, ‘[BUDG committee] members and the Commission’199 
during the 7
th
 term, adding to the underdeveloped working relationship at senior committee level. 
This evidence clearly contradicts how previous assumptions would have assessed the situation; 
working relationships between the Commission and BUDG committee were not as developed, or 
‘good’ at an important ‘informal level’ of exchange. ‘Unfortunately with the previous [7th term] 
Commission the informal relations were not very fruitful or very good’200 which did not benefit the 
committee’s overall influence. A lack of ‘informal relationships’ did have an adverse impact on the 
BUDG committee’s influence with a loss of a key ally and the associated ‘exchange of 
information’201 that can be vital to influence outcomes.202 This was surprising even to the former 
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BUDG committee leader ‘It’s odd because on a personal basis the relations were good; the DG for 
budget was a fellow countryman who was a good friend of mine’. This became even more surprising 
when it is considered that ‘the Commissioner in charge’, [during the 7th term] ‘was previously my 
predecessor [on] the budget committee, we knew him well and appreciated him, but it didn’t 
work’.203 Even with a former leadership member of the BUDG committee as Commissioner a 
significant working relationship that would have been mutually beneficial to both Institutions did not 
develop, and the impact of this was clearly evident in the example of the ‘MFF 2014-
2020’negotaitons.  
The direct policy example of the ‘MFF 2014-2020’204 negotiations clearly demonstrates how the 
negative interpersonal relationships impinged on BUDG committee legislative influence. The ‘MFF 
2014-2020’ negotiations, which took place during the 7th term, were one of the most significant 
budgetary policy issues that actively involved the BUDG committee and it would normally be 
expected that ‘policy making expertise’ and developed relationships with the Commission would be 
vital for success. However, ‘in particular during the big negotiations on the ‘MFF [2014-2020]’ we 
[the BUDG committee] were disappointed with issues coming from the previous Commission’. This 
major disappointment came ‘after having put forward reasonable and reasonably ambitious 
proposals’ and unexpectedly ‘the Commission gave up and yielded without fighting, and they left us 
[BUDG] defending their position [against the Council]’.205 The BUDG committee was 
disadvantaged, and influence over getting a preferred outcome was hindered by losing a bargaining 
partner who appeared to committee members to have the same, or even stronger, policy preferences to 
the committee. ‘As we say you can’t be more royalist than the king. We were left alone at the heat 
of the fight by the Commission and we resented this attitude’206 which was displayed by the 
Commission. Thus, despite having great potential as a result of a developed institutional memory with 
low turnover, and an experienced negotiating team, the BUDG committee was unable to gain the 
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ongoing support of the Commission, who should normally have been an important partner in 
determining a preferential outcome. Significantly, while the EP and BUDG committee publicly 
indicated some success in these ‘MFF 2014-2020’ negotiations (BUDG activity report 2014), sources 
suggest that the EP had to accept the Council’s harder line stipulating spending restrictions which 
worked out as real world cuts to budgets in contradiction to the BUDG committee and EP preferences 
(Jędrzejewska 2013). The BUDG committee chair was quoted in press releases as describing the 
‘MFF 2014-2020’ deal, rather unenthusiastically, as ‘merely decent’ (Fox 2013). 
More surprisingly, however, and again contrary to expectations, the impact of high turnover entering 
the 8
th
 term did not negatively affect, but in fact significantly enhanced, the influence of the BUDG 
committee in notable ways. Upon entering the 8
th
 term it was apparent ‘that these relations will 
improve and have already improved with this Commission [in the 8
th
 term]’ as a consequence of 
‘high BUDG committee [membership] turnover’. The significant level of turnover in the 8th term 
should not be underestimated; ‘in this Parliament [8th term] of course almost 70% or 80% of the 
committee are new’, it is ‘extraordinary as the entire bureau, the chairman, and the four vice 
chairs are new members of Parliament’.207 Despite this significant volume of ‘new faces on 
committee’208 a significant upturn in relations with the Commission was apparent from an early stage. 
Members of the BUDG committee found the improved relations, as a result of turnover, ‘surprising’. 
According to one senior committee member there is a ‘strong degree of optimism’, which even with 
high turnover within the BUDG committee at the 8
th
 term an improvement in the relationship is 
clearly in evidence, compared with the situation during the 7
th
 term. In part, also, a level of turnover in 
the Commission appears to have assisted the impression that relationships have dramatically 
improved 8
th
 term: 
‘With the new Commission I am very optimistic with the new Commissioner in charge of budgets, 
which is very good. In addition, the new DG for budgets was in charge of the financial services in 
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the previous Commission, and was highly appreciated by everyone and the relations with her are 
simple and based on confidence’.209 
Senior committee members are confident that the BUDG committee is not only going to maintain, but 
has actually increased, its legislative influence 8
th
 term. The reason for this increase in influence is 
that ‘turnover has refreshed the important relationship’210 between the BUDG committee and the 
Commission. The relationship was revitalised as a result of the ‘refreshing effect’ that ‘turnover can 
[and has had]’. This was identified by members who stated that ‘turnover is a good positive force’211 
on the BUDG committee. 
The issues with which the BUDG committee are dealing are ever expanding, becoming more 
complex, and evidence attests that the BUDG committee requires an intake of ‘fresh ideas to stay as a 
relevant policy actor’. The influential status of the BUDG committee is established and maintained by 
‘ensuring a balance between the old hands and younger members’212 coming into the committee. 
This, therefore, does not disregard the importance of ‘policy making expertise’ to the BUDG 
committee, according to members, ‘it’s often up to our skills, sometimes diplomatic, to circumvent 
the obstacles [to get a successful outcome]’,213 however, it illustrates the fundamental balance the 
committee needs to maintain in order to be influential and indicates the previously unforeseen and 
vital nature of ‘turnover [revitalizing] the committee’. The BUDG committee requires a level of 
‘refreshment every few years’. New member come into the BUDG committee with a ‘fresh look at 
our problems’, often as a result of having ‘a different parliamentary experience’,214 enabling the 
committee to come up with original and feasible policy solutions. The role of turnover is recognised 
by committee members as a source of BUDG committee influence, to the extent that some senior 
committee members have removed themselves from committee leadership roles ‘for instance I could 
have remained [in my committee position], but I refused as I thought that all the ideas I could have 
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on these issues I had implemented. It’s up to younger and different members with new ideas’. 215 
Senior members understand the potentially negative affect they could have for the BUDG 
committee’s influence if they became ‘roadblocks’ to new original policy making ideas; ‘It’s to 
probably younger and different members to continue the processes’.216 Very simply put ‘Yes, 
turnover is a positive for the [BUDG] committee’s’ influence as ‘it’s good to have fresh ideas’ and it 
is these ideas which establish the committee in an influential position; ‘turnover is good’. 
It is evident that the refreshing of membership, which brings in new ideas and concepts, is vitally 
important to the committee’s continuing influence. The committee’s lack of success during the ‘MFF 
2014-2020’ negotiations, in spite of being in a situation of possessing a highly experienced 
membership base as a result of a lower rate of turnover into this term, would support this contention. 
Thus, it is apparent from the empirical data collected here that ‘policy making expertise’ is not as 
significant a source of BUDG committee influence as would have been expected. Nevertheless, 
despite the important positive role of turnover, originally identified within this thesis, ‘policy making 
expertise’ does still have some important role to play in determining how the committee establishes its 
influence. 
As a direct result of possessing a developed level of ‘policy making expertise’ some members of the 
BUDG committee do in fact ‘know [the Council positions] because sometimes we get hold of the 
minutes of the Council meetings’, or often learn ‘who the ‘hold out’ member states are’217 which 
assists the committee in knowing what proposal would be more acceptable. This information directly 
related to policy making is not accessible by everyone, as it will often depend upon developed 
informal contacts which members possess as a result of ‘policy making expertise’. ‘Officially no, we 
do not formally see Council minutes , a lot of members of Parliament have ways inside the Council 
and have ways for getting inside policy information’.218 The impact of the BUDG committee being 
supplied negotiating information on the Council is significant, and knowledge on Council positions is 
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vital to the BUDG committee’s success on impactful legislation such as the ‘Annual Budget’. The 
importance of this was indeed highlighted in examples of the ‘2014 Annual Budgetary’ negotiations:  
‘We know there are two different groups of member states [on a budget], and although they appear 
to be one group we know exactly where the breaking line is, and it’s not surprising you will find the 
net payers and the net receivers
219
 in different positions’.220 
Having an informed knowledge of the Council’s position, as a result of a level of ‘policy making 
expertise’, BUDG committee members were able to understand what the main ‘sticking points’ were 
in the Council and were able to react accordingly, or simply put, used their ‘policy making expertise’ 
to the committee’s advantage. Without these minutes, the BUDG committee would have been lacking 
the policy information that ultimately facilitated the negotiating process to the benefit of the BUDG 
committee. While, as noted above, the committee does not always get what it wants, the committee 
was able to make some limited gains in the ‘2014 Annual Budget’, according to interview data, that it 
may have not achieved without a level of ‘policy making expertise’. 
Getting information on the Council’s negotiating positions, as on the ‘2014 Annual Budget’, is not a 
formal process, obtaining minutes ‘is strictly informal and not official’. This point emphasises the 
importance of contacts and relationships as ‘sometimes it is also the question of how good you can 
get along with your national representation’ when obtaining Council minutes and other information 
vital to good policy making. An additional caveat is that the exchange of information can be improved 
‘If they are a member of your own party, that helps a lot, but also if you have informal contacts 
with all the permanent representatives, it can be very good’.221 Consequently, there are a number of 
sources, often of a partisan nature, which the BUDG committee can and do draw upon to further the 
committee’s policy making information and, in turn, promote influence. ‘It’s good if you can 
approach guys [within the Council] and say “well is that what I presume”, and they will say “yes”. 
This is not official government information but you get an idea of what is going on in the 
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Council’.222 Partisan contacts as a source of the BUDG committee influence are evidently important; 
it is noted by an assistant to a member of the committee that ‘there are personal ties with ministries 
or even with the cabinets of ministers so the contact is there’ and that these ‘personal contacts’223 
are significantly linked to the committees being able to influence outcomes. These contacts only 
develop as a result of members developing a level of ‘policy making expertise’, ‘we learn who to 
contact and who to go to for policy information’.224 It is important to note this way of acquiring 
information is potentially not exclusive to the BUDG committee. It is possible all committees may use 
similar methods to acquire policy information if they have developed contacts similar to those 
observed here in the BUDG committee.  
4.3.2 Professional Expertise 
Members with ‘professional expertise’ will have specialist technical knowledge and informational 
contacts possibly not available to members without ‘professional expertise’. Assessing the relative 
level of ‘professional expertise’ within a committee is not difficult when MEPs publish their 
background data with the EP or on a personal website. If a committee appears to contain a high 
number of members with ‘professional experience’ that would suggest it is a useful source of 
committee influence as stated in the hypothesis (H2).
225
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Figure 4-6 Breakdown of professional expertise on the Committee on Budgets. Source: Collective curriculum vitas of 
committee members 
 
Figure 4-6 demonstrates the full breakdown of ‘professional expertise’ on the BUDG committee (7th 
term) between those who have a clear professional background in economics, finance, accountancy or 
any other area directly related to the BUDG committees remit, and those who would appear clearly to 
have none. 25 members (57%) of the BUDG committee in the 7
th
 term had no direct training or 
professional experience of finance or budgetary matters. 17 members (39%) of the committee did 
have a professional background in economics and finance.
226
 Marginally those without professional 
experience did outweigh those with experience. This data does, however, indicate that on the whole 
economic professionals are drawn to the committee as no other professional groups apart from career 
politicians were notably represented on the committee during the 7
th
 term.  
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Out of the 57% deemed to have no directly related professional experience, a large number have 
extensive domestic or European political backgrounds. Out of the 25 members listed with no 
economics background, 14 were highly experienced career politicians often with a previous 
specialisation in financial or budgetary policy areas. Some of these actors are senior EP and BUDG 
committee members who over the years have accumulated extensive specialist and technical 
knowledge. Many members did bring specialist/technical expertise understanding as a result of 
domestic governance experience; ‘I was a former budgetary minister and my successor on the 
committee is the finance minster, also, from the same government I was from at home’.227 Members 
will, of course, draw upon ‘policy making expertise’ from previous political experience, but it also 
apparent that some will carry a level of technical expertise from this professional political experience. 
Overall the data collected does indicate ‘professional expertise’ as a source of BUDG committee 
influence but potentially not an overriding one. It was deemed that having a ‘level of technical 
understanding is good’228 as this will help a committee member to efficiently deal with complex 
policy issues. The Commission have acknowledged that having BUDG committee members ‘who 
know what they are doing, technically’ is ‘helpful to everyone’.229 As a result of previous 
professional experience, members did know ‘what mechanism we could introduce and what would 
be technically workable [acceptable], to the Commission’230 and other actors. Interestingly, the 
common complaint, which was replicated in most interview data, was the frustrations over the 
Council’s, possibly deliberate (‘you call it playing politics, I call it stubbornness’231), 
misunderstanding of technical elements or ‘the [technical] solutions to problems’ of budgetary 
policy. This was evident in a number of proposals, surrounding the ‘Financial Regulation’. 
Members of the BUDG committee, as a result of former professional experience, were able ‘during 
the middle of the 7
th
 term’ to propose new ‘technical financial instruments’232 within the ‘financial 
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regulations’ of the EU. To very briefly outline the instruments, the committee proposed a so called 
‘revolving fund233’ payment system, which the Council was very positive towards as they are seen as 
‘positive towards any new financial mechanism’, but at the same time the Council ‘likes to keep 
control of all the money they can’. The outcome was that the Council agreed with the BUDG 
committee’s position that technically a mechanism was required, but looked to introduce changes to 
the ‘revolving fund’ in a way which disregarded the technical advice of the committee ‘so the 
revolving fund would only revolve for a single year, before going back into the budgets of the 
member states, who grab it’,234 rather than having the monies being recycled within the EU agencies. 
It would, however, take some ‘diplomatic skill’, essentially a level of ‘policy making expertise’ 
combined with the ‘professional expertise’ which BUDG members first displayed, to propose the 
revision to the ‘financial regulation’ to achieve some positive outcome.235 As stated by a member of 
the committee: 
‘I had to phone my permanent representative explaining to him what is going on and ask him 
please go back to the ministry of finance and explain to them if they insist on that point the new 
financial instruments [as a whole, including the ‘revolving funds’ point] will never fly and so he 
did. Next negotiation round the obstacle was gone’.236 
From the evidence collected it would appear that ‘the committee is attempting to propose innovative 
policy proposals’237, on its own initiative, which are technically feasible. While this would appear to 
confirm the importance of new ideas to the committee’s influence, as described above, the committee 
continues to face political resistance from the Council which must be overcome with the application 
of both policy making and professional [expert] resources.  
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‘It shows you politics from the member states is to a certain extent purely ignorant to solving the 
[technical] problem, they are more in favour of defending the [political] principle than solving a 
[technical] problem, or inventing a really innovative budgetary instrument here’.238 
So to be influential committee members do need a level of both technical expertise, which was shown 
in part to come from those members who did have previous professional backgrounds, to propose 
technically acceptable mechanisms, such as the ‘revolving funds’ payment system, and also a level of 
political understanding, such as knowing where the Council is on an issue, as a result of ‘policy 
making expertise’. While this is not an unexpected revelation it does potentially explain why 
‘professional expertise’ despite bringing very important benefits is not at higher levels on the 
committee as it is not a fundamental source of committee influence. 
The indication by committee members and assistants, within the empirical data, who themselves had 
limited or no ‘professional expertise’ was that not possessing such a background did not exclude them 
from being involved in policy making and assisting the committee overall. While the senior members 
interviewed did display clear levels of ‘professional expertise’ a number of potential expert sources, 
which BUDG committee member could utilise, were highlighted as supplementing any lack of 
membership expertise. The ‘secretariat is very important for all the MEPs, in the Budget committee, 
because of course they are involved with it all and know how it works with the whole picture and 
have the technical knowledge’239 which members may lack. This view was confirmed by senior 
members of the budgetary secretariat ‘because Parliament members, especially when they arrive, 
they do not have the expertise we [the budgetary secretariat] have here. We are the technical 
advisors, we prepare drafts for members and everything a member could need’240 with regard to 
technical information on policy. Members of the BUDG committee ‘are in contact’241 with their 
secretariat in order to supplement any technical expertise they are lacking as a result of not possessing 
professional backgrounds. Members without a professional background seemingly had ‘a wide range 
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of internal and external contacts to achieve [technical] information’242, which lessens the impact of 
lacking ‘professional expertise’ on the committee. ‘Professional expertise’ does supplement the 
committees overall influence, but is not a fundamental source. The reason for this is that the BUDG 
committee may be becoming more of a political rather than a technical committee, a role which the 
Committee on Budgetary control (CONT) may be adopting. 
Many members of the budget committee operate as both BUDG and CONT members. Each has a 
somewhat different attitude towards spending as ‘the members, like me who are on both committees, 
do have to restrain the spending attitudes of BUDG members, as we on the CONT committee have 
to monitor [the] spending and costs’. As one former CONT committee and sitting BUDG committee 
member put it ‘the budget controllers [CONT members] are always the ones who ruin the party’.243 
While the empirical data is not extensive, on this point, the indication from the limited interview data 
that does exist is that the CONT committee is becoming more of a ‘legislative active’ committee, 
trying to take over some ‘of the BUDG committee’s responsibilities’.244  This may reflect a maturing 
of the Parliament overall, as maturation in many comparable ‘older’ committee systems results in the 
more ‘important’ committees, in some cases, being perceived as political committee while the others 
become technical committees (Della Sala 1993). 
4.4 Committee Unity Perspective  
4.4.1 Political Dynamic of the BUDG Committee 
The BUDG committee consists of 44 members (7
th
 term) with the same number of substitute 
members, making it smaller than the ENVI committee that has 71 members (7
th
 term) but larger than 
the INTA committee that has 31 members (7
th
 term). The breakdown of the party groups within the 
committee is shown in figure 4-7 which highlights the EPP and S&D as the largest groupings. This 
dominance is not surprising as the committee reflects the partisan breakdown in microcosm of the 
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comparative party numbers of the Parliament. The dominance of the centre left and right can be seen 
in the interchange between S&D (PSE (SOC)) and EPP committee chairs. 
 
Figure 4-7 Party groupings of the BUDG committee 7th term. Source: European Parliament Website, BUDG 
committee Homepage 2014 
 
As shown in table 4-2, members of the centralist socialist group held the chairmanship of the Budget 
committee until 2004, and more recently the EPP have held the chair. The vice chair distribution, for 
the period of this study of the 7
th
 term, is also somewhat unremarkable to a large extent with two S&D 
vice chairs, one EPP vice chair (the EPP already controlled the chair) and one ALDE vice chair. This 
generally reflects the 81% of the committee members that these three groups collectively represent.
245
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Table 4-2 Chairs of the Committee on Budgets 
Date Held Chair   Chair Holder Party Grouping  
July 79 – July 84 Erwin Lange SOC 
July 84 – July 89 Jean-Pierre Cot SOC 
July 89 – July 94 Thomas Von Der Vring SOC 
July 94 – July 99 Detlev Samland SOC 
July 99 – July 04 Terry Wynn SOC 
July 04 – Jan 07 Janusz Lewandowski EPP 
Jan 07 – Jan 12 Reimer Boge EPP 
Jan 12 – July 14 Alain Lamassoure EPP 
July 14 -  Jean Arthuis ALDE 
Source: Corbett et al 2007, European Parliament Website Budget Committee Homepage 2014 
Within the current literature partisan conflict has been identified as playing a significant role in 
determining committee influence. Various studies indicate that conflict between the groups on the 
BUDG committee is extremely low and this has greatly supported the efforts of the BUDG committee 
to be influential in determining outcomes (Corbett et al 2007, Settembri & Neuhold 2009, Yoshinaka 
et al 2010). As identified in the theoretical framework, committee unity is extremely important, as a 
disunited front presented to other institutions can undermine committee influence. With particular 
emphasis on the present case study, the BUDG committee must have support from the plenary to have 
its position adopted, and consequently unity between party groups is vital for successful outcomes. 
The negative influence of any possible partisan conflict in the BUDG committee according to 
Settembri & Neuhold (2009) has not been particularly pronounced, and generally the committee 
largely operates in a consensual manner with political conflict being relatively low. This derives from 
a lack of a perceived left vs. right divide on the issues within which the budget committee functions 
(Settembri & Neuhold 2009). Whitaker (2005) comments that in order to achieve budgetary policy 
goals general consensus must be built between the party groupings. Even those more ‘Euro sceptic 
groups’ within the committee appear to ‘acknowledge the importance of unity’ as a source of 
influence, although it is generally with these groups that conflict can arise.
246
  
According to Whitaker (2005) the lack of partisan conflict is as a result of the significant direct 
influence that the committee has on budgets. The importance of the BUDG committee ensures that the 
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different national groups will attempt to represent the largest possible range of views on this 
committee in order to build consensus. This, according to Whitaker (2005) and supported by Judge & 
Earnshaw (2003), is to prevent undermining the national parties electoral position in their home states, 
which could be negatively impacted by partisan fighting and a disunited committee. According to 
Crombez & Høyland (2014) the main political party groupings are in close alignment and this can be 
clearly observed in roll call evidence of consistent voting patterns. Any divide that does take place on 
the budget is over the recognised ideological split between preferences for a bigger or smaller EU, 
such as over more funding for the integration projects (Crombez & Høyland 2014). Therefore, the 
generally acknowledged political unity between the groups on the BUDG committee would appear to 
be a significant source of influence.
247
 A committee presenting a united front to other actors will be 
stronger as a result, and much more so than if political infighting is persistent (Hix et al 2003).
248
 The 
empirical evidence collected would appear to support this perspective which helped to develop 
hypothesis 3.
249
 While less of a revelation than observations uncovered in the area of information 
expertise, particularly over turnover, it has been important to provide qualitative evidence to 
corroborate and further our current understanding of committee unity that to date has been based 
largely on quantitative roll call data (Crombez & Høyland 2014). Relying entirely on quantitative data 
may not reveal some of the interesting dynamics within the committee, and the qualitative data 
collected as part the present study introduces some important added perspectives to the current body 
of literature. 
4.4.2 Committee Unity 
The EPP and the S&D have routinely, over the different terms, made up the largest proportion of the 
committee.
250
 According to data collected, however, the committee in the 8
th
 term is very much 
dominated in its key positions by the centre right (this may reflect the gains made by the centre right 
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overall at the 2014 elections and the priority given to the BUDG committee). To quote a BUDG 
committee member in a leadership position, ‘we have a liberal chair, and a Christian democrat first 
vice chair, a socialist [as vice chair], and two other Christian democrats [vice chairs]’.251 The result 
of this is that members not coming from the Christian democrat tradition perceive the committee’s 
leadership as being ‘dominated by Christian democrats, they can support each other’252 and control 
the legislative agenda if they so wish. While this may be the situation in the 8
th
 term (2014-2019) the 
present study has focused upon the 7
th
 term where key committee positions were more evenly spread 
between the main groupings. In fact, the 7
th
 term, from the evidence gathered, has been marked as one 
of high consensus between the party groups, despite the wide political spread. Members attempt to 
work together to construct a united front against the Council.  
While members from the two main EP groups may dominate the committee, it has, nevertheless, been 
described as operating in a consensual manner, and along largely non-partisan lines (CEPS Report 
2012). A clear example of this was over the annual budget, potentially the most important area of 
involvement for the committee. It is common practice on the committee for the groups to unite over 
files such as the annual budgets. According to a highly senior MEP ‘I have chaired the budget 
committee for 5 years, the previous legislator [7
th
 term], and if I remember correctly, 4 times out of 
5 [on the annual budget] I got a majority made up of the two big groups, the EPP and the S&D, the 
ALDE and the Greens’.253  This evidence underpins the data collected in other studies (Yoshinaka et 
al 2010, Crombez & Høyland 2014) appearing to support the importance, and consistency of, 
committee unity. The only point where a grand voting bloc was not formed ‘was in the run up to the 
elections, so the Greens preferred not to join the majority, but it remained a huge majority’ on the 
2014 budget.
254
 Despite this single example when the Greens did not support the united front on the 
‘2014 Annual Budget’, the majority support was still 81% of the BUDG committee, rather than what 
would have been (86%) with the Greens. The committee and the political groups within it have 
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identified the importance that unity gives the committee ‘because it is an inter-institutional fight, we 
fight alongside the other party groups against the Council’.255 The leadership of the committee and 
the party groupings have clearly identified unity as a source of the committee’s influence, or at the 
very least how imperative it is to avoid a conflict which would undermine the committee’s overall 
standing. While ‘it is not always easy to reach a cohesive position’ members will actively look to 
create ‘cohesions between the groups’256 as it is important when gaining a final outcome. The 
dramatic negative effect which conflict can have has not always been addressed in some committees, 
either because it has not been identified as a factor, or partisan/political considerations have simply 
outweighed common cause, or unity on the scale operating within the BUDG committee is simply not 
possible. 
The BUDG committee does, according to empirical evidence collected, deliberately operate in a way 
to facilitate the greatest level of unity possible. The main reason for this is the formal majority which 
the committee must achieve in the plenary as a result of the formal budgetary procedures in place, a 
condition other committees do not have to meet as stringently. It is noteworthy that the committee has 
largely been successful in achieving its outcomes in plenary over the years (Westlake 1994). Internal 
rules, both informal and formal, that the committee has adopted, do promote this unity, according to 
the original evidence collected in this thesis. An example of this can be observed in the way 
legislative reports are allocated. One of the most important roles of the BUDG committee is to 
represent the EP in the budget negotiations that take place every year. This process would begin by 
selecting two rapporteurs to deal with the different aspects of the budget negotiations, firstly the 
Commission’s budget, and secondly the budgets of the other EU institutions (Corbett et al 2007). 
Both rapporteur positions are highly desirable and the negotiations that take place between the party 
groups to determine allocation are extensive. Selections for these positions have largely, but not 
exclusively, gone to members of the EPP and the centre left S&D grouping (Corbett et al 2007). It has 
also become informal practice ‘in the last five years that the BUDG committee has developed a 
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system of standing rapporteurs so that they were distributed among the political groups’257 to avoid 
conflict. This extends not just to the annual budgets and its rotation of rapporteurs, but also to co-
decision reports for which the committee has responsibility. ‘So according to political strength 
everyone got some responsibility, and also it was very clear in the beginning which political group 
got which rapporteur on the budget’.258 Any conflict over the allocation of reports has, therefore, 
taken place at an earlier point, negating the damage which would be done if conflict was visible or 
known about by other institutional actors at later negotiation stages. With this established system of 
standing rapporteurs within the BUDG committee, it is already apparent, before allocation, which 
groupings will get which reports based on the area.  
Some supporting evidence does, however, suggest that there are some tensions within the committee 
that, if systemic, may lessen the impact of unity. ‘Sometimes the interests are not the same between 
political groups and then they have a different opinion’ which can result in some ‘delicate 
situations’.259 As we have seen in the other case studies selected there is a great deal of competiveness 
between the party groups, and this has lead to an undermining of the standing of these committees, 
with a consequent reduction in influence. While the Budget committee is generally perceived as 
consensual in its operations, tensions still occur as a great deal of prestige is attached to some key 
files. All of the members of the committee ‘want to have the honour of having the responsibility on 
a certain subject’260 such as on the annual budget. The fallout from the last, and the expectations over 
the next, ‘MFF (2014-2020)’ has created tension, as ‘it is obvious in the coming 5 years that we [the 
BUDG committee] will have a midterm review of the multi annual framework’. The direct outcome 
of this as stated by a senior BUDG committee member is that: 
‘The Christian Democrats wanted to have responsibility for it [The ‘MFF 2014-2020’ negotiations] 
and the socialists said we will not accept that you have it alone, we will share responsibility over it 
and you get a socialist co-rapporteur. The Christian Democrats were against that for a very long 
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time because they wanted to have the responsibility alone. What is clear is that there is no better 
possibility [opportunity] to become visible [to have a high profile] in the Budget committee than on 
that very issue [of the MFF] because you are in direct confrontation with the presidency and the 
Council. You are something like the champion of the Parliament. It is about the prestige. It is not 
that we don’t trust the Christian democrats or they absolutely distrust us, there is some distrust, but 
it is more, I want the prestige for my political group’.261 
So there are clear partisan tensions, over some important legislative examples, which can affect the 
dynamics of the BUDG committee. Even the budgetary secretariat has found themselves in difficult 
situations, as ‘we have to be loyal to the coordinators positions’, putting them in a hard position, 
‘where opinions do differ’.262 In some cases the secretariat have ‘been asked’ by ‘a member of a 
small political group, or even a big group, to write something not pleasant for everyone, [but] we 
are obliged to do it’. The result appears to be, from the secretariat point of view ‘that sometimes [we 
have] taken the blame even if you don’t agree with this’263, rather than it being placed on the group 
that asked for the secretariat to write the original report. Evidence would, however, clearly indicate 
that conflict is an exception rather than a rule. Despite these isolated examples of friction over who 
controlled the ‘MFF 2014-2020’ policy negotiations, a position was reached between the groups 
which did not undermine the committee’s influence, but was ultimately seen as enhancing the 
committee’s position. 
The formal structures that the committee uses, as identified above, prevent any internal tension from 
negatively affecting the committee’s position towards other institutions in stark contrast to the 
interactions observed with the other case studies.
264
 Nevertheless the parties in the BUDG committee 
do work to protect their interests as ‘you have the advisors within the committees, the advisor of 
each political group and they are very useful as they will tell you “this is an EPP line; this is not an 
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EPP line” I don’t think it will be different for S&D’.265 However, despite party lines being advised, 
consensus is reached and unity has generally prevailed in the BUDG committee’s interactions with 
other institutions, to an extent that even ‘surprises’266 some members. Members have identified the 
benefits of ‘working together’ as the ‘enemy is not the other political groups but the Council’.267 
Thus all the evidence gathered supports the current assessment of committee unity as an extremely 
important source of the BUDG committee’s continuing influence, confirming hypothesis 3, with 
regard to this committee.
268
 
4.5 Public Policy Perspective 
It has been hypothesised (H4
269
) that committees dealing with distributive policy outputs will have 
less influence than other committees focusing on regulatory policy outputs, because, as history 
indicates, member states will put up greater resistance to the distribution/redistribution of funds 
(Burns 2005b). When member states are unsure of the consequences on sensitive distributive issues 
they will be resistant to increased supranational control in the area being devolved to EP committees. 
It has been argued that the budget in the past has been used as a side payment for furthering market 
integration, rather than being redistributive in aims (Carrubba 1997). This has been done in a way so 
as to circumvent objections by member states that may be disadvantaged economically. With the 
introduction of co-decision powers into the areas of budgets, some studies have indicated the 
prevalence of path dependence in blocking further reform of the budget (Lindner 2006). This has been 
observed most notably in dealing with distributive policy such as the CAP, and this in turn hinders the 
development of influence by the BUDG committee in those particular areas. Therefore, the success of 
the BUDG committee is likely to be linked heavily with the type of policy or the amendments it 
wishes to introduce, although this needs to be tested. As previously discussed, for many years the 
BUDG committee, with the separation between compulsory and non-compulsory spending, was 
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formally prevented from having an active role in the significant distributive areas, which included 
CAP spending. During the 7
th
 term the involvement in the more distributive side of the budget has had 
an effect on the BUDG committee’s attempted budgetary outputs, although this has not resulted in a 
positive increase in influence, according to evidence collected. In order to better understand the 
impact which policy type has on the BUDG committee a review of the appropriate literature should 
clarify if the committee is predominantly regulatory, or distributive, or somewhat mixed with regard 
to its desired legislative outputs. 
Overall there has been some disagreement over the labelling of the type of policy that the BUDG 
committee produces. Yordanova (2009a), who examined a breakdown of the policy outputs of the 
BUDG committee, determined they were principally regulatory in nature. Other studies suggest that 
the BUDG committee is actually distributive in both its policy output and where it wishes to allocate 
funds (Burns 2005b, Rasmussen 2011). According to Kauppi & Widgrén (2008) the BUDG 
committee and the Parliament, in contrast to the Council, are more likely to favour (re)distributive 
outcomes from decision making. This is supported by the empirical evidence gained from senior 
leadership members of the BUDG committee. There was a clear difference between firstly, the 
position of the Council, and secondly that of the Commission and the committee, over policy outcome 
preferences. The BUDG committee and EP are reported as being firm advocates for increased 
spending on ‘distributive programmes on social affairs and education’ and increased parliamentary 
control in the area (Burns 2005b); ‘members of the Parliament like to hand out money’.270 Thus the 
BUDG committee’s output does correlate with the concept of distributive outcomes, but with some 
mixed elements of regulatory policy with regard to financial regulation, discussed above, and non-
distributive budgetary areas. This is unsurprising as classically budgets are the prime area of 
distributive and redistributive policy with funds allocated and reallocated as a direct result of the 
budget (Kardasheva 2013). The differing conclusions as to the type of policy output produced by the 
BUDG committee, as reported in the literature, probably arise because the policy areas from which 
the committee was previously excluded were primarily distributive. 
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Little, however, has been written on the impact that policy output may have on the BUDG committee, 
beyond what has been hypothesised in this study and the classic view of budget policy outputs 
(Kardasheva 2013). If the general consensus is correct, and the BUDG committee is attempting to 
potentially increase distributive policy outputs, it will have a weakened influence over final policy 
outcomes as a consequence of facing greater resistance from the Council. According to Benedetto 
(2011) the resistance to supranational control may still exist preventing the BUDG committee’s 
growth in influence. While some areas of policy may have been subject to budgetary reform it is 
possible that other areas have had the status quo firmly entrenched in order to prevent budgetary 
reorganization (Benedetto 2011). Studies such as Kardasheva’s (2013), however, have proposed that 
the influence may have been increased in distributive areas, when the BUDG committee can make a 
‘logrolling’ deal with the Council in other areas. However, this study concludes that BUDG 
committee influence in distributive areas remains significantly weak compared with actors in 
regulatory policy areas. 
Empirical data 
The possible effect of policy output may well have intensified with the abrogation of the divide 
between ‘compulsory’ and ‘non-compulsory’ spending. For many years, key distributive areas, such 
as agriculture, covering CAP payments that make up the largest section of the budget, were beyond 
the BUDG committee’s remit (Westlake 1994). This, according to a supporting member ‘was devised 
by the French, for France, for agriculture, to ring fence agriculture and the funding of the CAP’, 
and this was done by ‘ensuring that both the substance of the policy, and the financing of the policy 
would be in the hands of the governments and the ministers, and without a role for the Parliament, 
apart from giving its advice: but nobody took account of Parliament’s advice’.271 Therefore, 
previously, as a result of this desire on behalf of member states to keep control of compulsory and 
distributive expenditure, the BUDG committee was excluded to a purely advisory role. During the 7
th
 
term ‘with the Lisbon treaty on the expenditure side, now there is no difference between the 
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mandatory [compulsory] and non mandatory [non-compulsory] spending, and the powers of the 
Parliament are the same in all the budget lines’.272 Nevertheless the member states’ extreme interest 
in the area, formally under compulsory spending, has not lessened despite the BUDG committee’s 
new active involvement in this heavily distributive area. Evidence published to date, on balance, 
would indicate that the BUDG committee is not drawing influence because of the type of policy that it 
is making. An insight into the policy dynamics at play is most appropriately undertaken by an 
examination of the practical legislative example of the ‘general draft budget of the European Union 
for the financial year 2014’ (‘Annual Budget 2014’) which took place at the end of the 7th term when 
the budget committee should have been at the zenith of its influence. 
Evidence supplied from a number of senior sources demonstrates that the BUDG committee and the 
EP ‘did not feel that a successful outcome was gained at the ‘2014 budget’ negotiations’.273 The 
BUDG committee stated that it “deplored the Council’s decision to proceed again this year with the 
usual approach of horizontal cuts to the draft budget, aiming at artificially reducing the level of the 
Union’s resources for 2014” (Jensen & Hohlmeier 2013: 1). The Parliament was also “surprised that 
in its position, the Council” has both “not taken into account agreements on the MFF” (made 
previously between the BUDG committee and Council) over the “frontloading [of] Erasmus+ and 
Horizon 2020 programmes”274, but also “decreased further the appropriations for some of those 
programmes” (Jensen & Hohlmeier 2013: 1). This was unpalatable to the committee, and EP, as 
normally the ‘BUDG committee amends to [try to] reinforce and beef up its lines generally over the 
last few years in what we call category A1, research, infrastructure, investments for the future, 
Erasmus and also category 4 on foreign policy’.275 This is a clear budgetary line where the 
committee has a distributive preference, ‘it’s a very important ‘heading’ for us [BUDG committee] 
which we really care about’276, and where it is has been successful in the past. From evidence gained 
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it is clear that the BUDG committee was unable to resist either a cut in real spending or gain in future 
commitments to spending. In total the ‘2014 Annual Budget’ saw a 9.4% drop in spending compared 
with the ‘2013 Annual Budget’, and as a result all headings apart from administration faced extensive 
real term cuts (Fox 2015). 
The BUDG committee and the Parliament decried the Council’s positions over the 2014 budget, and 
its implications for the wider framework, which was to cut funding by reducing commitments ‘for the 
Multi Annual Framework, that we have a situation where the payments are 5% below the 
commitments and this is political suicide’.277 Therefore, the Council was adamant in its position on a 
reduction of funds and the BUDG committee during the 7
th
 term, as evident in the ‘2014 budget’, was 
forced to accept the Council’s position. This is more significant when it is considered that ‘they [the 
Council] are cutting down the payments, firstly the commitments and then the payments even 
more’.278 So both the promised commitments member states had made to fund the BUDG 
committee’s priorities in the future, and the actual monetary payments distributed to the areas, have 
been reduced. The political situation between the BUDG committee and Council has become difficult 
as ‘Sunday they [the Council] are telling the public “the EU is to give money to innovations” and 
on Monday they cut the research and development money’.279 The result of this is that it is unlikely a 
compromise will be reached favourable to the BUDG committee, which undoubtedly impacts the 
committee’s overall influence. The BUDG committee finds this exasperating as ‘there is no political 
line or purpose, they [the Council] just cut it down and you don’t see a system; we just look at the 
cuts and ask, why? And there is no reason for it’.280 There is a clear and fundamental policy divide 
between the Council and BUDG committee over the distribution of funds. This is evident in the 
normal outcome of conciliation between the committee and the Council: 
‘Tomorrow in the afternoon we will have the first conciliation with the Council, that normally stops 
after some minutes, because they have made their point, and we have made our point; then we 
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would say to the Council do you have something to offer, and they say no, and we say thank you, 
and then go home’.281 
While in all areas there are nominal tensions between EP committees and the Council, the current 
relationship between the BUDG committee and the Council over the policy of direct funding and 
commitment cuts is not conducive to gaining the desired outcomes that the BUDG committee wishes, 
especially in distributive areas. In other comparative areas the Council and relevant committees do 
have different policy preferences that lead to conflict
282
, and how systemic and fundamental these 
policy divides are will impact on committee influence. Due to the fundamental nature of the policy 
divide between the Council and BUDG committee in distributive areas it is less likely a compromise 
deal will be reached in negotiations, meaning that the BUDG committee will be less likely to gain a 
favourable compromise outcome. The empirical evidence indicates that this was true in the example 
of the ‘2014 Budget’ and mirrors the unfavourable outcomes as observed with the resultant massive 
budgetary cuts. 
The evidence above gleaned from the interactions of the BUDG committee with the Council clearly 
supports the hypothesis (H4) that distributive committees have significant problems in influencing 
policy. Consequently distributive policy outputs are not a source of influence for the BUDG 
committee, and, in fact, may be detrimental to its influence. The wider impact of this will be discussed 
in the final chapter in comparison with the other case studies, and conclusions will be drawn on 
whether public policy type is a major determining factor in EP committee legislative influence. The 
evidence collected on the BUDG committee clearly demonstrates that the committee was not able to 
increase funding in distributive areas, and in fact saw a cut in the commitments and payments to its 
priority projects. Therefore, to reiterate, policy type is most certainly not a positive source of 
legislative influence for the BUDG committee. 
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 This was reflected on not only the case study committees but was reflected by actors working on the JURI, 
AGRI, IMCO, FEMM and CONT committees in interview data. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
It is unlikely that any committee would merely utilise a single source of legislative influence, and the 
present study confirms that the BUDG committee is no exception as it is evidently drawing upon a 
number of sources, some predictable, some not, to exert influence. New evidence has been generated 
to support, or complement, existing perspectives such as the importance of policy making expertise 
and committee unity, while other findings such as the potential positive outcomes of turnover have 
questioned current expected convention. Overall the BUDG committee has been an excellent case 
study to examine and it has provided not only different but also some novel perspectives on 
understanding the dynamics of the various sources of committee influence, such as the role of 
turnover and committee unity to the committee. 
‘Policy making expertise’ was discovered to be operating in a way contrary to what would be 
expected and has been reported within the current literature. Turnover levels, and the associated 
institutional memory loss, have been highlighted as a factor adversely affecting committee influence 
in a range of studies (Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, Lindner 2006). Evidence within this case study, 
demonstrated this assumption as over-simplistic, in the selected example. In respect to the BUDG 
committee, the establishment of new and positive relationships, as a result of turnover, have played a 
vital role in the committee’s overall influence. Not only had previous fractious and consequently 
unproductive relationships been replaced with more positive interactions (between the Committee and 
Commission) but also an infusion of ‘new blood’ has contributed new ideas on improving procedures 
and enhancing outputs. Thus, the BUDG committee draws influence from regular ‘refreshment’ and 
membership turnover may not impinge on ‘policy making expertise’ and institutional memory as 
much as was previously thought, perhaps because a significant amount of it is embedded within the 
secretariat (or other permanent services). 
These are significant findings that provide contrary evidence to the current convention that turnover is 
heavily detrimental to a committee’s influence. The committee, also, draws some influence from a 
level of ‘professional expertise’, although potentially this is starting to shift towards, and more 
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important for, the CONT committee. It was, also, confirmed within the chapter that the unity of the 
BUDG committee between the party groups is a significant source of influence. By consistently 
presenting a united front to other actors, the BUDG committee’s position could not be easily 
undermined. Informal norms (on rapporteur-ship allocation) are shown as important in sustaining the 
unity observed as vital to the committee’s influence.283 While the findings of the present study 
generally confirmed previous studies it, also, provided additional original information on the partisan 
dynamic within the BUDG committee, and demonstrated that while some partisan tensions remain 
present the committee clearly identifies the importance of establishing unity before negotiating with 
the other institutions. Finally, the findings on policy output type did confirm hypothesis 4. Following 
the reforms of the ToL, that extended the BUDG committee’s remit to cover significant additional 
distributive elements, the committee was unable to expand its influence, as an expansion of powers 
may have indicated, as a result of the Council continuing to resist distributive outcomes. The 
committee is, therefore, confirmed as not establishing its influence as a result of the type of policy 
outcome it desires.  
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Chapter Five Committee on International Trade 
5.1 Introduction 
The INTA committee has been identified in previous research as being an important actor because of 
the significant formal legislative power it possesses, despite a perceived lack of ‘specialised/technical 
expertise’ on the committee (Woolcock 2010c, Kleimann 2011, Richardson 2012, Gstöhl 2013). This 
widely accepted perspective, with regard to the INTA committee’s influence, has been tested at length 
below, and conversely it has been demonstrated for the first time, with original empirical data, that the 
INTA committee’s influence is drawn in large proportion from high levels of ‘professional expertise’ 
contained within its membership. These new empirical findings, not only challenge the prevailing 
convention of what comprises the INTA committee’s sources of influence, as previously promulgated 
in the literature (which was not always supported by empirical evidence) but also helps to expand 
upon our general understanding of the sources of committee influence. 
In order to give an appropriate perspective and to establish the INTA committee’s situation within the 
overriding framework of this thesis, in the first instance, its’ place within the decision-making process 
during the 7
th
 term has been extensively reviewed and discussed. Past literature on the committee has 
been examined in order to identify potentially from which sources the committee has been drawing 
its’ influence. Thereafter previous claims surrounding the committee have then been tested, alongside 
the hypotheses, as outlined in the theoretical framework, with original data, in order to elucidate a 
better understanding of how the committee has been able to establish its’ influence. The chapter 
concludes by reviewing the findings generated from this final case study.  
5.2 The Decision Making Process 
Trade has long been at the centre of EU policy making, ever since the establishment of the customs 
union in 1957. Trade is a policy area that is deeply institutionalised within the EU (Young 2011). The 
Commission is the formal representative of the EU in any international trade agreements (Young 
2011), and research has previously focused significantly upon the role of the Commission in 
international trade as a result. However, with the changes deriving from different EU reforming 
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treaties, the ToL being the most recent, the power and involvement of the INTA Committee in the 
process of European international trade policy, although it is yet to be extensively studied, has 
increased considerably.
284
 
The institutional origins of the INTA committee follow a somewhat convoluted pathway compared 
with the development of other EP committees. These complex origins have seemingly had 
consequences with regard to the committee’s current standing and involvement in the decision-
making process. The body which would become the International Trade Committee was known 
initially as the External Economic Relations Committee (EERC) on its founding in 1978. In 1999 the 
EERC was absorbed by the Industry, Research and Energy Committee (ITRE), and as a result lost its 
independent status. The committee, which would become known as the International Trade 
committee, would only (re)gain independence as a formal EP committee with its re-establishment as 
late as 2004 (Corbett et al 2007).
285
 While some studies (Corbett et al 2007) do track the INTA 
committee over these different iterations, others suggest (Woolcock 2008, 2010b) it only had its 
genesis in 2004, and as a result it is perceived as being a relatively ‘junior committee’ with an 
underdeveloped institutional memory (Woolcock 2010b: 23), which may as a result affect the 
committee’s overall legislative influence. A committee identified as relatively ‘junior’ and lacking in 
significant seniority in membership will be perceived as a less powerful legislative actor than more 
established committees with a high degree of senior membership (Kleimann 2011). It has been 
proposed by Woolcock (2010b), however, that while the INTA committee may be ‘junior’ and 
lacking in institutional memory it remains potentially a highly influential committee, whose influence 
has only expanded over time as a result of its increased formal potential to impact trade deals. 
Furthermore, this assessment by Woolcock (2010b) was before the implementation of the ToL (2009) 
reforms, which further expanded the committee’s formal involvement in the decision making process. 
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 With the introduction of the Lisbon treaty for the first time the INTA committee has gained a veto over trade 
negotiations as well as seeing its remit of co-decision expanded to include regulation on the implementation of 
trade agreements. 
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 Interestingly some current INTA members ‘remember working on the old EERC’, showing a level of 
maintained institutional memory ‘for those days sometime ago’. Interview with Senior Member of the 
Committee on International Trade 15/1/16. Glasgow. UK 
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With the application of the ToL
286
 during the 7
th
 term, the EP (based on the INTA committee’s 
position that will set a defined recommendation) and the Council now must equally agree upon the 
adoption of all international trade agreements, under the ‘consent procedure’. The EP/ ‘INTA 
committee cannot amend trade agreements due to the application of the consent procedure’287, but 
the INTA committee continues to remain able to have a significant impact and influence over the 
actual policy making process (Gstöhl 2013). The EP must approve all multilateral trade agreements 
negotiated by the Commission before they can be ratified (Woolcock 2010a, 2010b, Young 2011, 
TFEU Art.218 (10)). In effect the INTA committee holds a significant veto power with its ability to 
propose the EP’s position to consent, or not, to an agreement. While it is unlikely that the INTA 
committee would veto an international trade agreement which has overwhelming support, such as 
from all member states in the Council as well as the Commission, some agreements have been 
influenced at the negotiation stage by the committee to include provisions such as greater focus on 
human rights conditions within Free Trade Agreements (FTA) (Woolcock 2010a, 2010b). Prior to 
Lisbon, the INTA committee was recognised as an actor with significant potential to influence the 
outcome of agreements, with the Commission taking notice of an opinion produced by the committee 
over where objections may arise. Lisbon formally codified many already established informal 
conventions, placing the INTA committee in an even more significant position to (potentially) affect 
outcomes by imbuing it with formal powers, such as an ex-post veto, to potentially force any issues 
(Young 2011, Van den Putte et al 2014). 
In addition, after Lisbon, there are now formal requirements for the Commission to inform the INTA 
committee of the progress of any international trade negotiations. The Commission must regularly 
report to the INTA Committee and the Council’s Trade Policy Committee (TPC) jointly, and with the 
same policy information (Woolcock 2010c). Some studies have questioned this apparent equality, 
between the INTA committee and TPC, by asserting that the TPC has a higher stature than the INTA 
committee due to the higher levels of ‘expertise’ reportedly contained within the Council (Woolcock 
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 The formal responsibilities of the International Trade Committee as defined within the treaty framework of 
the EU is located in Appendix VIII.  
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 Interview with Senior Member of the Committee on international Trade 17/11/15 Phone Interview 
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2010c, Gstöhl 2013). The first stage of any international trade negotiations begins with the 
Commission setting out its negotiating mandate. This mandate is subsequently sent to the Council for 
agreement. Formally it is only the Council who are involved in accepting the Commission’s original 
mandate. It has been suggested, however, that the INTA committee and the Parliament are involved at 
an informal level when the Commission is creating its negotiating positions (Van den Putte et al 
2014). The practice for a substantial time has been for the Commission to conduct so-called ‘scoping 
exercises’ on the attitudes of the INTA committee and other institutional actors. These ‘scoping 
exercises’ would be conducted for all FTA negotiations to effectively sound out the committee’s 
likely position in order to avoid a possible veto coming from it at a later, ex-post, stage (Richardson 
2012). While the INTA committee can have no formal agenda setting impact on the negotiating 
mandate proposed by the Commission, a significant impact on the mandate can still be made by the 
committee expressing its position. By stating an early opinion the INTA committee can clearly 
indicate what it is willing to accept, and what it would find unacceptable in the Commission proposal 
(Van den Putte et al 2014). An indication that the Commission had changed its voting mandate or 
even adopted a different mandate to placate the committee would suggest important levels of 
‘committee influence’ at a key formative stage.288 Therefore the INTA committee in practice is 
allowed some remit in influencing the agenda of trade agreements. 
Empirical cases, such as the Japan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations
289
, certainly indicate a 
key level of involvement in this important agenda setting stage by the INTA committee (Van den 
Putte et al 2014). During the lead up to FTA negotiations with Japan, the EP requested that no 
negotiations should take place before the INTA committee had produced and issued its position on the 
Commission’s proposed mandate (Van den Putte et al 2014). This is significant as the committee 
wished to make its position clear to the Commission at this earlier stage in order to, attempt to, 
influence the negotiating mandate. With the introduction of the Lisbon treaty the INTA committee 
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 The ability to influence a proposal, ex ante, by a committee is a significant example of committee influence 
(Shepsle & Weingast 1987). 
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 The Japan ‘Free Trade agreement’ (FTA) sought to remove barriers, such as trade tariffs, between Japan and 
the European Union in order to establish a free trade area where there are no impediments to the exchange and 
trade of goods between the areas (Japan and EU member states). 
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and the EP soon made it clear that they would closely monitor every stage of international trade 
negotiations and ratification, indicating they would attempt to use its new found ability to its fullest 
potential (Woolcock 2010c). 
The relationship between the INTA committee and the Commission had, to some extent, informally 
developed pre-Lisbon, with the agreement to inform the committee of trade negotiations via the so 
called ‘Luns-westerterp’ procedure (Richardson 2012). These informal agreements came as a result of 
the committee attempting to pre-empt the reform that would be introduced in the ToL, in order to 
become more accustomed with the processes involved. The INTA committee was, therefore, able to 
adapt more rapidly than comparable committees to its new powers having built up its institutional 
memory pre-Lisbon adoption (Armanovica & Bendini 2014). However, the ability to successfully use 
its involvement in the international trade agreement process, to impact outcomes, will depend on 
where the committee is drawing its influence from. Indeed studies would suggest that the INTA 
committee is deficient in major areas, such as lacking significantly in ‘expertise’ and ‘specialist 
knowledge’ (Woolcock 2010c, Kleimann 2011, Richardson 2012, Gstöhl 2013, Van den Putte et al 
2014). 
Beyond the, albeit significant, involvement of the INTA committee in international trade agreement 
negotiations, post Lisbon, the committee is also formally involved in the important decision making 
area of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP).
290
 The OLP now applies to the CCP and external 
trade regulations, and, therefore, the formal role of the committee in this area has expanded 
significantly (Woolcock 2010b, 2010c). Legislation linked to the implementation of trade policy now 
also falls under the OLP. The INTA committee has dealt with a growing number of co-decision 
reports that need to be negotiated with the Council in the implementation of trade framework 
agreements (Eeckhout 2011). The committee is now an equal partner in the decision making process 
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 Common Commercial Policy brings under the competency of the INTA committee areas such as 
implementation of international trade agreements, anti-dumping policy, foreign (external of EU) direct 
investment regulation, and other key trade interments related to Common Commercial Policy (Article 207.2 
TFEU, Gstöhl 2013) 
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alongside the Council; it is able to propose amendments and ultimately veto legislation falling under 
the OLP and its remit. 
While these formal powers are important to the INTA committee, and its potential involvement in the 
decision making process, they do not, however, identify the sources which the committee draws upon 
to exercise its influence in practice. As discussed in the theoretical framework it is the utilisation of 
different sources of influence that accounts for a committee’s overall influence and its ability to 
maximise legislative outputs towards its own preferences. Elements of each of the three proposed 
perspectives, ‘expertise’, ‘unity’ and ‘policy output’, as outlined in chapter 2, have to some extent 
been identified as being instrumental in determining the INTA committee’s influence. However, the 
current understanding as to what extent each of these different perspectives accounts for the INTA 
committee’s influence is highly ambiguous. 
5.3 Informational Perspective 
The general consensus of studies that have examined the INTA committee is that the committee is 
lacking in both technical specialization (associated with ‘professional expertise’) and institutional 
memory (‘policy making expertise’) (Woolcock 2010b, 2010c, Kleimann 2011, Richardson 2012, 
Gstöhl 2013). However, many of the literature sources discussed, while focusing on specialist 
information and expertise, do not always precisely report on what type of specialization they observe, 
be it ‘policy making expertise’ or more technical expertise (as a result of professional backgrounds), 
that may be lacking. Furthermore they have often lacked empirical evidence to support the 
assumptions made.  
It has been the general consensus that while the INTA committee is, with Lisbon, formally equal with 
its counterpart in the Council, the Trade Policy Committee (TPC), with respect to the high level of 
information to which it has access, the INTA committee actually contains a significantly lower level 
of ‘technical expertise’ (Kleimann 2011). This, as a consequence, is thought to undermine the 
committee’s position against the TPC, which has been acknowledged to contain significant ‘expertise’ 
(Woolcock 2010c, Gstöhl 2013). Woolcock (2010b) suggests that, while the committee does appear to 
179 
 
have the same level of specialist information as the Council, or at least is apparently well informed of 
the Commission’s negotiating progress291, its influence and impact on negotiations has yet to be fully 
analysed (or realised) due to a lack of research. The INTA committee being informed, after Lisbon, at 
every stage of the negotiating and decision making process has been perceived to have extensively 
expanded its potential to try and shape the negotiation agenda, not only at an early stage but also 
throughout the decision making process (Woolcock 2010c, Richardson 2012). Without a level of 
expertise, however, to fully utilise the information to which the committee now has access, the 
potential gains in influence could be undermined. Nevertheless, a potential to develop ‘policy making 
expertise’ may well result from the abundance of information available. 
Strong relationships between the Commission and EP committees can facilitate the spread of 
specialist information vital to a committee’s influence. Currently, the flow of specialist information 
between the two actors appears to be good according to the formal provisions in place, despite the 
perceived lack of ‘technical expertise’ on the INTA committee, and the relationship potentially still 
maturing (Kleimann 2011). There is a clear indication from Richardson (2012) that the information, 
both technical and political (related to ‘policy making’), coming from the Commission is, however, 
spread asymmetrically across the INTA committee. Different party groups and MEPs, such as the 
greens and other left-wing MEPs, have commented that policy information supplied formally to the 
whole INTA committee is often short on crucial details (Richardson 2012). Many of these important 
missing details will only find their way to specific groupings or individuals on the committee. 
Seemingly, therefore, the committee as a whole is not fully empowered by information coming from 
the Commission, access to which does apparently depend on partisan factors. The reasons for this 
asymmetrical spread of information have been attributed to the relationship that has developed 
between the Commission and some select INTA committee members (Van den Putte et al 2014). This 
may, however, be a weak explanation without further examination, as it is unclear if this was as a 
result of personalities clashing over a single term, or resulting from ideological cleavages. 
                                                          
291
 It is now also formal practice that members of the Parliament (in practice mainly INTA members) will be 
granted observer status in international trade negotiations, increasing the Parliament’s ability to monitor 
important events (Armanovica & Bendini 2014). 
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Importantly, however, an asymmetrical input of information to the committee as a whole would 
further exacerbate a lack of any technical understanding. 
According to Van den Putte et al (2014) & Richardson (2012) those MEPs on the INTA committee 
who adopt a more classically liberal approach to trade policy have a stronger relationship with the 
Directorate-General (DG) for trade (where considerable policy making and technical expertise is 
retained (Kleimann 2011)), which has a similar liberalizing attitude towards trade. Perhaps not 
surprisingly it has been suggested those members sharing the Commission’s perspectives are better 
informed than those who hold different ideological trade positions. Studies (Van den Putte et al 2014) 
suggest highly important policy documents, which will often include significant details on the 
Commission’s negotiating positions, will only be transmitted to a select number of committee 
members. Formally members of the INTA committee including the chair, the vice chairs, the 
responsible rapporteur and the party coordinators should be supplied with this highly sensitive 
information from the Commission (Devuyst 2013). This, however, has not changed the fact that many 
on the political left of the Parliament still comment that they are under briefed on the Commission’s 
positions, and the information provided to them is of a lower standard than is supplied to their trade 
liberalizing counterparts (Van den Putte et al 2014). 
According to Richardson (2012) the party groupings are not significantly involved in facilitating the 
flow of policy making information passing between the Commission and committee. Interactions 
between the Commission and INTA committee often take place through the non-political secretariat 
(Richardson 2012). However, the effect of this exchange between party groups and their MEPs is not 
well established and, therefore, comprises an area for further examination in the empirical section 
below. 
While the implications on the role of partisan groupings in supplying expertise remain to be 
determined, more research has focused on the perceived impact of the late establishment of the INTA 
committee, as an independent committee, on the levels of retained expertise (Kleimann 2011, 
Richardson 2012). The general, though somewhat limited, consensus is that the source of the INTA 
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committee’s influence is not rooted in a high level of expert knowledge or seniority retained within 
the committee (Kleimann 2011, Richardson 2012, Gstöhl 2013). Richardson (2012) has commented 
that due to the INTA committee’s late formation the relationships vital to a committee’s influence 
with external (to the EP) expert groups has yet to become fully consolidated, and as a result the 
committee is perceived as lacking extensive expertise which would be provided by external groups. 
Almost paradoxically, however, due to its ‘junior nature’ (Kleimann 2011) the INTA committee is 
perceived as requiring a greater input from external groups such as interested stakeholders and 
relevant lobbyists, than more established committees, to fully maximise effectiveness. As a result of 
the need for specialist information the INTA committee does appear, according to different studies, to 
potentially rely heavily on outside experts, who will undoubtedly come with their own agendas 
(Richardson 2012). According to Kleimann (2011) the ‘junior’ nature of the committee means that 
expertise contained within the INTA committee is underdeveloped and as a result its negotiating 
influence is weaker.  
The impact of the INTA committee’s perceived junior nature, also, impinges on its relationship with 
the Council (Kleimann 2011). Due to the Council’s (TPC) long association with trade policy 
agreements alongside the Commission, it is identified as a powerful actor with a developed 
institutional memory. The TPC has had a significant number of years to successfully build up its own 
internal expertise and develop efficient working practices between civil servants (Richardson 2012, 
Van den Putte et al 2014). Added to this there are the substantial resources and expertise that the 
member states have at their disposal to use in the Council. Woolcock (2010b) suggests that while the 
Commission will inform the INTA committee at the same level as the TPC, the two institutions are 
not equal in resources. The committee cannot compete with the TPC due to the latter body having 
‘more expertise, institutional memory and meeting every week, rather than once a month, as in the 
case of the INTA [committee]’ (Woolcock 2010b). Consequently, the INTA committee is starting 
from a lower experience baseline than the TPC and is required to catch up, a task that would 
seemingly be further hampered by the regular turnover in committee membership (Richardson 2012). 
Despite these apparent deficiencies both Richardson (2012) and Woolcock (2010b) believe that the 
182 
 
INTA committee still has a significant potential to influence legislative outcomes and trade 
agreements. Without the technical expertise, however, according to Kleimann (2011: 13) the 
committee will find it ‘difficult’ to ‘translate political preferences into credible and well-informed 
negotiation positions’.  
Nevertheless the INTA committee is still viewed as an important actor with growing legislative 
influence that can significantly affect trade policy outcomes, and ‘is the most current [salient] 
popular committee to be on for members’292 in the 8th term. In previous parliamentary terms the 
INTA committee had been perceived as an actor with relatively low levels of legislative output. 
However, with the expansion of co-decision, the level of legislation produced expanded significantly 
during the 7
th
 term. Between the end of 2009 and beginning of 2014 (the 7
th
 term) the INTA 
committee processed 53 co-decision files and 73 files that fell under the consent procedure 
(Armanovica & Bendini 2014). A report by the CEPS (2012) examining the legislative output of all 
EP committees recognised the INTA committee as one that had increased in competence, and 
influence, over the years, a process that had accelerated with the implementation of the Lisbon treaty. 
The committee was well aware that an ‘increase in the INTA committee’s powers’ would lead to an 
‘increase in workload’293 and this, in fact, did happen. The INTA’s ability to deal successfully with 
an increased workload will to some extent define its current level of influence.
294
 An inefficient 
committee will struggle to be influential (Kreppel 2003, Maurer 2003), especially if pre-existing 
expertise is perceived as deficient as is the general consensus with the INTA committee. 
5.3.1 Policy Making Expertise 
Many of the elements of ‘policy making expertise’ are perceived as absent within the INTA 
committee according to the current literature (Woolcock 2010c, Kleimann 2011, Richardson 2012, 
Gstöhl 2013). ‘Policy making expertise’ is associated with, and often physically evident in the level of 
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 Interview evidence demonstrated that despite the increase in work load, the INTA committee and Parliament 
had difficulty in expanding its resources as this was blocked by the Council as it would have increased their 
monetary contributions, which they oppose at an almost fundamental level, according to a number of the 
recorded conversations with Brussels actors. 
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turnover and membership retention that a legislative committee experiences. A higher level of 
membership retention between terms would suggest an established level of membership experience, 
and retained ‘policy making expertise’. The rate of membership retention of the INTA committee for 
the 7
th
 parliamentary term is displayed in figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1 Membership retention rate of the International trade committee entering into the 7th term from the 6th. 
Source: International Trade Committee website (2014). 
Figure 5-1 demonstrates that not only was membership retention low but a noteworthy number of  
experienced INTA members left the committee before the start of the 7
th
 term taking with them their 
acquired ‘policy making expertise’ and institutional experience. This would automatically indicate 
that ‘policy making expertise’ was not present to a significant level within the INTA committee during 
the 7
th
 term, and does to an extent explain why recent studies, conducted during the 7th term 
(Kleimann 2011, Richardson 2012, Gstöhl 2013), have associated the INTA committee with 
containing low levels of expertise. To take figure 5-1 at face value would be to underplay the potential 
level of ‘policy making expertise’ which may have been contained within the INTA committee, 
entering into the 7
th
 term, as a direct result of experienced MEPs joining the INTA committee at the 
start of the term (Figure 5-2). 
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Figure 5-2 Rate of EP committee system experience entering INTA committee 7th term. Source: International Trade 
Committee (2014). 
Figure 5-2 reveals that while ‘policy making expertise’ will be more developed with a higher retention 
rate of experienced INTA committee members, some benefit will result from having members who 
have previous experience of the EP committee system ‘or have a level of name recognition’.295 The 
INTA committee was seen as ‘the committee to be on [for the 7th term and 8th]’296 by experienced, 
and senior, parliamentarians as a result of a perception that the INTA committee would be one of the 
most influential committees after the ToL was enacted. High turnover on the committee came in part 
as a result of ‘experienced MEPs seeking to join the [INTA] committee’297 on mass and maximise its 
potential influence. This, therefore, raises further questions about the claimed absence of ‘policy 
making expertise’ on the INTA committee, 7th term. Even if ‘policy making expertise’ was low as a 
result of turnover, membership retention need not be a prerequisite for a committee to be significantly 
influential, as observed in the present study with the ENVI and BUDG committees (Chapter 3 and 4). 
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The rejuvenation of a committee by the acquisition of ‘new blood’ membership was viewed just as, or 
even more significant, to its influence, as its level of membership retention. To accept that the INTA 
committee was weaker, in terms of influence, in the 7
th
 term because of high membership turnover 
(Richardson 2012) would, therefore, be premature in the light of supporting findings showing an 
influx of experienced MEPs entering the committee at this point bringing with them significant 
‘policy making expertise’.  
With data collected from elite interviews it was evident, as expected, that ‘policy making expertise’ 
was highlighted by all actors at all levels within the INTA committee as being a ‘potentially 
significant source of influence’.298 This has been empirically demonstrated, and as a typical 
interviewee states that ‘to have the information [on policy] is one of the main and important things’ 
for actors to be influential and the committee to be effective overall; however, ‘normally it 
[information] is not given to you’.299 The significance placed on ‘policy making expertise’, and the 
impact which the accumulation of policy making information associated with this type of expertise, 
has on the INTA committee’s influence was acknowledged within the data. However, there was an 
indication that while this expertise was lacking in a conventional sense as a result of the significant 
turnover of the committee entering the 7
th
 term (figure 5-2), this was in part compensated for by the 
introduction of experienced MEPs coming in from other senior committees. 
The suggestion in the literature that the committee’s ‘junior standing’ (Kleimann 2011) contributed to 
the lack of ‘policy making expertise’ was challenged by the collected empirical data, refuting this 
existing consensus. While perceived as a ‘rather new committee in the internal structure of the 
European Parliament’ it was ‘15 years300 ago since it was a junior committee’, and since this time 
‘it has developed as an autonomous committee with the same standing as all the other EP 
committees’.301 To equate a lack of ‘policy making expertise’ to the INTA committee because of its 
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perceived ‘junior’ standing, as has been done previously (Woolcock 2008, Kleimann 2011) would be 
a simplistic view. The INTA committee is ‘still coming to terms with the new powers it gained with 
the Lisbon treaty’302 but it would be more correct to assert from data collected that any lack of ‘policy 
making expertise’ is as a result of high committee turnover entering the 7th term rather than it being 
‘junior’. The INTA committee, however, is evident as containing some forms of retained ‘policy 
making expertise’, which does benefit the committee. 
The INTA committee is, post-Lisbon, deeply involved in following the process of all trade 
negotiations and in theory must be equally supplied with policy information by the Commission, 
previously only accessible to the Council. ‘The Commission has to come and explain their position 
but also answer questions’303 before the INTA committee. This has resulted in ‘the increased 
presence of the trade Commissioner [attending committee meetings] and the increased frequency of 
the supplying of information’304 to the committee. As stated by a senior committee member, the 
Commission has taken a greater policy interest in the INTA committee
305
 as a significant actor: 
‘I have seen also more and more frequently the presence of the European Commission and the DG 
trade within the INTA committee, either on the level of the chief negotiator, for the different trade 
dossiers, or at the level of the presence of the trade Commissioner them self’.306 
This increased exchange of information
307
 between the INTA committee and Commission was a 
significant development during the 7
th
 term and has continued into the 8
th
. There is now an increased 
exchange of policy making information in ‘both frequency’, but, ‘also’ importantly ‘an increase in 
the quality of the information’308 between the two. This is an important development, as while the 
Commission does have the obligation to inform the INTA committee on the negotiating process with 
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policy making information ‘of course you can have a presentation [from the Commission] with less 
or more quality information
309
 towards the members’.310 Members with experience are able to assess 
the information for its quality, and it is apparent that there was a definite ‘increase in the quality of 
information that we are given’311 by the Commission, which has greatly benefited the INTA 
committee’s policy making role.312 
‘Policy making expertise’, interestingly, is not seen as being evenly spread across the whole 
committee due to the ‘unique’ nature of trade policy. The normal practice is that ‘trade negotiations 
are conducted with a certain degree of discretion and a certain degree of secrecy; these are 
necessary for negotiations’313 to be successfully concluded. As a result of this required discretion, 
many key documents are not accessible to all INTA committee members. Evidence collected 
demonstrates that a unique and particular significance is often placed on seniority within the 
committee.
 314
 While ‘seniority is important in each EP committee’ it is particularly important 
‘especially in the INTA’ committee where it is seen that ‘you have more senior members’315 despite 
a lower rate of membership retention compared to other committees, therefore, referring to those 
senior parliamentarians who joined the committee at the 7
th
 term.
316
 This signifies the importance of 
‘parliamentary seniority’, where a member has parliamentary rather than just committee specific 
experience, within the INTA committee. While senior committee members who retained their position 
7
th
 term did have a uniquely over emphasised role, being the only remaining receptacles of maintained 
‘policy making expertise’ at a European level within the committee, it is clear parliamentary seniority 
was also important on the committee. Consequently, seniority did play an important role on the INTA 
committee in the 7
th
 term and is shown to have affected ‘policy making expertise’ as a source of 
committee influence. 
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Members of the INTA committee 7
th
 term, were not equal in their access to policy information ‘senior 
members, and also the [party] coordinator, will have better access to information than the other 
members as they receive documents that we [non-senior members] don’t have’.317 Senior 
parliamentarians will receive better access to information than those still establishing themselves 
within the parliament overall. According to members serving on both the INTA committee and other 
EP committees the ‘INTA [committee] is specific in a way because it follows all of the trade 
agreement’318 negotiations which can extend over parliamentary sessions containing highly sensitive 
policy information, which is not distributed to every member. Having limited access to policy-making 
documents would heavily undermine a member’s ability to develop ‘policy making expertise’ and 
contribute to the collective benefit of the committee with a developed policy understanding. This was 
clearly evident ‘in the [policy] example of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership319 
[TTIP]: they [senior INTA members] have access to restricted documents and [non-senior] INTA 
members we only have access to limited documents’320 due to the secluded nature of trade 
negotiations.
321
 This is unique to the INTA committee, and not limited to the TTIP negotiations. 
Senior members play a significant role on the INTA committee, not only due to the retained ‘policy 
making expertise’ they already possess, but, also, because of the access to key policy documents they 
enjoy over other members. There is ‘a hierarchy in the type of communications you can have access 
to’322 which does limit the potential of ‘non-senior members’ (the vast majority) to operate, with 
gatekeepers controlling access to policy making information and expertise (as well as the impact 
associated with ‘professional expertise’ detailed below). If members wish to gain access to important 
restricted policy making documents, which are required for members to draft both competent and 
politically acceptable policy/amendment proposals, a non-senior member on the INTA committee 
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must contact their party group coordinator. ‘If you wanted access to one document you can talk to 
the coordinator, and normally there is no reason why they cannot give it to you’.323 So while 
gatekeepers do exist on the INTA committee preventing everyone accessing all of the policy making 
documents, in theory, information on policy making is accessible in all normal circumstances. As the 
term ‘in all normal circumstance’ would suggest, however, there may be cases where information is 
not supplied. 
The effect of a concentration of ‘policy making expertise’ is highlighted in the allocation of committee 
reports. While senior members on all EP committees will have heightened influence over report 
allocation this influence is seen as disproportionately greater as ‘in practice it’s really political [the 
allocation of reports]’324 within the INTA committee. ‘If you are a really important member’ in the 
INTA committee ‘you will be able, more often, to get what you want, and if you are a new member, 
who is less important, it will be harder to get what you want’.325 Thus having a level of seniority is 
often vital for gaining a desired report as these senior members are seen as having a ‘developed 
institutional memory within the INTA committee’326 that is crucial if the committee is to maximise 
its potential influence. New evidence derived from the process, and the presence, of secluded decision 
making, also, emphasises the importance which seniority has on the INTA committee, and more than 
on other EP committees. 
The justification for this practice, of secluded decision making, is as a result of the general lack of 
‘policy making expertise’ within the committee. Due to the heavy legislative workload the INTA 
committee has adopted the documented practice of operating ‘a system of monitoring groups’, which 
functions as ‘a smaller committee [within INTA] which contains only one representative from each 
[political] group’.327 These group representatives will meet with ‘experts from the Commission 
where we discuss more specifically about trade negotiations’. After these secluded meetings, the 
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whole committee does meet ‘where you have all the legislative text’328, generated from the closed-
door meeting, presented. While all members are informed, it is considered more efficient for these 
monitoring groups to deal with the substantive policy information. The perception is that decision 
making is isolated within a selected group of senior ‘policy making experts’. 
If seniority is important on the INTA committee, this gives greater support to the understanding of the 
positive effects of committee turnover, as the INTA committee actually experienced an influx of 
senior parliamentarians (and an ex-Commissioner) joining the committee as a result of turnover. As 
originally demonstrated in the other case studies, the refreshment of a committee and the acquisition 
of ‘new blood’ was identified as having a potentially positive impact on the committee’s influence, 
disproving the fundamentally negative view of membership turnover on legislative influence (Scarrow 
1997, Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, Benedetto 2005, Daniel 2013). Evidence of this concept, of the 
acquisition of ‘new blood’ onto a committee, and its positive impact on influence is also present 
within the INTA committee, lending further evidence to the significant findings empirically identified 
in the previous cases. The evidence collected from the INTA committee, due to its unique nature, 
further helps to develop this new concept of turnover. 
At a fundamental level there is ‘a difference [between members] within the INTA committee’ that 
has a direct effect on the committee’s decision making process, beyond the discussed ideological 
divides of left/right over trade preferences (Woolcock 2008, Nugent 2010). This newly identified 
divide is manifest between those ‘MEPs who were there pre-Lisbon, and those MEPs who have 
come more recently’ on to the INTA committee. Relatively new INTA members ‘hadn’t had an 
experience of the [INTA] committee which had very little information and very little power’,329 
before the 7
th
 term. This has resulted in a difference in attitudes between ‘new’ and ‘old’ MEPs. New 
members now start in better circumstances than INTA members who had experience of the committee 
before the 7
th
 term. The impact of this, in the view of new members, is that while ‘the old members 
have been there and seen a gradual increase in their powers, they are very cautious about asserting 
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that power’330 and maximising their potential. The non-assertive nature of more experienced members 
means that they are less willing to test the limits of the INTA committee’s post-Lisbon influence 
‘where the new INTA members have come in, and see it as theirs [the new powers of the INTA 
committee] to use’331 in order to maximise potential outcomes.  
New members of the INTA committee ‘have’ however ‘not seen older members becoming blockages 
on the INTA committee’. So, while there is an indication this may happen ‘it wouldn’t surprise me if 
it [experienced senior members becoming roadblocks] happened simply due to human nature’332, 
there are no specific examples of INTA members who appeared pass their ‘sell-by date’ on the 
committee, as seen in the other case studies. The significant committee turnover of the 7
th
 term may 
have resulted in those members most likely to be entrenched in their viewpoints, and as a consequence 
facilitating blockage of new initiatives, simply not being retained on the INTA committee. Those 
members who are still perceived as ‘senior’ within the committee ‘have worked well with junior 
members’.333 ‘If you had a senior MEP who was determined to only talk to his old friends’ they 
would, according to junior members, ‘not get very far’.334 
Further evidence collect from the INTA committee does, however, create a more nuanced 
understanding of the impact of ‘new blood’ on a committee’s potential influence. As discussed above, 
senior members, while viewed as less willing to exercise power by new members, did see many new 
members as making too many ‘passionate political declarations at the expense of feasible 
outcomes’335 which did not help the INTA committee to gain preferential results (to be influential). 
While a level of politicization is accepted and ‘not [seen as] a [significant] problem’ on the 
committee, some experienced members are concerned, with the start of the 8
th
 term, that ‘now we only 
have ambition and this is not a way to work and to build a workable solution’336 on the committee. 
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A focus on political declaration by new committee members has been negatively received by 
experienced members:  
‘Be they well intended, if you go along with a political declaration of values and you are so far 
from the practical feasibility then maybe nothing will happen in conclusion. You will remain very 
pure [ideologically] because you have stated your values which are very high but you have 
accomplished nothing in reality, as nothing happens so nothing changes, you remain just with a 
political declaration’.337 
While tension is apparent between ‘experienced’ and ‘junior’ members, to an extent it is vital to 
highlight that this was not a significant problem ‘in the last mandate [during the 7th term]’. With the 
start of the 8
th
 term, ‘approximately one third of the Parliament is new’; this has created more 
conflict on the INTA committee as a consequence. With the new intake (of the 8
th
 term) ‘many of 
them are younger people, they are deeply involved in national politics, and they bring very 
passionate messages of national politics into the EP’338, which creates many of the tensions 
discussed. During the 7
th
 term there appeared to be a balance between old and new members creating 
a more stable equilibrium to balance tensions, and this appears to have deteriorated during the 8
th
 
term. 
Political debate is central to any parliamentary system and the party groupings within the INTA 
committee do play an important role in the distribution of ‘policy making expertise’ in an attempt to 
compensate for a general absence within the committee. It has been proposed within the theoretical 
framework of the thesis, and observed within the collected evidence that the party groupings can, 
indeed, supplement any lack of membership ‘policy making expertise’ by allocating ‘resources to 
supply their members with information’.339 While the ‘exchange of information’ has been indicated 
as not overtly involving the party groupings in the INTA committee, there is clear evidence of some 
form of policy information vital to the development of ‘policy making expertise’ being distributed by 
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the party groups due to their greater access to policy documents. The party groups are ‘a source of 
support to MEPs’ offices’340; however, this is interestingly seen as a largely political level of support, 
rather than the supplying of technical information. Even at the level of national parties and 
government ‘ministers who are attending a trialogue meeting’ will sometimes ‘report the results of 
discussions in Council to their group’ within the INTA committee. This will often be followed by ‘a 
political group meeting’341, where all the reports from both sides of the trialogue negotiations are 
discussed. 
Access to policy making information in the INTA committee does to an extent rely on the party group 
to which a member is attached. It ‘does depend on which group you are coming from, if you are, say 
for example, ALDE and mainstream it is easier’342 to have access to the documents needed to 
develop a level of ‘policy making expertise’. This result corroborates the previously proposed 
findings, that ‘policy making expertise’ is lacking in the INTA committee, and is further limited by 
which political group a member originates from. Smaller groups on the INTA committee do find it 
harder to achieve meaningful outputs as ‘if you are Green or non-attached it will be really hard to 
have a resolution passed or an amendment adopted, as it is politics’, and in addition ‘access to 
important [policy] documents’343 will be limited. 
5.3.2 Professional Expertise 
Extensive original data has been collected on the professional backgrounds of the members of the 
INTA committee, 7
th
 term, to determine the presence and extent of ‘professional expertise’. This data 
is displayed in figure 5-3 and shows the relative rates within the committee of members with 
appropriate professional or non-professional backgrounds. Exhaustive data was collected by 
reviewing the complete professional and training backgrounds of every MEP who was a full member 
of the INTA committee at the end of the 7
th
 parliamentary term. A member was deemed as possessing 
‘professional expertise’ if they had a professional background in an area directly involving 
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international commerce, international business/trade, high level (ministerial or similar political 
position) governmental experience of international trade negotiations
344
, trade negotiations/trade 
practices experience, executive experience of cross-border trade or any other relative professional 
experience with a clear international trade dynamic. 
 
Figure 5-3 Rate of ‘professional expertises’ within the INTA committee at the end of the 7th parliamentary term. 
Source: Collective curriculum vitas of committee members. 
Figure 5-3 shows that there is in fact significant remit specific expertise present within the INTA 
committee. This is a finding that drastically contradicts previous studies (Kleimann 2011, Gstöhl 
2013) that disregarded or overlooked the high levels of ‘professional expertise’ clearly contained 
within the committee. The findings do however correlate with those of Whitaker (2011) who noted an 
empirical relationship between member ‘professional expertise’ and committee allocation on the 
INTA committee in previous terms (before the 7
th
). A new perspective on expertise must, therefore, 
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be adopted which includes as a stand-alone entity ‘professional expertise’ and its impact as a source 
of committee influence. While the impact of these findings indicates that ‘professional expertise’ may 
be a central source of the INTA committee’s influence over legislation, contrary to the current 
prescribed convention, this cannot be definitively stated without considering additional evidence 
collected from elite interviews.
345
 The empirical conclusions generated from these interviews clearly 
support this novel and original finding presented within this study that ‘professional expertise’ is not 
only extensive within, but is important in determining the influence of the INTA committee. 
Interview Data 
The significance of ‘professional expertise’ was highlighted for its ‘importance’ to the INTA 
committee ‘in helping members and secretariats in their work, due to the previous experience and 
expertise which they bring’346 from former professions. As a result of previous professional 
experience members did see themselves as being more ‘capable when dealing with policy’ due to 
having that specialist knowledge and knowing what is ‘technically feasible’347 when drafting policy. 
Members, who had professional experience, working as, for example, as a senior trade minister in 
their member state, emphasize the importance of this experience, that does ‘benefit’ their committee 
work; ‘as a minister for trade in my country I have been used to trying to build functioning 
mechanisms’.348 Committee members with this type of professional experience appear to focus on 
developing workable technical solutions to files dealt with by the committee ‘I’m accustomed with 
making things work’ rather than looking to reach ‘purely political outcomes’.349 As well as the 
associated benefits of being able to propose superior amendments and practical policy alternatives, as 
a direct result of ‘professional expertise’, members of the INTA committee are able to set their 
ambitions at a more appropriate level within negotiations with other actors, and gain preferential 
outcomes as a result. 
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Committee members with ‘professional expertise’ understand from knowing what is ‘technically 
feasible’ that ‘sometimes when you want to make things work, you have to start with a lower level 
of ambition’350 to achieve what would be considered a successful outcome. Once the correct level of 
ambition has been reached the committee can ‘then progressively build more and more ambitious 
systems, but you have to have a basis’, which comes as a result of previous ‘professional expertise’ 
contained on the committee. Gauging this correct level of ambition and being able to draft proposals 
that are ‘workable’351 places the committee in a stronger negotiating position by demonstrating its 
technical competence. This makes it harder for other decision making actors to dismiss an INTA 
committee proposal out of hand claiming a lack of ‘technical’ understanding. The INTA committee 
during the 7
th
 term did attempt to draw influence from its ‘professional expertise’; there are, however, 
a number of caveats that must be examined before ‘professional expertise’ can be accepted as a 
reliable source of INTA committee influence.   
Interestingly the data collected demonstrates that high levels of ‘professional expertise’ concentrated 
within a committee can have drawbacks, which could affect a committee’s overall influence over 
legislative outcomes. To treat ‘professional expertise’ as a single monolithic entity would be 
incorrect, different professional backgrounds and expert technical perspectives do exist. For example, 
those committee members who have a professional background in national government will have 
different professional experiences as ‘the administration system in member states may be very 
different between states’352 and this does impact upon what solutions members will find acceptable. 
This may bias different members towards opposing solutions and technical outcomes. Actors are 
conditioned by the institutional rules in which they have prior experience, and this can affect their 
policy attitudes. This suggestion, beyond some limited evidence, was, however, not extensively 
reflected within the data. In general it was suggested that ‘the reflexes of the people working in 
administration, working in departmental offices and businesses, are very similar’353 in their 
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practices and desired outcomes. Despite similar working approaches adopted by members who have 
‘professional expertise’, difficulties do arise when dealing with the different technical systems:  
‘If you want to build something new, something which did not exist [which is known from working 
in home member states], then you always face difficulty as the governmental system will always be 
against you if you want to change something’.354 
Members who do, as a result of understanding practices and different systems, have a realistic idea of 
what outcomes the INTA committee are able to achieve, and prevent overreach, when attempting to 
achieve compromise with the Council and Commission. There have, however, been examples of 
members, who do not have extensive ‘professional expertise’ forcing the committee into an over-
extended position, and as a result harming its potential influence. Many ‘young members with less 
professional understanding, but are more political active’355 have been seen as being a potential 
detriment to the committee’s overall influence, making unpractical demands based on ‘political 
declarations’ rather than technical understanding and ‘technical feasibility’.356 
The role which an MEP’s assistants play in supporting INTA committee members, and assisting their 
level of ‘professional expertise,’ must, also, be highlighted. For a committee member to be efficient 
and successful ‘you have to have good staff’ who will help collect and organise the ‘large volume of 
[technical and policy making] information received from many different sources’.357 A member’s 
influence does, to an extent ‘come down to having good staff in a MEPs office’ as well as being able 
to utilize the ‘good resources within the Parliament to rely on for information’.358 The importance of 
assistants cannot be overlooked as they do retain ‘professional expertise’ alongside their members. 
There is an indication from the empirical data that assistants on the INTA committee may differ from 
assistants on other committees. The practice on the INTA committee is to ‘hire assistants which have 
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a [prepossessed] degree of specialist understanding of trade policy’.359 The evidence indicates, 
therefore, that assistants on the INTA committee are more likely to have a higher level of 
‘professional expertise’ than is observed as possessed by assistants on other EP committees. Indeed, 
evidence further indicates that MEPs on other committees are ‘taking a lead’ from the INTA 
committee and are beginning to adopt similar practices of ‘hiring professional specialist assistants in 
their own [policy] areas’360 to further their respective committee’s influence. 
The unique significance of ‘professional expertise’ to the committee, however, becomes further 
apparent with empirical evidence highlighting restrictions, not applied to other EP committees, placed 
on INTA committee members. Due to the environment associated with international trade policy, 
documents both of a technical and political nature are often highly sensitive. As a result, many 
documents have legal restrictions place upon them preventing their removal from the INTA 
committee. This has often been cited in the case of the, now well publicised, ‘Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership’ (TTIP), which has been highly sensitive and controversial in its attempts to 
establish a free trade agreement between the EU and the USA.
361
 A level of ‘previous professional 
understanding can help’362 a member to deal with technical documents associated with trade 
agreements efficiently and increases the committee’s overall influence as a result. In other comparable 
legislative committees, a member without ‘professional expertise’ would contact an external expert, 
within the policy area, to gain their specialist understanding, and, also, to develop their own expertise. 
Members of the INTA committee are severely limited in this respect as they are ‘unable to pass on 
sensitive documents surrounding negotiations’363, with TTIP being documented as a prime, and 
often cited in the data, example
364
, due to the legal restrictions on the distribution of these documents 
to anyone outside of the committee and Parliament. INTA members are often placed in situations 
where they ‘want to pass on a [TTIP related] document to this specialist [external] academic who 
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could tell us the impact’ of a document ‘but can’t due to the restrictions in place’. Committee 
members are, therefore, unable to generate the ‘information or evidence needed to support their 
position in committee’365 and are, furthermore, restricted in their ability to gain expertise if they do 
not already possess it. The cost, therefore, of not possessing a level of ‘professional expertise’ is 
evident as significant (more so than in the other case studies examined) if a member wishes an active 
role in policy. TTIP has been a prime example, with many committee members feeling their 
participation is restricted simply as a result of a lack of technical expertise, and also being prevented 
from acquiring it externally. This evidence would, therefore, account for the high levels of 
‘professional expertise’ contained and in fact needed within the INTA committee.  
Members of the INTA committee without ‘professional expertise, are also believed by members with 
‘professional expertise’, as, on occasions, harming the INTA committee’s overall influence as a result 
of their perceived focus on ‘political declarations rather than [finding] workable technical 
solutions’.366 This was evident in the example of the ‘Conflict Minerals’ report367, which was 
proposed originally during the 7
th
 term, but continued into the 8
th 
term, and attempted to create a 
common European regulation on the trading and tracking of minerals derived from, and potentially 
produced in designated conflict zones. The plenary of the Parliament adopted a ‘strict political 
position, due to the tabloidization of this topic’368 according to some involved. This ‘collective’ 
position was not supported by the report’s rapporteur, who was ‘in a minority against the reports 
shadow rapporteurs’, who had adopted a collective opposing position against the rapporteur’369 
which was considered politically ambitious. This hard-line political position was much to the 
consternation of other INTA committee members with professional experience ‘I wanted to have a 
functioning regulation along the line proposed by the Commission, which has not happened’.370 
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The outcome of the report has been that ‘the Parliament has adopted a very strict position which is 
very far away from the Commission, and it is also very far from the Council, so it will be really 
difficult [to reach a successful legislative outcome]’.371 By adopting a position not perceived as 
technically feasible by other actors, or many INTA committee members, a compromise, which would 
have remained beneficial to the INTA, was not reached. ‘Professional expertise’ can benefit the 
committee overall, as this new data clearly demonstrates, however political or policy making 
considerations do play a role in the relative influence of the INTA committee, as indicated. The INTA 
committee has been observed to become ‘increasingly political over time’372, which has affected the 
‘balance of decision making’373 within the committee. 
5.4 Committee Unity Perspective  
‘Partisan politics’ is at the centre of decision-making in all areas of the European Union and is, of 
course, evident in the INTA committee.
374
 While party sources may empower their members with 
specialised expertise, they can affect a committee’s influence in both a positive or negative manner by 
the associated unity and conflict between the different groupings. A committee suffering from internal 
conflict will have less influence overall than a committee that can present a united front to other 
actors. A more cohesive committee will be a more influential committee (Kreppel 1999, 2000, 2002b, 
Nugent 2010, Hagemann & Høyland 2010, Costello & Thomson 2013, Burns 2013b). The INTA 
committee has its own partisan dynamic that affects the committee’s standing within Europe, and 
despite being seen as largely consensual, conflict is present due to the extensive national interests at 
stake. 
5.4.1 Political Dynamic of the INTA Committee 
The INTA committee is one of the smaller committees within the EP. During the 7
th
 term the INTA 
committee consisted of 31 full members along with an equal number of substitutes (Kleimann 2011). 
To place this in a comparative context with the other case studies, the ENVI committee had 71 
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members and the BUDG committee had 44 members in total during the 7
th
 term. The INTA 
committee is, therefore, the smallest of the three case studies that make up this project, and is also one 
of the smallest active legislative committees in the EP. It has often been suggested that the more 
members a committee comprises (within practical reason at an optimal level to ensure efficiency) the 
more important it is accredited to be as a legislative actor (Mattson & Strøm 1996, Strøm 1998). It 
would appear, however, that the INTA committee is an exception to this ‘rule’375, and despite its 
comparatively low membership numbers, and ‘junior’ standing (disputed above) by way of its 
perceived late origin, the INTA committee has become one of the busiest legislative committees of 
the EP during the 7
th
 parliamentary term (Podgorny 2013).
376
 
The origins of the INTA committee are complex, and as a result the history of its chair appointees has 
been similarly convoluted. If the committee is understood to be a continuation of the External 
Economic Relations Committee (EERC)
377
, founded in 1979, there have been a number of different 
committee chairs (as demonstrated in table 5-1) from a range of political ideological backgrounds.
378
 
Since its establishment
379
 as the INTA committee in 2004, the committee chairs have comprised 
appointees from the centre left S&D, and the further left European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
groupings. During the course of the 7
th
 parliamentary term the INTA committee was chaired by the 
highly experienced S&D member, Dr Vital Moreira.
380
 During the Moreira term the committee had 
two vice chairs being held by the ECR, and one vice chair each allocated to the EPP and the Green 
groupings. It is important to understand this political dynamic, as if one ideological discipline with a 
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 A second, converse, exception to this rule would be the AFET committee which is one of the largest, but one 
of weakest committees in terms of legislative involvement, as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is 
not a supranational policy area.  
376
 Interestingly the number of members of the INTA has increased to 41 for the start of the 8th parliamentary 
term. This would signal an understanding of the importance that the Parliament places on the INTA committee 
and would match the significantly greater number of legislative files having to be processed by the INTA. It is 
difficult, however, to gauge how many of these members are indeed active in the legislative process, as it is 
common that some full members may not actively take part in committee proceedings, whereas some substitutes 
may take an active interest in the operational procedures (Corbett et al 2007). 
377
 There are still INTA members during the 7
th
 term who had originally served on the EERC committee. 
378
 Swinging politically from right to left. 
379
 Or re-establishment depending on your perspective. 
380
 With the start of the new parliamentary term the committee chair is now held by Bernd Lange, once again of 
the centre left S&D. In addition for the 8
th
 term the vice chairs of the INTA are largely controlled by the centre 
right of the EPP, with 2 vice-chairs, and the ECR, with 1 vice-chair, and the final vice-chair held by the Greens. 
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particular perspective on international trade, is guiding the committee this could have a significant 
effect on the INTA committee’s legislative influence and far reaching ramifications for its legislative 
standing. 
Table 5-1 Committee Chairs of External Economic Relations (1979 – 1999) and International Trade Committee (2004 
– 2014) 
Date Held Chair Chair Person Party Grouping 
1979 - 1984 Fred Catherwood ED  (Centre Right) 
1984 - 1987 Shelagh Roberts ED  (Centre Right) 
1987 - 1989 Jacques Mallet RDE (EDA)( Centre Right) 
1989 - 1997 Willy De Clercq LIB (Liberal) 
1997 - 1998 Luciana Castellina GUE (Left) 
1998 - 1999 Philippe Herzog GUE 
1999 – 2004 External Economic Relations 
Committee Merged with ITRE 
Committee 
- 
2004 – 2007 (INTA committee 
established) 
Enrique Baron S&D 
2007 – 2009  Helmuth Markov GUE 
2009 - 2014 Vital Moreira  S&D 
2014 -  Bernd Lange S&D 
 
The political party breakdown of the INTA committee during the 7
th
 term can be observed in figure 5-
4. Interestingly, in most EP committees the third largest bloc would not normally be the ECR, but 
would commonly be the ALDE, which only has three members on the INTA committee. This reflects 
the ECR’s significant ideological prioritising of trade policy that also appears evident in its control of 
two vice chairs during the 7
th
 term. In addition, the GUE/NGL and the Greens/EFA groupings had 
two members each, while the final committee positions comprised one member from the EFD, and 
one independent member.  
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Figure 5-4 Political breakdown of party groupings within the 7th term of Committee on International Trade. Source: 
European Parliament website INTA committee, members list (2014)  
 
‘Grand coalition’ forming between the EPP and S&D was the most common result within the INTA 
committee according to published reports (CEPS 2012) on voting patterns. Towards the end of the 7
th
 
term the rate at which a grand coalition would form was in two out of every three votes (CEPS 2012). 
There is, however, existing evidence of a minor shift towards the centre left with the S&D and the 
ALDE
381
 groupings seen as being marginally more likely to gain a favourable outcome than other 
groupings at the end of the committee’s legislative process (CEPS 2012). This may indicate to an 
extent what ideological shape proposed amendments may have taken within the committee. Due to the 
allocation of seats and committee leadership positions, however, it is clear that the centre right had a 
particularly strong interest in the INTA committee with the overrepresentation of centre right 
members, from both the EPP and the ECR on the committee and in leadership positions. This fact, 
coupled with the success implicated within the literature (Van den Putte et al 2014) of the centre and 
centre left in influencing the committee output, could create an interesting partisan dynamic to 
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 The ALDE grouping is often perceived as being more classically liberal on trade as their name would 
suggest, but with a degree of variation, as with all groupings. 
204 
 
examine with regard to its impact on the committee’s influence. There has, indeed, been evidence 
(Van den Putte et al 2014) of a clash of views over such key agreements as TTIP, which has 
undermined the committee’s position. However, conflict would appear minor during the 7th term, but 
dramatic in the 8
th
 term. 
5.4.2 Committee Unity  
As detailed within the theoretical framework, committees will maximise their potential influence if 
the party groupings demonstrate significant unity, whereas a collective position and influence would 
be undermined by infighting between committee members. Significantly, therefore, published reports 
(CEPS 2012) identify the INTA committee as one of the committees with the highest levels of 
consensual law making within the EP, despite the partisan issues identified previously. This would 
suggest that the need to present a united political front in order to best achieve objectives is 
recognised by the party groupings within the committee. However, a perception that conflict between 
the party groups is absent in the INTA committee would be an overstatement, challenging the 
perceived wisdom where unity may be expected, in order to maximise influence. According to 
Podgorny (2013)
382
 there has been evidence that the area of trade policy has in fact become, and 
continues to develop as, a highly politicised area. It is noteworthy that the policy preferences of both 
the centre right and the centre left are divergent within the INTA committee: classically the centre 
right preference is for trade liberalization and supporting the Commission’s efforts to achieve this 
objective, while the centre left (the S&D encompasses a wide range of trade priorities, from 
liberalization to labour protection) and broadly supports more labour and environmental provisions to 
be included in trade agreements (Woolcock 2008). Although this has the potential to affect the 
relationship each group has with the Commission, the committee has been noted for supporting to 
some degree both preferences, and for the most part finding acceptable compromise agreements 
(Woolcock 2008).  
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 An experienced policy advisor to the 7
th
 term chair of the INTA committee 
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In addition to partisan interest at a supranational level, national interests are, also, often represented 
on the INTA committee in some sectors and these in turn may affect the committee’s decision-making 
processes (Richardson 2012). Since the extension of powers to the INTA committee, with the 
implementation of the Lisbon treaty, the EU-Korea free trade agreement (FTA)
383
 has been the biggest 
single item of legislation that has significantly involved the committee. A large number of 
amendments were proposed by the INTA committee to protect the European car-manufacturing 
sector. Notably, German and Italian MEPs from a spread of all parties represented on the committee 
presented these amendments (Richardson 2012), and this demonstrates that the INTA committee 
provides a platform from which national interests can be represented successfully. Indeed it appears 
that these provisions largely derived from national lobbying groups.
384
 ‘Trade is an area where 
national divisions do exist. The national division [on interests] in the Council are replicated in the 
Parliament, you see them clearly’.385  Thus the different interests represented on the INTA 
committee, supranational vs. national vs. party group, which the previous example highlights may 
affect the policy output that the committee is producing and increase partisan conflict as a result. 
It has been suggested that a select sub-group of specialist actors on the INTA committee, largely 
along partisan lines, dominate in relation to contact with the Commission (Richardson 2012, Van den 
Putte et al 2014). It has been reported that meetings between the Commission and the committee have 
often taken place with only a small number of INTA members present from particular ideological 
backgrounds and this, perhaps not surprisingly, causes much ‘consternation’ with the wider 
committee membership (Richardson 2012). Those with a more classically liberal outlook on trade are 
observed as having a closer relationship with the Commission, which as a result empowers said 
actors. 
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 Which sought to established a free trade agreement (the removal of trade barriers and tariffs) between the 
European Union and the Republic of Korea. 
384
 ‘We are really lobbied by permanent representatives [representatives of the member states]; they never 
leave us in peace. Trade is an area of national divisions. Normally the discussion in the Council, they look 
just like the discussion in the Parliament, you can see this international division too’. Interview with Assistant 
to Member of the Committee on International Trade 7/11/14 Brussels BE. 
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 Interview with Assistant to Member of the Committee on International Trade 7/11/14 Brussels BE 
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Empirical Data 
The party groupings have a significant impact on the decision making process of the INTA 
committee. All amendments proposed on the committee are examined by ‘the political party’ in order 
to confirm the political ‘feasibility of the amendment’.386 As is the practice on other committees, 
reports are allocated based on a points bidding system. As would be expected ‘the biggest group 
decides first, so the EPP, then the Socialists, then ECR, then the ALDE, decide which reports they 
want to follow’.387 This method of allocating reports is common across the EP with a few exceptions, 
such as the BUDG committee where reports are rotated in a non-partisan manner; report allocation 
‘takes place as more a negotiation between the groups’ on the INTA committee. Evidence collected, 
which highlights significant unity often displayed on the INTA committee, also indicates a clear 
partisan dynamic within the INTA committee that has created a level of disunity and undermined the 
INTA’s common position as a result. This has been most noticeable during TTIP negotiations, but 
also in the interesting example of the ‘Conflict Minerals’ report.388 
The members and their party groups, which make up the INTA committee, do ‘understand that 
presenting a united front to other institutions is an important source of committee influence’.389 
Interview evidence from all sources clearly supports the hypothesis that only with a united position 
can the INTA committee reach its potential zenith of legislative influence. ‘Committee unity is not 
always easy ‘as is evident from the conflict resulting from, the almost aptly named, ‘conflict minerals 
report’ ‘but it’s the goal to present a united front to other actors’.390 Evidence exists of conflict 
between the different party groups on the INTA committee, with some fundamental policy divides 
undermining influence. The committee has been highlighted as an area where national interests are 
represented, ‘trade is an area of national divisions’391, and common positions are ‘often difficult to 
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reach’392 as a result. Empirical evidence does show, despite the perceived consensual nature of the 
committee, ‘within the INTA committee one important thing is that it’s really about the divisions, 
between the groups, between the nationalities, and sometimes between the northern and southern 
Europe division’393 which does affect the committee’s decision making. These divides can be seen 
clearly as ‘the discussions in the Parliament, it looks just like the discussions in the Council, you 
can see this international division’394 displayed within the committee. The importance of partisan 
interests and conflict would appear particularly salient, therefore, in the case of the INTA committee. 
To be clear, conflicts relating to national interests are not the same as partisan conflict (the latter 
refers to conflict among different political groupings/different ideological perspectives). What is 
being referred to here, are cases where a national interest divides the committee, which is meant to 
look out for the pan-European (supranational) interest. 
There is a ‘clear divide between the attitudes over trade outcomes between the [political] groups’395 
of the International Trade committee. The centre right of the committees has a more ‘liberal attitude 
towards trade agreements outcomes’, while the left has a ‘more ‘social’ attitude towards trade 
agreements’.396 As well as the dimensions listed, differences occur between the ‘northern and 
western parts of Europe, the service based economies, and you have those economies in central and 
eastern Europe where manufacturing is still very important’.397  While these ‘differences’ have been 
noted within previous studies on decision making in EU trade policy (Woolcock 2008, Nugent 2010), 
and thus confirm the previous consensus, it is important to clearly highlight these points in the context 
of conflict and how they impact on INTA committee influence, which has not previously been 
discussed in significant detail. There is, indeed, an important link between the ideological split and the 
committee’s overall influence which has not previously been acknowledged. The divide confirmed 
above impacts upon the committee’s overall ability to influence outcomes. A clear divide exists 
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between what is seen as a successful trade outcome based on the origins of the group and the political 
actor involved. 
Conflict within the committee has been attributed directly to the fact that ‘you have national interests 
and you have European common interests’, represented on the INTA committee, and ‘sometimes it’s 
not very easy to make the compromise’398 between these deeply conflicting ideas. Attitudes towards 
trade are starkly different across the whole of the EU, and over a number of different competing 
dimensions, which ‘are reflected clearly on the committee’.399 Due to this ‘diversity of interests’ 
unity can be difficult to reach within the INTA committee which consequently undermines the 
collective position of the committee in negotiations with other actors. ‘Industries’ which are 
‘important to one country’ may be ‘totally absent in another’400, so policy priorities will, and have 
been, evident in interview data, as differing to protect these different industries. Due to these 
‘perfectly rational concerns and differences’ between members, the INTA committee does ‘not find 
it at all easy’ to reach a comprise position especially ‘if the stakes are high’. Depending on the issue 
‘this leads to the difficulties when dealing with certain dossiers because the political passions 
arise’.401 The direct impact of partisan conflict on the overall influence of the INTA committee is 
evident within the empirical example of the ‘Conflict Minerals’ report. 
The object of the ‘Conflict Minerals regulation’ ‘was to set a technical plan which would be 
workable in implementation’ and was originally proposed within committee to be ‘close to the 
Commission’s preferred position’. The final outcome of the report within the INTA committee was, 
however, that ‘there has not been a consensus; there has been a majority decision in the INTA 
committee, but not a consensus’.402 As shown in the previous section, the Parliament adopted an 
overly ‘radical’ political position, far away from the Commission and Council’s positions, and as 
result has been unable to influence the report as would normally be expected. The position adopted 
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was due to the partisan conflict which existed within the INTA committee as ‘in this specific report 
the INTA committee’s rapporteur was in the minority, all the INTA committee shadow rapporteurs 
made a coalition to change completely the philosophy of the text’.403 The INTA committee was not 
able to create a united front ‘which lead to the failure of the report’.404 The role of the rapporteur and 
the shadow rapporteurs was highlighted as a main factor in the failure of consensual decision making 
in this case. 
As with all EP committees, rapporteurs will draft a position towards a Commission proposal and the 
capacity to create a united front does to a great extent ‘depend on the rapporteur and their 
abilities’.405 This has been demonstrated in the data for other EP committees but is, also, confirmed in 
the INTA committee. In the case of the ‘Conflict Minerals’ report the decisions were taken in the 
‘shadow meetings, but without the rapporteur’ being present. Notably the action taken by the 
shadow rapporteurs ‘is not a regular practice’ within the INTA committee ‘they just completely 
disagreed with the rapporteur’s line’.406 The outcome was a collective position opposing the 
rapporteur. It is important to note that the partisan conflict over the report was not over the 
fundamentally technical elements, but rather the shadows (who were supported by the plenary) were 
seen, by those in opposition (yet having actually drafted the report), as making ‘political declarations 
at the expense of technical outcomes’.407 This may not be a universal opinion, of the actually reality 
of events, but the example does display the empirical potential for conflict on the INTA committee 
and the impact it can have on influence. 
Conflict, between actors within the INTA committee has, also, been observed in the TTIP 
negotiations. The INTA committee membership does suffer from significant differences of attitudes, 
matching with the classic understanding of trade policy, in a number of clear policy examples ‘it’s 
really true these divides exist, you see it on many files like TTIP’.408 In the example of TTIP it ‘was’, 
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according to members, ‘a Northern European MEP and EPP member’ who drafted the INTA 
committee’s position with a particular ‘view’ in mind, while ‘all the shadows were Italians or French 
MEPs’ who ‘understood each other very quickly and worked well together’409 with their own 
position. While this would largely confirm what would be expected for this policy area, based on 
previous understanding of trade policy, the important finding is that despite partisan conflict over key 
provision within TTIP, this has been cited as an ‘exception rather than a rule’410 within the INTA 
committee. 
Some level of partisan conflict will exist on all EP committees, which does undermine collective 
positions, and the INTA committee is no different. However, while key examples do exist of conflict, 
over ‘TTIP’ and ‘Conflict Minerals’ where the INTA committee’s influence was weakened as a result, 
these are exceptions especially during the 7
th
 term. The outcomes of the ‘Conflict Minerals’ report is 
noted as an ‘anomaly where consensual decision making did not prevail’. A ‘united position is the 
more common of outcomes’411 with any partisan conflicts being dealt with at early committee stages 
during the 7
th
 term. 
5.5 Public Policy Output 
The INTA committee has been assessed as being largely driven by informational inputs and 
producing mainly regulatory outputs (Yordanova 2009a). That the committee is driven by 
informational input would appear to correlate with the specialist nature of the INTA committee. With 
the expansion of legislative powers and greater involvement in trade negotiations, post-Lisbon, the 
nature of the INTA committee policy making may be in a process of realignment. It is plausible with 
the increase in political involvement that there could be a progression towards a more interest driven 
input, and correlating distributive outputs originating from the committee, with the committee 
involved in more politically sensitive agreements where domestic interests may be at stake. This 
would correlate with Follesdal and Hix’s (2006) argument that the EU no longer produces only 
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regulatory policy as most policy areas post-Lisbon now include distributive outputs, and a general 
trend towards politicisation.  
If this is happening it would weaken the influence of the INTA committee, as committees seeking 
regulatory outputs are seen as more successful than those looking to gain distributive outputs against 
the opposition of the Council, as hypothesised (H4). The expansion of co-decision which the 
committee experienced, after the ToL, was in largely regulatory areas, however, associated with the 
actual implementation of trade agreements. The empirical evidence collected does demonstrate that 
the International Trade committee deals largely with regulatory policy as this is the nature of 
international trade legislation. 
The evidence would suggest that the source of the INTA committee’s influence does in large part 
come from the type of policy enacted. There have been a number of new policy provisions proposed 
and supported by the committee, for example, such as the inclusion of human rights provision into 
FTA agreements, which have been adopted by the Commission during the negotiation process 
(Armanovica & Bendini 2014). The INTA committee has a number of opportunities to attempt to 
influence final agreements during the negotiation process, as detailed in the introduction section, and 
how framework agreements are shaped. The committee has been placed in an advantageous position 
that it can use to further its own influence over legislation (Richardson 2012). This is not a surprising 
development as the committees of the EP are well known for their ability to make incremental gains 
in their legislative influence, often well beyond whatever was envisioned in any implemented treaties 
(Judge & Earnshaw 2003). The INTA committee appears, following the ToL, to be a committee that 
is trying to maximise its potential to influence legislation. It is currently unclear, however, how much 
this potential influence has developed into real practical influence within policy. 
During the 7
th
 term the INTA committee dealt with 53 co-decision reports, of these 53 co-decision 
files only 8 required a second reading, and only one of these required a conciliation meeting 
(Legislative Observatory 2014). The greater majority of these legislative files were regulatory in 
nature. The committee does have formal involvement in areas of legislation dealing with ‘Macro-
212 
 
Financial Assistance’ (MFA) packages, which do directly distribute funds to external states. However, 
while the funds do originate from the member states they generally come as a result of collective 
agreement within the Council, pledging MFA support to third party states before a legislative proposal 
is drafted. This can be viewed in the example of the ‘Further Macro-Financial Assistance for 
Georgia’. The objective of this act was to provide the country of Georgia with financial assistance to 
demonstrate continued economic and political support for the country after the 2008 armed conflict 
with Russia (European Council 2012, Official Journal 2012). The Commission proposal allocated €46 
million in MFA, and included a number of provisions for reform and better economic governance to 
promote greater integration between Georgia and the EU, and as a result set the potential for a future 
free trade agreement between the two. This support was, however, already pledged by the member 
states directly after the conflict in 2008, and thus long before the proposal to continue the support. So, 
while the INTA committee was involved in amending this legislative act, which did distribute funds, 
and required three full legislative readings, there was no remit to extend funds beyond what the 
member states had already agreed to allocate. Therefore, the INTA committee’s distributive 
involvement was already limited. 
Most of the files dealt with by the 7
th
 term INTA committee were agreed during the first reading. It 
would seem that this was due to the significant technical and regulatory nature of the proposals made. 
Even in the example of the ‘Further Macro-Financial Assistance for Georgia’ the main negotiating 
points between the INTA committee and Commission were over comitology issues of procedure 
(European Council 2012), rather than substantive changes over the distribution of funding. It would 
appear that, tentatively, the INTA committee was more influential during the 7
th
 term as a result of the 
regulatory nature of trade policy dealt with over this time period. However, this is a clear area for 
future investigation, as without more prime examples of the committee attempting to produce 
distributive policy outputs, a firm conclusion cannot be drawn on what the impact of policy areas on 
influence could be. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
This investigation of the International Trade committee has revealed a number of original points, 
greatly expanding upon the current understanding of the potentially different sources and avenues of 
committee influence. Unique empirical evidence collected for this study has refuted the previous 
convention over the sources of INTA committee influence, questioning previous orthodoxy contained 
within the literature. Formerly the INTA committee, while seen as potentially highly influential, in 
‘reality’ has been observed in some cases as weak in terms of its ability to impact upon legislative 
outcomes. This lack of influence had previously attributed to a perceived absence of expertise and 
specialization within the committee (Woolcock 2010c, Kleimann 2011, Richardson 2012, Gstöhl 
2013). The INTA committee, however, as demonstrated in the empirical data collected, has a 
significantly high level of ‘professional expertise’. All data collected indicated the significance of this 
resource to the committee’s overall influence and ability to impact legislative outcomes, supporting 
H2, and challenging previous consensus on the committee. An INTA member without ‘professional 
expertise’ must pay a heavy cost to be involved in the policy process. This was further compounded 
by the INTA committee members’ inability to consult external policy experts. ‘Professional 
expertise’, therefore, is undoubtedly the main source of INTA committee influence, disposing of some 
of the out-dated understanding contained within the literature. With regards to the role of ‘policy 
making expertise’, however, a more nuanced, while still deeply significant, result was identified. 
‘Policy making expertise’ was shown to be comparatively low within the INTA committee, 
confirming previous impressions of the committee, which had lacked empirical support (Kleimann 
2011, Richardson 2012, Gstöhl 2013). However, a previously unidentified level of expertise was 
retained in senior committee members, which was evident in the hierarchical committee structure 
observed in this study during the 7
th
 term. This level of stratification did make it harder for new 
committee members, who did not already possess some level of expertise, to develop the ‘policy 
making expertise’ skills that would have benefited the INTA committee’s overall influence. 
Committee turnover did have an impact on the INTA committee with some loss of ‘policy making 
expertise’ entering into the 7th term, negated, however, somewhat by an influx of new members with 
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previous expertise on other committees. Interestingly evidence of tension between ‘new blood’ 
members and older members was evident to an extent. New members were perceived as being more 
active in policy entrepreneurship in attempting to exercise the formal powers of the INTA committee, 
although, older members were not seen as potential roadblocks to progress as observed in other case 
studies. Overall the case of the INTA committee expands our understanding of the potential sources 
of committee influence, and challenges previous consensus. The role of turnover and current 
understanding surrounding the concept (Krehbiel 1991, Mattson & Strøm 2006, Costello & Thomson 
2010) has been further questioned, and hypothesis H1 challenged, with evidence showing the 
(re)invigorating effect of turnover. 
Political conflict within the INTA committee was generally low, albeit beyond some exceptional, yet 
dramatic, examples. Committee members clearly understood the importance of presenting a united 
front to other actors, largely confirming H3. The committee made efforts to pursue this unity despite 
the classical divisions over trade, which are illustrated in the example of the ‘TTIP’ negotiations. The 
evidence of the ‘Conflict Minerals’ report, which ultimately ended412 in protracted dispute did, also, 
illustrate how important unity was to the committee if it wished to be influential. If more conflict had 
been apparent between partisan groups, within the INTA committee, it would have seen its influence 
undermined more often, and as dramatically, as was the case in the ‘Conflict Minerals’ report. Finally 
hypothesis H4 was confirmed as the committee was observed as drawing some influence from the fact 
it did not engage in largely distributive policy outputs. 
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 Officially the file is still active within the plenary but no hope of progress was expressed, with positions 
currently entrenched. 
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Chapter Six Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this project has been to elucidate the potential sources of committee influence in the 
European Parliament. The reason behind this focus has been to address the puzzle, highlighted in 
chapter one, that while all EP committees are equal in terms of formal legislative powers, some 
committees are reported to have more influence than others, potentially utilising different informal 
sources of influence. The central argument of this thesis, therefore, has been that committees draw 
upon different sources of influence rather than drawing influence from any single source, and that 
different committees do not utilise these potential sources of influence in a uniform manner. The 
influence of an actor is defined by the totality of sources (Scully 1997a) and resources (Dahl 1957, 
1961) that an actor (committee) has available to exploit and deploy in their relationships with others 
to impact outcomes towards their desired preferences. This concept of influence presented by Dahl 
(1957, 1961) and others (Bowler & Farrell 1995, Scully 1997a, Marshall 2010, Costello & Thomson 
2013) constitutes this thesis’ understanding of influence. 
This thesis has proposed and tested four different hypotheses to empirically account for the patterns 
and relationships that occur between the different sources of influence that can be identified, in an 
attempt to account for how committee influence is established. As a result, a number of previous 
assumptions over committee influence were tested, and evidence counter to the standard view 
provided. This final chapter will review the main findings from the three case studies comprising the 
thesis, with the aim of understanding their implications, not only for the committee system of the EU, 
but also for the wider field of legislative politics, within the general limitations of the methods used 
within the study. The findings from each of the individual case studies will be compared against the 
proposed hypotheses to test their validly. The empirical evidence comprising this thesis has allowed 
the research question ‘how do committees establish legislative influence?’ to be answered. 
Beyond the United States’ Congress, which has been researched extensively (Shepsle 1979, 1986, 
1989, Shepsle & Weingast 1981, 1984, 1987, Krehbiel et al 1987, Weingast & Marshall 1988, 
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Gilligan & Krehbiel 1989, Weingast 1989, Krehbiel 1991, Cox & McCubbins 2007a, 2007b), 
understanding of sources of committee influence, both in the comparative field, of different 
parliament systems, and within the European Union, is underdeveloped. What is currently known 
about committee systems, especially in the EU, is generally derived either from a select number of 
largely quantitative studies, that have used spatial modelling to assess the EP’s total legislative 
influence (Tsebelis 1994, Moser 1996, 1997, Crombez 1997, 2000, Tsebelis et al 2001), or 
alternatively studies focusing on the former ‘legalist’ discrepancies which existed between EP 
committees when differing legislative procedures have been implemented (Tsebelis 1995, Garrett & 
Tsebelis 1997, Tsebelis & Garrett 1997, 2000, 2001, Scully 1997a, 1997b). While in recent years a 
very limited number of studies, most notably by Whitaker (2011) and Yordanova (2013), have 
attempted to address this lack of academic scrutiny, current understanding of what comprises sources 
of EP committee influence remains largely incomplete and patchy. 
Standing committees represent the best mechanism by which democratically elected legislatures are 
able to influence policy outcomes in many political systems (Strøm 1998). Without influential 
standing committees, the process of political decision-making would otherwise become increasingly 
dominated by executives and non-elected technocrats. This is true, not only in the case of the EP, but 
also for all systems in which committees have a role in the legislative process. If parliamentary 
committees, by having legislative influence, have a meaningful role, then this is important for 
democracy as it means that legislatures continue to represent the electorate. The thesis has addressed 
the paucity of knowledge over sources of committee influence in the EP by adopting a qualitative 
approach with the use of elite interviews
413
, along with extensive empirical data collected on 
individual members’ professional backgrounds and experience.414 Quantitative methods have largely 
dominated the field of legislative politics, and this study has redressed this imbalance. This qualitative 
data has not only greatly expanded the understanding of what comprises committee influence in the 
                                                          
413
 30 semi structured interviews have been conducted in total with actors ranging from former government 
ministers and senior EP committee chairs, to junior committee members and committee secretariat. 
414
 Statistical data was collected on all (146) full committee members serving on the selected case study 
committees. 
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EP in particular but also, importantly, it has helped to elucidate better the mechanisms of committee 
legislative influence, within the limits of a small-n comparative study. Thus, while the attention of this 
project is on the EP, discussion can be focused on the significant impact that the original empirical 
findings, comprising the present study, have for developing the wider comparative field of legislative 
studies, while acknowledging the limitations and avoiding overly general claims. 
The chapter will first present, and then analyse, the empirical findings generated within each of the 
case studies. Once these findings have been discussed, they will be assessed for their impact on the 
current understanding of legislative influence. Finally, as a result of the findings generated here a 
number of new avenues for potential future research are discussed. 
6.2 Empirical Findings 
The empirical findings that have been generated in the present study have far reaching ramifications 
well beyond the area of focus, the committee system of the EP, as they question and provide evidence 
to the contrary of many of the existing perspectives on influence and legislative committees. 
Committees can draw influence from a number of potential, non-exclusive sources. Three EP 
committees were selected as case studies as each was clearly identified as being consistently, and 
highly, influential within the committee system of the European Parliament. Of the three case study 
committees selected, each has previously had the potential source of its significant legislative 
influence identified in existing literature, with each apparently drawing influence from a different 
‘pattern’ of potential sources (see Chapter 1). Some preconceived ideas regarding the origins from 
where the three committees have derived their high levels of influence already exist, with varying 
degrees of empirical support. These perceived sources of influence, drawn from the existing literature, 
were therefore tested in turn for their validity in each case study against the empirical evidence 
collected in this thesis, to generate an informed conclusion and understanding of what comprises 
sources of committee influence. Table 6-1 demonstrates the patterns of the sources of influence which 
committees do draw upon, identified as a result of the empirical data, across the selected cases. 
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Table 6-1 Sources of Committee Influence (7th term) 
 Policy Making 
Expertise 
Professional 
Expertise 
Committee 
Unity 
Policy Output 
 
The Committee on 
the Environment, 
Public Health and 
Food Safety 
 
 
Major Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
Minor Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
Minor Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
The Committee on 
Budgets 
 
 
Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
Major Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
 
Not a Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
The Committee on 
International Trade 
 
 
Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
Major Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
 
Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
Source of 
Committee 
Influence 
 
The informational perspective, originating from the US congressional committee system (Gilligan & 
Krehbiel 1989, 1990, Krehbiel 1991), proposes that committees operate in such a way as to actively 
promote members to acquire information (expertise) in order to become experts within their 
committee’s remit, which as a consequence heightens the committee’s influence. The more 
appropriate expertise a committee contains, the greater the influence that committee will have as it is 
able to make proposals and amendments to legislation which are more technical and specialized in 
nature. Committees are designed to further the expertise of its members as time progresses, by making 
expertise a requirement for a member to actively participate in the legislative process and keeping the 
costs of acquiring it low (Krehbiel 1991). Thus, while expertise has been established as a potential 
source of committee influence, this is often associated with high membership retention (Scarrow 
1997, Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, Benedetto 2005, Daniel 2013). In order to test the validity of the 
informational perspective in accounting for committee influence, expertise has been defined as 
consisting of two separate elements, ‘policy making expertise’, which consists of a member’s acquired 
experience and institutional memory of policy making within a system, and ‘professional expertise’ 
which consists of the technical specialization a member has developed from a previous professional 
career, a clear distinction identified within this thesis. 
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6.2.1 Policy Making Expertise 
The longer a member stays on a committee, the more ‘policy making expertise’ that member will 
acquire (Scarrow 1997, Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, Benedetto 2005, Daniel 2013) as a direct 
experience of developing an ‘institutional memory’ of the policy process and learning how to work 
with other legislative actors. It was, therefore, hypothesised that with the associated benefit of having 
a higher level of ‘policy making expertise’ within a committee, (H1) ‘a committee with high 
membership turnover will have a weakened level of legislative influence’. This hypothesis was tested 
in each of the case studies selected and the results, to a significant degree, refuted the hypothesis and 
generates evidence counter to the current convention over the effects of membership turnover on 
committee influence. 
‘Policy making expertise’ had previously been established within the literature as a significant source 
of legislative influence for the ENVI Committee (Bowler & Farrell 1995, Burns 2005a, Weale et al 
2005) and the BUDG Committee (Corbett et al 2007, Kauppi & Widgren 2008), but not for the INTA 
committee (Kleimann 2011, Richardson 2012, Gstöhl 2013). While the empirical evidence collected 
confirmed that ‘policy making expertise’ was a source of ENVI and BUDG committee influence, the 
concept of membership retention as a prerequisite for committee influence was significantly 
challenged in all cases. Furthermore, the INTA committee has been established empirically as 
containing notable levels of ‘policy making expertise’ within the data, questioning previous 
assessments of the committee’s source of influence. 
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Figure 6-1 Committee Membership Turnover. Source: Collective Data from European Parliament Website (2014) 
Each of the cases had a relative level of membership turnover (figure 6-1). The ENVI committee 
retained a comparatively higher proportion of its membership (41% membership retention) than many 
other EP committees entering the 7
th
 term. The BUDG (32% membership retention) and INTA (26% 
membership retention) committees, in contrast, had lower rates of membership retention. Elite 
interviews confirmed that having a high number of members, who had experience of the co-decision 
procedure before the 7
th
 term, was an evident factor in determining the ENVI committee’s overall 
legislative influence.
415
 Members of the committee, while often shown as lacking in technical 
understanding of policy, had a deeply developed understanding of the policy making process within 
the ENVI Committee’s remit. However, maintaining a higher level of membership retention would 
not appear to have improved all aspects of the ENVI committee’s influence judging by the empirical 
data generated. 
The ENVI committee does use ‘policy making expertise’ as a source of influence; it was, however, 
observed that extended individual membership on the committee did not result in a continuation and 
enhancement of the committee’s overall influence. ENVI committee members have been shown, for 
                                                          
415
Many committees would only gain co-decision powers at the start of the 7
th
 term. 
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the first time as part of this study, to have legislative ‘sell-by dates’. After an extended period of time 
spent on the committee, despite having a deep level of ‘policy making expertise’, such ‘past their sell-
by date’ members become an observable hindrance to, rather than a facilitator of, policy making and 
consequently diminish the ENVI committee’s influence. This remarkable result, not just specific to 
the ENVI committee, but also interestingly replicated in the data collected from the BUDG 
committee, has not previously been noted in the literature which, in fact, has focused only on the 
negative aspects of turnover. Once an experienced ENVI member has passed this ‘expiration date’, 
becomes ‘set in their ways’, and begins to oppose original policy making solutions, their removal as a 
result of natural electoral turnover, has been shown to have a significantly positive effect on the ENVI 
committee’s overall influence. 
For the BUDG committee to influence budgetary outcomes, its relationships with the European 
Commission must be well established as elite interview data has shown. Personal contacts and 
institutional networking are vital in determining its comparative influence. Empirical interview 
evidence demonstrated that during the 7
th
 term (2009-2014), despite the extremely high potential 
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for a strong relationship to be formed, this was not in fact established. Notably, upon entering into the 
8
th
 term (2014–2019), when significant turnover resulted in only 16% (7 members) of BUDG 
committee members retained and seemingly the committee was losing significant amounts of 
collective institutional memory, relations between the Commission and the BUDG committee were 
greatly improved to the BUDG committee’s legislative benefit. This finding, which may appear 
counter-intuitive, was a direct result of new committee members, or ‘new blood’, having a 
‘refreshing’ effect on the institutional relationship between the BUDG committee and the 
Commission. 
The previous assertion that high turnover would have a consistently negative effect on the BUDG 
committee’s legislative influence, with a perceived loss of ‘policy making expertise’ and institutional 
memory (Linder 2006), has been challenged for its validity. Empirical evidence has demonstrated that 
                                                          
416
 Interview participants stated strong personal relationships existed despite no ‘institutional working 
relationships’ developing 7th term. 
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a further perspective has to be considered, namely that for the BUDG committee to be influential it 
requires a regular ‘transfusion of new blood’ with new members ‘refreshing’ the committee as they 
replace older members as a result of turnover. With the acquisition of ‘new blood’ onto the BUDG 
committee, relationships vital to the committee’s continuing influence were revitalised. Furthermore, 
it was established from evidence that the BUDG committee’s continuing legislative influence is 
reliant on ‘new blood’ members as they act as a source of original policy making ideas. A steady 
influx of ‘new blood’ is evident, as imperative to maintaining the BUDG committee’s high influence 
and keeping its reputation as a dynamic and highly relevant policy actor. Thus, contrary to 
expectations, informed by comparative studies (Brady 1978, Weingast & Marshall 1988, Scarrow 
1997, Mamadouh & Raunio 2003), turnover of members has been demonstrated empirically as a 
positive for all three cases. 
The empirical evidence has also generated original observations that have questioned how the INTA 
committee uses ‘policy making expertise’, which is identified as present within the committee, as a 
source of influence. Evidence has demonstrated that a select number of committee members have 
their access to documents, containing vital policy making information, restricted. The impact of this 
restricted access was considerable on how it affected committee influence. In examples of contentious 
legislation, like that of the TTIP negotiations, key policy documents were not available to all 
committee members and access was controlled by gatekeepers, placing restrictions on the ability of 
non-senior members to develop ‘policy making expertise’. 
The INTA committee did have a markedly higher turnover of members in the 7
th
 term, compared with 
both the BUDG and ENVI committees. Before the findings of the other case studies this would have, 
according to H1, indicated a low and reduced institutional memory that resulted in weakened 
committee influence. However, the empirical evidence attests that the significant rate of turnover 
entering the 7
th
 term was because of the high demand to join the INTA committee from experienced 
MEPs. The committee did, therefore, gain significant policy making experience from inside the 
institutional systems of the EU, thus refuting the assessment of the INTA committee’s lack of 
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experience in this area by previous studies (Kleimann 2011, Richardson 2012, Gstöhl 2013). Turnover 
was in fact perceived as a positive entering into the 7
th
 term, and as a result of this injection of ‘new 
blood’, the INTA committee was able to maximise its legislative influence as these new members 
were able to bring their experience from maximising the influence of other previous ‘in vogue’ EP 
committees to bare.
417
 On average the INTA committee did contain a similar level, with a very 
marginally higher concentration of senior parliamentary members, to the BUDG and ENVI 
committees (table 6-2). Aggregate levels of seniority (rather than just the seniority of the chair) 
would, therefore, appear to be important for a committee’s influence, with the INTA committee 
increasing its levels of senior members to match the two other, long established, influential 
committees during the 7
th
 term. The rate of seniority on the INTA committee could only have reached 
the level it did, as quickly as it did, as a result of turnover allowing senior parliamentarians to join.  
Table 6-2 Seniority and Institutional Memory of Committee Membership  
 
 
                        Committee (7
th
 Term) 
ENVI BUDG INTA 
Total Membership 71 44 31 
Mean years (+/- S.D.) in 
Parliament  
8.94+/- 
5.77 
9.11+/- 
7.31 
9.74+/- 
7.58 
Mean years (+/-S.D.) on 
Committee 
7.18+/- 
5.22 
6.93 +/- 
5.96 
5.23+/- 
3 
Years of Co-decision in 
Committee 
21 5 5 
Source: Collected Data from European Parliament Website, MEP profiles (2014) 
 
Table 6-2 illustrates that while, as noted above, all the cases have similar rates of senior legislators, 
variations do exist in the levels of committee specific institutional memory. The INTA committee, 
compared with the other cases, has a lower level of members with an institutional memory of the 
                                                          
417
 Like cheating in cycling, a rider (committee) can boost their stamina (influence) with a blood transfusion 
(turnover), this can come from donated blood (newly elected members entering the committee) or from the 
cyclists own blood which was donated at an earlier time (experienced MEP’s joining a new committee to boost 
its influence).  
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committee. More members of the ENVI or BUDG committees have served more than a single 
legislative term on their particular committees than their counterparts within the INTA committee. 
This variation would further account for why the INTA committee does not draw upon ‘policy making 
expertise’ to a similarly high extent as the ENVI and BUDG committees, ultimately the INTA has a 
lower level of the committee specific resources to draw upon, yet this is mitigated somewhat by 
membership parliamentary seniority. 
6.2.2 Professional Expertise 
‘Professional expertise’, a member’s specialization often of a technical nature developed as a result of 
a professional background in a policy related area, has been identified within the theoretical 
framework as a source of committee influence which may differ between committees. It was therefore 
hypothesised that (H2) ‘A committee with low levels of professional expertise will have low levels of 
influence’. Table 6-3 reflects the results from each of the cases examined. 
Table 6-3 Relative Importance of ‘Professional Expertise’ as a Source of Committee Influence 
Committee ‘Professional Expertise’ as Source of 
Committee Influence 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health 
and Food Safety (ENVI) 
Complementary 
Committee on Budgets (BUDG) Complementary 
Committee on International Trade (INTA) High Reliance 
 
Within the case study examples, the ENVI committee has been deemed previously as containing low 
levels of ‘professional expertise’ in the existing literature (McCormick 2001). However, apart from 
the ENVI committee, the study of ‘professional expertise’ as a source of committee influence has 
been poorly developed in the EP context. While the level of ‘professional expertise’ contained within 
the BUDG committee had previously not been an area of academic focus, the general consensus from 
the existing literature for the INTA committee is that, while the committee is potentially influential, it 
is severely lacking in, or has a total absence in, any type of specialist expertise (Kleimann 2011, 
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Richardson 2012, Gstöhl 2013). The findings here, however, demonstrate that the INTA committee is 
drawing upon ‘professional expertise’ to a significant extent418, while the BUDG committee is evident 
as benefiting from it but to a lower level. An explanation is also provided as to why the ENVI 
committee does not contain ‘professional expertise’ at a higher level. 
 
Figure 6-2 Comparative Levels of ‘Professional Expertise’ between Case Study Committees. Source: Collected 
Member CVs 
 
Data collected on the background of MEPs confirmed that ‘professional expertise’ was marginal 
within the ENVI committee during the 7
th
 term (see Figure 6-2). The ENVI committee did not contain 
a noteworthy number of members with ‘professional expertise’ compared with the INTA committee’s 
significant levels. The ENVI committee has been shown to be markedly different from the INTA 
committee, BUDG committee and other EP committees, as significant numbers of the ENVI 
committee membership have a deep policy interest (for environmental protection) in the committee’s 
main remit of environmental policy, but are without a professional or technical understanding of the 
                                                          
418
 Supporting Whitaker’s (2011) findings, indicating professional expertise as a reason for members placing on 
the INTA committee. 
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policy area. In addition, the ‘professional expertise’, which the ENVI committee does contain, is 
spread thinly over the committee’s wide policy remit, as opposed to the BUDG committee, which 
although having similar levels of professional experts, focuses entirely on the narrow area of 
budgetary mechanisms. While studies by both McCormick (2001) and Weale et al (2005), without 
either study producing significant supporting empirical evidence, have suggested a dearth of technical 
expertise, which is largely derived from ‘professional expertise’ within the ENVI committee, the 
current thesis has now empirically demonstrated this to be correct. 
Within the ENVI committee those members who have a clear level of ‘professional expertise’ (Figure 
6-2), while drawing some collective benefit from it, can only exploit this potential source of influence 
in a limited and narrow way. Due to the complex policy nature of the ENVI committee’s remit a 
single proposal will ‘spill-over’ into a number of diverse and highly different technical areas, 
therefore placing a cap on the use of ‘professional expertise’ as a source of committee influence. As a 
consequence, ENVI committee members with ‘professional expertise’ have to rely on external 
sources of technical information to a similar extent as those ENVI committee members who possess 
no prior ‘professional expertise’. As technical information is widely available to the ENVI committee, 
little difference is observed between professional and non-professional members in their ability to 
efficiently organise and comprehend the significant volume of technical information available; indeed 
the evidence demonstrates that both find it difficult. Thus a deficit in ‘professional expertise’ does not 
prevent an ENVI committee member from being active in highly technical policies areas, as not 
possessing it does not place a significant extra cost on acquiring policy information, with the 
consequence that all members can actively contribute towards the committee gaining successful 
outcomes. Therefore, unlike the other case studies where it acts as a source of influence in varying 
degrees, ‘professional expertise’ is not a direct source of the ENVI committee’s established high 
legislative influence. 
Within the BUDG committee, interview evidence reflected the benefits of ‘professional expertise’ in 
assisting an individual member’s ability to comprehend highly technical issues on the committee. 
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Being able to contribute fresh policy ideas, as a result of a professional background, is an integral part 
of the BUDG committee’s ability to influence outcomes. While members without ‘professional 
expertise’ can contribute fresh and innovative policy ideas, members with a professional background 
will come to the committee with more understanding of what new policy/budgetary mechanisms are 
realistic or more likely to be implemented. However, it was evident from the data that MEPs with 
‘professional expertise’ within the remit of the BUDG committee were also attracted to membership 
of the Budgetary Control (CONT) committee, and consequently this diluted the wealth of 
‘professional expertise’ available to, and directly within, the BUDG committee. The CONT 
committee, while lacking in legislative power, is considered a more ‘technical committee’ 
(Yordanova 2009a :257), as opposed to the BUDG committee which is perceived as a more ‘political 
committee’ as a result of the powers it has to influence the budgetary outcomes of the European 
Union. The different technical/political backgrounds of MEPs are likely to influence to which 
committees they would gravitate. Consequently, the statistical evidence demonstrates that career 
politicians
419
 were the largest group represented on the BUDG committee, as opposed to the INTA 
committee where professional experts comprised the largest represented group. 
Many studies have recognised the inability of the INTA committee to match the Council’s Trade 
Policy Committee (TPC) in resources (Woolcock 2010b, 2010c, Gstöhl 2013), but have completely 
overlooked the potential of ‘professional expertise’ as a source of INTA committee influence. The 
evidence in this thesis, however, refutes this former consensus by empirically identifying significant 
levels of ‘professional expertise’ contained within the INTA committee (Figure 6-2). Members with 
‘professional expertise’ constitute a significant proportion of the INTA committee with 71% (Figure 
6-2) possessing a professional background in trade, compared with only 39% of ENVI and BUDG 
members who possessed a relevant background. 
As a result of possessing previous professional experience, INTA committee members are quickly 
able to understand what trade policy solutions are technically feasible within the area of remit when 
                                                          
419
 Career has been defined by working in domestic politics or the European Union, rather than the private 
sector. 
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making amendment proposals, and as a result this benefits the INTA committee’s overall influence. 
The INTA committee, during the 7
th
 term, with the ‘professional expertise’ it contained, was able to 
influence policy outcomes, proposing technical/feasible solutions that were acceptable to other actors. 
The high level of ‘professional expertise’ it contains does account for, or may indeed signify, why the 
INTA committee has not yet developed entrenched contacts with external (Richardson 2012) or 
internal (Kleimann 2011) sources for the provision of technical information. 
In addition, INTA committee members are restricted in their ability to consult external sources and 
experts, something not observed in the BUDG, ENVI or other EP committees. INTA members are 
restricted in how they are able to use information contained within trade documents as many 
documents cannot legally be taken out of the INTA committee. This places a severe disadvantage on 
any INTA members without pre-existing ‘professional expertise’, compared with members in other 
EP committees, such as the ENVI outlined above that can consult outside experts to gain a developed 
technical understanding of the relevant policy area. This would help to explain why some studies 
(Whitaker 2011) have seen in previous terms, ‘professional expertise’, as associated with committee 
allocation to a higher level in the INTA committee, than other EP committees. Consequently, being 
limited in the ability to contact outside expertise requires members to have prepossessed levels of 
‘professional expertise’ if they wish to operate on the committee and attempt to influence outcomes 
successfully. The cost of not having ‘professional expertise’ on the INTA committee would, 
therefore, be considerable. This is particularly significant when compared directly with the ENVI 
committee where the cost of not possessing ‘professional expertise’ was judged as negligible. Thus an 
ENVI member without ‘professional expertise’ can participate in legislative decision making, while a 
non-professional INTA member would find this extremely difficult. 
While it was also found that assistants and committee secretariat could provide members with, and in 
turn enhance a committee’s technical expertise in all cases, the extent to which this happened, or was 
possible, varied between the committees (Table 6-4). It is common practice on EP committees that 
member’s assistants will often chair technical trialogue meetings, however in the case of the ENVI 
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and BUDG committees interview data suggests that assistants do not generally possess ‘professional 
expertise’. In contrast, it is relatively common practice in the INTA committee to hire assistants with 
‘professional expertise’ to support members. This would appear to correlate with the evidence above, 
that the INTA requires and utilises a greater level of ‘professional expertise’ resources than other 
committees to establish influence.  
Table 6-4 Resources of Professional Expertise Available to Committee 
 MEPs MEP Assistants Committee Secretariat 
 
Committee on the 
Environment, Public 
Health and Food Safety 
 
Moderate  
 
Low  
 
Moderate  
 
 
Committee on Budgets 
 
 
Moderate  
 
Low  
 
Moderate (to, 
potentially, High)  
 
Committee on 
International Trade 
 
 
High  
 
Moderate  
 
 
Moderate 
 
With respect to the committee secretariat all evidence indicated that, while previously they did supply 
extensive technical expertise to EP committees, as a result of forced mobility and new hiring 
practices, in the 7
th
 term their ability to supply this technical expertise was significantly diminished 
(Table 6-4). Thus, the practices currently adopted directly undermine collection of ‘professional 
expertise’ on a committee. Thus, a new secretariat will start on a committee in which they have a 
policy remit relevant professional background, but within a few years will find themselves on a new 
committee operating within a policy remit in which they have no prior knowledge, and as a result 
‘professional expertise’ is not retained. While interview data did suggest that the BUDG committee, 
potentially due to the many professional backgrounds that possess financial expertise, did retain a 
respectable level of technical expertise all committees are currently equally and adversely affected by 
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the same practices which prevent the collection of ‘professional expertise’ in the committee 
secretariat. 
6.2.3 Committee Unity 
Committee unity refers to a consensus developing between different political groupings on a 
committee uniting behind a single policy proposal. According to current literature (Kreppel 1999, 
2000, 2002b, Nugent 2010, Hagemann & Høyland 2010, Costello & Thomson 2013, Burns 2013b) by 
presenting a ‘united front’ a committee will maximise its influence by creditably claiming to represent 
the only acceptable policy position, while if a committee is disunited in its position it will potentially 
have its final position undermined, and as a consequence weaken its influence. It was therefore 
hypothesised that (H3) ‘the lower the degree of unity on committee, the lower the level of influence’. 
While the ENVI committee is perceived, despite being highly influential, as somewhat mixed in terms 
of its unity between the party groups represented on the committee (CEPS 2012), both the INTA and 
BUDG committees were consistent in their unity, albeit with some important exceptions (Table 6-5). 
Table 6-5 Committee Unity 
Committee Levels of Committee Unity 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health 
& Food Safety 
 
Mixed Cohesion 
Committee on Budgets 
 
High Cohesion 
Committee on International Trade 
 
High Cohesion 
 
 
The ENVI committee, during the 7
th
 term, according to the empirical evidence generated in this thesis, 
operated with a moderate level of cohesion between the largest groupings. While largely confirmed as 
consensual in its decision making, the ENVI committee is denoted as a committee where cohesion is 
more difficult to achieve than in other comparable EP committees, as members find it impossible to 
unite over certain environmental, and even food standard policy issues (the ‘Novel Foods Regulation’ 
(2013/0435(COD)) being a notable example involving both areas). In addition, incidents were 
reported, which indicate significant disunity over contentious policy issues, with arguments between 
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members from different partisan groupings. On one occasion, in particular, this occurred in front of 
the Council’s representatives during a trialogue meeting. 
Different partisan groups have been shown to attempt to control the agenda within the ENVI 
committee at the expense of the committee’s overall legislative influence, an action not overtly 
evident as occurring within the INTA or BUDG committees. Despite their relatively small size, the 
Greens on the ENVI committee have been most notable in attempting to seize the agenda at an early 
stage in order to have their interests constitute the committee’s initial report. Due to the role of 
trialogue in decision making, political groups are equally represented during the early stages 
regardless of group size. The preferences of the Greens are invariably more extreme than the median 
preference of the European Parliament’s plenary. Thus, if the Greens’ views are represented in the 
committee’s initial report the committee loses influence, as its position is likely to be amended in 
plenary (for a similar conclusion see Farrell & Heritier 2004, Costello & Thomson 2010 and Burns 
2013b). 
A lack of cohesion was also evident within the partisan groups, of the ENVI committee. The 
ideological spectrum of members on the committee is significantly wide, especially when compared 
with the more focused remits of the INTA and BUDG committees, and this can lead to internal 
partisan conflicts. Some members of the European Peoples Party (EPP)
420
 on the ENVI committee, 
that are not considered to have a high preference for environmental protection by opposing political 
groupings, are considered by their own fellow EPP members as having high demander preferences on 
environmental issues. Matching results were observed for the European Conservatives and Reformists 
(ECR) grouping within the ENVI committee. Due to the wide range of environmental preferences on 
the ENVI committee, finding a compromise agreement which appeals to members holding a median 
preference (between those who favour stronger environmental protection and those who seek weaker 
standards), and whose support is required to achieve a consensus position, is highly difficult and 
sometimes impossible to achieve. Members, who are ideologically moderate, holding centrist 
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environmental positions
421
, are shown from empirical evidence, as often not being selected as 
rapporteur by their own political group, despite appealing to other ideological moderates on the 
committee, as they are far out with the entrenched internal preferences of their own party group. 
While some similar patterns of conflict have been reported to exist on the INTA committee, with a 
divide between liberal and ‘left wing’422 attitudes towards international trade (Richardson 2012, Van 
den Putte et al 2014), the empirical evidence here demonstrates a remarkable display of general unity, 
albeit with some singular, dramatic, incidents of disunity. Partisan groups on the INTA committee did 
recognise the fundamental importance of unity to the committee’s overall influence. However, this did 
not mean that all issues resulted in an easy consensus agreement between the partisan groups, 
potentially to the detriment of the INTA committee’s influence on those issues. This conflict has 
resulted from the INTA committee being a forum to an extent for national interests to be represented. 
The embodiment of national trade preferences on the INTA committee creates a situation where a 
compromise agreement is not always readily achievable due to the distance between some of the 
national positions of members, which may take precedence over the liberal/protectionist divide. The 
INTA committee, therefore, perhaps reflects more the Council’s position than other comparable EP 
committees in its decision making process. 
The negative impact of a lack of unity was demonstrated after the INTA committee proposed a 
position on the ‘Conflict Minerals’423 report, perceived as too politically radical by many of the 
committee’s own members. The INTA committee was not able to carry the Commission and Council 
with it and was, therefore, not able to successfully influence the legislation. Despite this conflict, the 
INTA committee was empirically demonstrated as drawing influence from operating a largely 
consensus decision-making process during the 7
th
 term. However, the empirical evidence also 
suggests that conflict is on the increase during the 8
th
 term (2014-2019) which could negatively 
impact on influence. Thus, unity is a clear source of EP committee influence; this is demonstrated 
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 The provision of human rights clauses, workers’ rights, etc. 
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 The ‘union system for supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum 
and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas (2014/0059(COD))’. 
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clearly with regard to the influence of the INTA committee, but more strikingly with regard to the 
BUDG committee. 
The ability to present a unified position between the political groups within the BUDG committee is a 
significant source of that committee’s legislative influence. Due to the nature of budgetary policy in 
the EU, the BUDG committee must have the support of the plenary in its position. No party group 
could gain from attempting to have their position deeply entrenched in the committee’s proposals, as 
was observed on the ENVI committee, as it is widely acknowledged by the party groups that they 
would have their position rejected in plenary and weaken the BUDG committee’s position overall. As 
a result of enforced informal practices, reports are evenly distributed between the party groups, and, 
as a consequence, no single group dominates key legislative examples such as the annual budget. The 
party groups within the BUDG committee endeavour to support each other, as budgetary policy is not 
perceived as a competition between the party groups on the committee, but rather that they are united 
against the Council. The BUDG committee was demonstrated as regularly forming grand coalitions 
including the EPP, S&D, ALDE and even the Greens grouping on all but one annual budget during 
the 7
th
 term (2009-2014). While there is a clear divide on the committee between Euro-sceptics and 
pro-Europeans, both view the influence of the BUDG committee as of overall importance, and its 
unity a primary concern. 
The example of how reports are allocated has been found, also, to signify to what extent a committee 
requires unity to be influential. The principles of report allocation differ among committees according 
to the evidence collected. The BUDG committee, where unity is seen as vital to committee influence, 
informally assign reports in a non-partisan way, to avoid groupings coming into conflict by allocating 
the reports before the term starts. The INTA committee adopt the normal bidding approach
424
 to report 
allocation but with significant degrees of negotiations taking place between the groups over who will 
get which report. Finally, the ENVI committee allocate reports in a largely partisan way, negotiations 
do take place, however evidence suggests in a more competitive bidding environment. This reinforces 
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the importance which unity can have in relation to influence. Committees which draw heavily on 
unity to establish influence adopt informal mechanism to ensure continuing unity. Even the ENVI 
committee, on occasions have suspended the normal bidding process when dealing with reports seen 
as too important to risk having its position weaken by internal conflict, the climate change package 
being the prime example (Burns 2013b). 
Finally, evidence did indicate that national interests could impact upon unity, becoming a dividing 
line that superseded EP grouping divisions. In all cases, it was expressed that national interests had 
led to some conflict. While this was less pronounced in the 7
th
 term where unity generally prevailed, 
with some exceptions on the ENVI committee, in the 8
th
 term conflict over national interests are seen 
as a growing issue, undermining committee influence. This would appear to correlate with the idea 
that greater politicisation (or re-nationalisation) is (re)emerging (if it even actually went away) within 
the European Union. This, however, may not be the politicisation that was predicted to alleviate the 
democratic deficit (Follesdal & Hix 2006, Hix 2008) as it undermines committee influence, which is 
central to the efficient working of the European Parliament. 
6.2.4 Public Policy Output 
European Union member states have previously been willing to allow regulatory policy to be dealt 
with and controlled by supranational institutions as the costs are dispersed and generally paid for by 
non-state actors such as industry. Distributive policy areas have until recently been closely guarded by 
the member states as costs are directly paid for by the states who are resistant to supranational control 
(Burns 2005b). It was, therefore, hypothesised that (H4) ‘Committees with distributive policy outputs 
will exercise lower levels of influence over legislation than committees with regulatory policy 
outputs’. 
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Table 6-6 Policy Output of Committee 
Committee Public Policy Output 
The Committee on Environment, Public 
Health and Food Safety 
Mixed Policy Output 
The Committee on Budgets Distributive Policy Output 
The Committee on International Trade Regulatory Policy Output 
 
In the first instance the ENVI committee originally sought to produce regulatory policy outputs 
(Judge et al 1994). It was this pursuit of regulatory outputs that some studies have identified as 
accounting for the ENVI committee’s significant legislative influence (Judge et al 1994), though it 
lacked empirical support (Burns 2005b). However, by the 7
th
 term (2009-2014) the committee was 
identified as producing both regulatory and distributive policy outputs (Yordanova 2009a). From the 
evidence collected here it was confirmed that the ENVI committee was able, in the example of the 
‘Plastic Bag Directive’,425 to greatly influence policy provision despite the opposition of both the 
Council and Commission, in areas of regulatory policy. The ENVI committee dealt predominantly 
with regulatory policy during the 7
th
 term, to the extent that little evidence existed of the committee 
pushing for distributive outputs. 
The ENVI committee has been confirmed as a policy outlier, in part disputing McElroy’s (2006) 
assessment that the committee was not far outside the plenary preferences, and empirically supporting 
the mainstream view of the ENVI committee’s outlier status (Yordanova 2009a), which has not 
always been ‘validated empirically’ (Hurka 2013: 278). While the committee has been perceived as 
becoming less radical over the years in its policy outputs (Burns 2013a), empirical evidence has 
shown it remains an outlier within the EP, being more radical than the plenary. The plenary is closer 
to the Council in environmental preferences. Thus the implications are that the ENVI committee will 
often find resistance coming from the plenary, which undermines its overall legislative influence. This 
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contradicts the conventional wisdom that may have suggested that the plenary willingly rubber-
stamps the committee’s position (Tsebelis & Kalandrakis 1999). This is in marked contrast to the 
BUDG committee, which due to its distributive policy outputs, meets resistance from the Council 
rather than the plenary. 
The success or failure of the BUDG committee has been attributed largely to the type of policy it 
attempts to include within the EU budget. As evidence has shown, the BUDG committee is 
predisposed to increasing the spending and distribution of funds (table 6-6), as opposed to the Council 
that actively seeks to cut the distribution of EU funds and spending. Being commonly perceived as a 
distributive committee (Burns 2005b, Rasmussen 2011) the BUDG committee was predicted to 
struggle to secure policy outcomes that resulted in the increased distribution, or re-distribution of EU 
funds. As empirical evidence shows, despite gaining in powers with the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty
426
 to influence distributive spending, once the sole reserve of the member states, the BUDG 
committee was unable to increase the distribution of funds and spending, as its position entailed, but 
was forced to accept significant cuts in these areas. This confirms, and supports with greater empirical 
evidence, the viewpoint in the literature (Benedetto 2011) that member states would continue to resist 
supranational involvement in budgetary areas of spending, at the expense of the BUDG committee’s 
influence. However, claims made in the literature that the budgetary status quo would continue to be 
entrenched, with the BUDG committee accepting the Council’s position on cutting distributive funds 
(Benedetto 2011), has been challenged by the empirical data. The evidence collected demonstrates 
that BUDG committee members are moving closer to challenging the status quo, on ongoing 
budgetary cuts, and are potentially willing to use their budgetary veto at the next opportunity. 
The INTA committee, as opposed to the BUDG committee’s distributive policy outputs, produces 
largely regulatory policy outputs (Yordanova 2009a)
427
, due to the nature of trade legislation in 
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 The INTA committee saw an increase in its powers during the 7
th
 term with regulations which define the 
framework of trade policy falling under the co-decision procedure for the first time during this term, establishing 
the INTA committee as a co-legislator with the Council in this area. 
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Europe. The INTA committee having had its formal powers increased in areas of regulatory policy 
was most significantly active in those policy areas. This may, however, also signify that member 
states
428
 and the Commission did not draft proposals that would greatly involve the INTA committee 
within distributive areas of trade policy. The INTA committee was active within files dealing with 
regulatory policy and generated no significant further evidence to question or challenge previous 
convention held over the impact of public policy output. Some potentially interesting points were, 
however, identified with regard to the INTA committee’s future policy ambitions. With regard to the 
‘Conflict Minerals’ report the committee was unsuccessful after proposing increased regulatory 
requirements well outside the Commission and Council’s desired preferences. This could indicate that 
the committee is attempting to maximise its influence in regulatory areas and failing, or may signify 
that the committee over reached as a result of lacking in understanding of what would be achievable 
for the INTA committee i.e. lack of ‘policy making expertise’ (table 6-2). 
A clear pattern has, however, emerged from comparing the three cases; when focusing on regulatory 
policy the committees were, perceived by members, to be more able to gain successful outcomes and 
draw greater influence. As a result, the INTA and ENVI committees largely produced regulatory 
outputs to maintain their influence, and seemingly avoided distributive areas, as they saw entering 
into distributive policies as potentially reducing their influence. To pursue a difficult distributive 
output would, potentially, waste time and resources which could be better applied to areas where the 
committee knows it can influence the final outcome (regulatory policy areas). A similar pattern was 
observed in the BUDG committee. While the BUDG committee, unlike the others, deals with 
predominantly distributive outcomes, the committee attempted to produce regulatory outputs, 
alongside their main distributive remits, as this was seen by members as an area they could influence 
with more certainty. Regulatory outputs are therefore confirmed, across all the cases, as a source of 
influence. 
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6.3 Implications 
Policy Making Expertise and Turnover 
From the data collected within this thesis it is clear that significant implications are apparent for the 
current literature focusing on ‘policy making expertise’, and a re-evaluation of the importance of 
committee turnover may be required, in future, as a result of some of the contrary evidence provided 
here. Understanding how policy is made, gaining ‘policy making information’ (Krehbiel 1991), and 
learning how to work with different political actors in institutional situations, will always contribute 
towards the total collective benefit of a committee’s legislative influence. As expected, this 
understanding of committee influence, derived from Krehbiel’s (1991) informational perspective, was 
confirmed within the empirical data comprising all three case studies. However, current understanding 
of the relationship between ‘policy making expertise’ and committee ‘turnover’, formulated from the 
collective literature (Weingast & Marshall 1988, Shaw 1998, Mamadouh & Raunio 2003) has been 
challenged in the selected cases, and perceived wisdom on ‘committee turnover’ may be questioned as 
a result of the empirical data collected. Importantly, if replicated beyond this small-n study, these 
findings may have significant ramifications well beyond the EU into the general comparative 
literature on the informational perspective of committee influence, changing how we think about 
committee influence, and questioning fundamental concepts, such as the effects of turnover, which are 
present in all parliamentary systems. It is important to stress, that while the evidence would suggest 
important potential ramifications following on from this study, as a result of making deliberate 
methodological choices to adopt a small-n approach, which selected upon the dependent variable, the 
study is limited in the generalizations it can make. Without more cases only certain conclusions can 
be drawn. 
Current convention, drawn from the US Congress, European Parliament, and other comparative 
parliamentary systems, holds that with higher membership retention the influence of a ‘stable’ 
parliamentary committee will be heightened as a result of its members having extensive ‘policy 
making expertise’, specialization, and institutional memory (Brady 1978, Weingast & Marshall 1988, 
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Krehbiel 1991 (US Congress), Héritier 1996, Scarrow 1997, Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, Benedetto 
2005, Daniel 2013 (European Parliament), Shaw 1998, Mattson & Strøm 2006 (Comparative 
Parliamentary Perspective)). According to Mamadouh & Raunio (2003: 349) turnover is potentially a 
‘serious problem’ affecting the legislative influence of EP committee: 
‘The development of policy expertise is facilitated when representatives serve on the same committee 
for an extended time period. Considering the very high turnover of MEPs, the membership of 
committees changes significantly after each election, and this may weaken the legislative influence of 
the Parliament’. 
The convention according to Mamadouh & Raunio (2003: 349) and others, looking at the EU or US 
systems, (Brady 1978, Weingast & Marshall 1988, Scarrow 1997, Benedetto 2005) is that turnover 
weakens (committee) influence, and it is this understanding which helped to generate H1.
429
 However, 
this convention may not accurately account for the realities of committee influence, which have been 
shown as evident in the cases of this thesis.  Turnover is evident within the selected cases, as 
operating in such ways as to positively benefit a committee’s overall legislative influence. The thesis 
therefore contributes empirical evidence that the institutional memory of a particular member may not 
guarantee continued, or exponential, growth in associated informational benefits. Membership 
longevity can only benefit a committee’s influence for a finite period. Committees may have to be 
‘refreshed’ at regular intervals in order to directly benefit the committee’s influence. These findings 
provide an additional or alternative explanation for Scully’s (1997c) observation that a high intake of 
new members at the 4
th
 EP term had a marked impact on the Parliament’s influence. This was 
originally attributed by Scully (1997c: 244) to an increase in the Parliament’s formal powers that a 
large number of new highly ‘motivated’ members could utilise. The above quote from Mamadouh & 
Raunio (2003: 349) is also questioned as the findings have shown that ‘policy making expertise’ is 
attained by seniority (years of service in the EP), not necessarily by seniority in the same committee. 
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Thus, within the scope of the limited number of cases comprising this study, in order to remain 
influential a committee must undergo a level of turnover which removes members who are past their 
(‘expiration date’) policy making prime, and replace them with new members who revitalise the 
committee with a ‘transfusion of new blood’. Once a member reaches an ‘expiry date’ they no longer 
act as an asset to the committee’s influence but become a detriment, acting as a ‘roadblock’, or 
‘bottle-neck’, to original and innovative policy making solutions. In some notable examples (such as 
was evident in the BUDG committee) senior members self-identified the benefits of turnover, and in 
some cases removed themselves from key committee positions after identifying the advantages which 
‘new blood’ could bring to the committee’s influence. Together with the benefits associated with the 
removal of ‘expired members’, the injection of ‘new blood’ as a result of turnover is identified as a 
key source of committee influence for the first time in this thesis. The introduction of ‘new blood’ 
onto committee has been shown to act to revitalise a committee and its relationships between other 
institutional actors. If these observations from this limited small-n study can be replicated within 
further cases, beyond the scope of this project, many of the general conventions which are held over 
committee membership turnover may be questioned.  
A ‘transfusion of new blood’ onto committee, as a result of turnover, further benefits a committee’s 
influence as new members are able to offer new solutions to old policy making problems, and increase 
a committee’s ability to deal with ever evolving policy issues. The ability to deal with evolving policy 
issues of increased complexity has always been cited as the main reason for the existence of 
committee systems (Blondel 1969, Krehbiel 1991, Mattson & Strøm 1996, Strøm 1998, Shaw 1998). 
The findings of this thesis, with evidence generated from all three case studies, therefore may 
highlight new and important points of significance to the field beyond the case example of the EU, 
over the importance of committee efficiency and how it is linked to turnover. Future, larger, studies 
would be needed to determine whether this is a general phenomenon. Turnover may establish 
committees as continuingly relevant policy actors, preventing stagnation, which would negatively 
impact upon committee influence. Within the empirical evidence the ‘refreshment’ of the committee 
and acquisition of ‘new blood’ was apparent as a fundamental source of the committee’s legislative 
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influence. All parliamentary committee systems see differing levels of ‘new blood’ joining 
committees as a result of turnover, but it is a factor previously not identified as affecting committee 
influence until this study. These findings, therefore, may help to account for the concepts of 
‘turnover’ and its potential elemental role within legislative systems, reconciling it with the idea of 
committee ‘specialization’, by indicating an unforeseen relationship between the two. Rather than 
being a detriment to committees, as was expected when it was tested against the example of EP 
committees, turnover was actually identified within this limited n-study, as part of the process which 
enables committees to deal with evolving policy issues, by structurally allowing and promoting the 
propagation of innovative policy solutions. 
This thesis has, therefore, by testing ‘H1’, qualified the (now former) convention that a committee 
with high turnover would result in a committee that has undergone a reduction in its legislative 
influence with its concomitant loss of expertise (Brady 1978, Weingast & Marshall 1988, Mamadouh 
& Raunio 2003, Benedetto 2005, Whitaker 2011) in the selected cases. This is an extremely important 
original observation in the context of understanding committee influence in the European Union, but 
more importantly, creates a better understanding of how this mechanism of ‘turnover’, which is found 
within all legislative committee systems, may operate as a potential source of influence, indicating the 
need for future testing with a wider number of cases with an aim of establishing a strong causal link. 
Having a better understanding of turnover, as a result of the testing done in this thesis, will potentially 
contribute significantly to our comprehension of committee systems in a wider, theoretical, way. 
While these findings are significant to the field of legislative systems, some brief comment on the 
significant implications for the EU is required. Whitaker (2011) suggests that the institutionalization 
and maturation of the committees of the EP as legislative actors has led to a reduction in the turnover 
of committee membership. The findings of this thesis would suggest (as only three cases were 
examined and a clear generality cannot be asserted), that this may endanger, rather than enhance, the 
continued influence of committees of the EP, as Whitaker (2011) appears to suggest. If committee 
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retention becomes further entrenched, then the EP may risk
430
 entering a premature old age where 
policy stagnation becomes the norm and committee influence reaches an inescapable plateau. The 
importance of ‘committee refreshment’ and ‘new blood’ is identified by many senior and junior MEPs 
across committees whose interview contributions have helped to establish these empirical points. It is 
only within the academic sphere that the true importance and ramifications of turnover have yet to be 
recognized. 
Committee influence, within the cases examined here, is, therefore, not defined by turnover reducing 
the ‘policy making expertise’; rather a committee’s influence is defined by the rate and level of 
‘membership refreshment’. Committees require a level of ‘policy making expertise’ to be retained 
each term but must contain a level of turnover which ‘refreshes’ the committee in order to maximise 
its influence. These findings may have a significant impact far beyond the field of EU studies as they 
could be applied to any governmental and parliamentary system that relies upon legislative 
committees to operate efficiently, and does not implement strict term limits on its length of 
membership service. It is, however, only with more extensive testing that the general application of 
these findings may become apparent, due to the limited small-n approach of this study. In parallel and 
in a similar manner to the normative benefits of keeping democratic representation refreshed with 
regular elections, a regular turnover of committee members has a tangible impact on the continued 
relevance and influence of committees by preventing the stagnation that is an anathema to any good 
democratic system. Many of the comparative studies looking at other parliamentary system, discussed 
above and within the theoretical framework (Brady 1978, Weingast & Marshall 1988, Krehbiel 1991, 
Shaw 1998, Mattson & Strøm 2006) may be ready for reassessment as a result of the findings of this 
study. For example, the studies (Brady 1978, Weingast & Marshall 1988, Krehbiel 1991) that 
previously established the impression of committee turnover as a negative with regard to influence, 
originated within the US congressional system. However, the importance of seniority within the US 
                                                          
430
 High turnover of the 8
th
 term European elections may have lessened this risk. 
243 
 
Congress has been seen as waning over the years (Hall & Shepsle 2014
431
), along with a general 
perceived stagnation in congressional politics and decision making. The concept of ‘committee 
refreshment’ identified in this thesis, may offer an alternative explanation for changes such as the 
reduced importance in seniority in the US Congress, or at the very least they may contribute greater 
evidence to those calling for congressional term limits. Overall, if results can be replicated beyond the 
cases examined here, it could be argued that the evidence produced as part of this thesis comprises a 
potential paradigm shift on how committee turnover in general could be viewed as a source of 
committee influence. 
Professional Expertise 
Beyond the notable contributions of Krehbiel (1991) and Daniel (2013), ‘professional expertise’ is 
currently not a fully characterised source of committee influence.
432
 What we know about 
‘professional expertise’ often derives from comparative and normative work on epistemic 
communities in different contexts (see Haas 1992, Radaelli 1999). The findings of this thesis help to 
expand upon current understanding, providing better evidence to contextualise professional expertise. 
Within the EP the use of ‘professional expertise’ was shown, in this thesis’ selected cases, empirically 
as a source of committee influence that varies between committees. Some committees use 
‘professional expertise’ as a direct source of influence as a result of the benefits it can bring to 
understanding the technical elements of policy (INTA). Some committees will use it to complement 
other significant sources of committee influence (BUDG). Conversely, other committees are restricted 
in their use of ‘professional expertise’ due to the nature of the wide policy remit under which they 
operate (ENVI). While the normative concept is, therefore, confirmed in that ‘professional expertise’ 
will have an impact on (committee) influence in institutions (Haas 1992), its absence does not 
necessarily mean a lessening of committee influence, in part challenging the second hypothesis 
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(H2)
433
 in the examined cases, which helps to further the understanding of ‘professional expertise’ as 
a generalizable concept which can be expanded upon in future studies. 
While the empirical findings of Daniel (2013) were supported with respect to committee members 
using ‘professional expertise’ as a source of influence, the empirical data collected in the present 
study exposed limitations in the Daniel (2013) study in that it did not identify that the influence of 
‘professional expertise’ can vary significantly between committees as shown in the cases here. 
Variation in levels of ‘professional expertise’ between committees does not necessarily result in a 
‘like for like’ variation in the comparative influence of committees. For example, the ENVI 
committee did not experience a significantly lower rate of influence than the INTA committee despite 
the wide variations in ‘professional expertise’. To reiterate, a rate of (high) influence is maintained as 
constant across the case studies within this thesis. In summary, therefore, while certain EP committees 
are reliant on ‘professional expertise’ to establish their high levels of legislative influence others have 
established their influence as a result of other potential sources of influence. An absence of 
‘professional expertise’ in all circumstances does not guarantee weaker influence, contrary to ‘H2’. 
By testing this hypothesis, however, patterns, previously unidentified, were observed to account for 
the findings. 
The claim has been made that expertise will be generated in a committee if the cost of doing so is low 
(Gilligan & Krehbiel 1990, Krehbiel 1991). However, the evidence generated from this thesis expands 
well beyond this understanding of expertise as a source of committee influence, contributing evidence 
towards the developing concept of ‘professional expertise’. A comparison of the evidence generated 
in each of the three case studies examined demonstrates that the reliance of a committee on 
‘professional expertise’ as a source of influence may depend on how high the cost will be of not 
possessing a level of technical expertise. So not only will low costs, to acquisition expertise, drive its 
generation in committee (Gilligan & Krehbiel 1990, Krehbiel 1991) but it will seemingly also be 
driven by how vital its acquisition is for a member to participate, and not be excluded, from the 
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decision making process. If technical information is widely available in a comparative committee, as a 
result of well-established contacts such as with external experts, then the committee does not require a 
significant level of ‘professional expertise’ to be influential. If technical information is not widely 
available or accessible outside the committee, due to underdeveloped or restricted relationships with 
external experts, as is seen in the case example of the INTA committee (Kleimann 2011, Richardson 
2012), then members must rely on their own technical abilities to a greater extent as the costs of not 
possessing a technical understanding of the remit would have a negatively high impact on the 
committee’s overall influence. 
A more coherent understanding of ‘professional expertise’ as an indicator for technical expertise has 
been developed as result of the findings in this thesis, and a previously underdeveloped indicator of 
committee influence ‘professional expertise’, has been ‘fleshed-out’, allowing for its application in 
wider comparative examples as an alternative explanation for committee influence. An understanding 
of ‘professional expertise’ has been developed that includes not only the expertise of committee 
members but, also, takes account of other resources available to the committee coming from 
assistants, secretariat, party officials and national contacts. It is the totality of these resources which 
seemingly affects a committee’s ability to draw upon ‘professional expertise’ as a source of influence. 
The evidence from the three in-depth cases compared within this thesis, on links between professional 
expertise and committee influence, sets the groundwork for future studies to test in a wider range of 
cases the comparative reproducibility of the results. Overall such studies will create a more general 
understanding of the link between professional expertise and committee influence. 
 While it is not unheard of for a young member, with little ‘life experience’, to find themselves in an 
elected position, most parliamentarians have previous career experience to draw upon. By using the 
indicators developed here that ‘professional expertise’ does matter, but may differ in significance, and 
that it is the cost of not possessing technical information that drives its presence on a committee, a 
better understanding of committee influence can be gained. For example, in US politics today, elected 
members make much about not being a ‘Washington Insider’. Watch any US political advertisement, 
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for a new or even a sitting congressman, and it will often attempt to instil the virtues of their previous 
professional careers rather than policy experience.
434
 While this is often done for political reasons, to 
connect with voters, this thesis has developed upon the actual impact of ‘professional expertise’, a 
previously underdeveloped concept in the comparative context. 
Committee Unity 
Committee unity does affect the relative level of influence that a committee possesses. This helps to 
confirm and contributes further empirical evidence towards the perspective of Kreppel (1999, 2000, 
2002b) and others (Nugent 2010, Hagemann & Høyland 2010, Costello & Thomson 2013, Burns 
2013b) that actors
435
 will be more influential the more often they are consistently united in their 
legislative position, and for the most part confirms the third stated hypothesis (H3).
436
 However, some 
important caveats, changing perspectives on the importance of committee unity and its relationship 
with influence, are apparent as a result of the empirical data. The implications of the findings derived 
by testing the unity in the case example of the EP will help to create a more developed understanding 
of committee unity, which can in the future be applied outside the EU. Comparing the results, drawn 
from the case studies, it is clear that some committees require greater levels of unity to maintain their 
high levels of legislative influence than other committees that do not require the same levels of unity 
to be equally influential, and highlights an original observation surrounding the concept of unity. 
Members of EP committees do identify committee unity as a potential source of committee influence; 
however, the actual negative impact of disunity on a committee varies noticeably. The ENVI 
committee remained a highly influential committee despite having some significant examples of 
conflict taking place between party groups. If the BUDG and INTA committees were to have similar 
levels of conflict, as are sometimes present within the ENVI committee, it would have a more marked 
effect upon both the BUDG and INTA committees’ overall respective legislative influences. Indeed, 
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 For example, the ‘infamous’ advertisement for now sitting Senator, Joni Ernst; 
https://youtu.be/p9Y24MFOfFU. 
435
 Often within the literature it is only unity within the EP which is discussed rather than in the committees. 
436
 ‘H3. The lower the degree of unity on committee, the lower the level of influence. 
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conflict within the INTA committee has been observed as an increasing trend which has had a deeply 
negative impact on the influence of the INTA committee at the start of the 8
th
 term. The ENVI 
committee, on the other hand, is seemingly able to accommodate some displays of disunity without 
overly undermining overall influence. The ENVI committee’s ability to deal with disunity may be as a 
result of having more experience with compensating for disharmony, between party groups, which 
other committees lack. Committees, therefore, do vary in how they can use unity as a source of 
influence: for some committees, it appears a fundamental source of influence, while for other 
committees, unity merely acts to supplement other potential sources of influence. These findings help 
to expand current understanding of committee unity as a source of committee influence. 
What is apparent from these findings is that they contribute additional evidence and re-enforce the 
concerns of Lord (2013) and Burns (2013b) that the drive for consensus to promote unity and increase 
committee influence can come at the expense of marginal voices on committees, such as within the 
EP with the Greens and other ‘outsider’ groups. However, more importantly, this study builds upon 
previous findings by demonstrating with its in-depth cases, examples of when the drive to present 
unified positions inside party groups can marginalise moderate voices even within major groupings. 
In the EP context, while it has previously been identified that the S&D have experienced internal 
conflict over trade policy positions (Van den Putte et al 2014), the importance of conflict within party 
groups on committees has sometimes been overlooked despite the related impact it can have on the 
overall influence of a committee. The political groups of the EP operate as ‘broad churches’ 
encompassing a wide spectrum of ideological backgrounds and this will impact committees in 
different ways depending on the issues within a particular committee’s remit. While the party groups 
have been established as notably cohesive in the EP (Hix & Noury 2009), friction within the groups 
can have an effect on committee influence even if the group ultimately votes together, as potential 
disunity in Parliament has been signalled to the Council. In the ENVI committee, rapporteurs will be 
selected by how closely they reflect their own group’s main preferences, often at the expense of more 
moderate group members who may have more success in achieving compromise positions. In order to 
have unity on committee the first step must be to have unity within one’s own group, which will mean 
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selecting a rapporteur who is most acceptable to the group’s ideological preferences, as shown in the 
empirical evidence. If a party group is not firmly united behind their own rapporteur, conflict will 
follow. 
Different studies have asked under what circumstances different parties unite over a single position 
and for what reasons this occurs. However, in most cases the focus has been on internal party unity 
(Sieberer 2006, Carey 2007, Pasquino & Valbruzzi 2012), while less has been written on the impact 
of unity between party groups and its impact on committee influence. This thesis has helped to 
develop a more coherent concept of committee unity, with the case study evidence it provides, which 
can be used in future studies to attempt to generate a more general understanding, as discussed below. 
These findings are also important in relation to the broader trends of politicisation and differentiated 
integration (or re-nationalisation) that are seen as affecting the European Union (Schimmelfennig et al 
2015). Partisan disunity and conflict over national interests within committees have been identified 
within this study, while they did not impact heavily upon committee influence during the 7
th
 term; 
early indications of the 8
th
 term suggest an increase in disunity across both EU party lines and over 
national interests. These trends, if continued, would undoubtedly undermine committee unity and 
hence EP committee influence. Political groupings do have extensive experience is reaching 
compromises which ensure continued unity of committee; however, when national interests are the 
dividing line the continued influence of a supranational body (the EP’s committees) may be less of a 
concern. Therefore, differentiated integration
437
 (Schimmelfennig et al 2015) and increased 
politicisation may impact the unity, and influence, of committees asymmetrically, with some 
committees more exposed and susceptible to such factors, depending on the interests at stake. 
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 Integration, occurring in asymmetrical ways with different actors being involved in policy areas to varying 
degrees. 
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Public Policy Output 
Each of the case study committees selected displayed a uniquely different type of policy output (Table 
6-3). The evidence collected and discussed, once compared, confirmed the hypothesis (H4
438
) that 
policy output would affect the influence of committees. Committees dealing with distributive outputs 
did meet greater resistance from member states as to having a supranational actor enter into areas that 
they perceived as their property right, such as the (re)distribution of budgetary funding. Less 
resistance was observed for committees dealing with regulatory policy outputs as was evident in the 
case of the INTA committee (with the exception of the ‘Conflict Mineral’ reports example, which was 
more likely as a result of the committee over reaching or from internal conflict). The ENVI committee 
has been demonstrated as dealing with both distributive and regulatory policies. In reports dealing 
with regulatory policy the ENVI committee was able to extend the provision of a report, the ‘plastic 
bags report’, further than the Commission’s original proposal and with the acceptance of the Council. 
When dealing with examples of reports with distributive elements the ENVI committee was not able 
to further, in a comparable way, the provisions of the Commission. This evidence therefore confirms 
the hypothesis (H4) that committee influence does differ depending upon the type of policy that it is 
being processed, and supports previous findings (Burns 2005b). With regard to the implications for 
the wider field, this thesis provides more evidence to support policy outputs as an indicator of, and 
potential source of, influence. This concept first created in the context of the US Congress (Lowi 
1964, 1972) has been largely confirmed and reinforced within the difficult case study of the EP, in 
this thesis and other studies (Judge et al 1994, Shackleton 2000, Burns 2005b, Yordanova 2009a). 
This provides the groundwork and lays a template for testing policy output as a source of influence 
within other comparative systems. 
6.4 Future research 
The findings that have been generated within the thesis have significant ramifications for not only the 
field of EU legislative political and committee influence but may also help to develop future 
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 ‘H4. Committees with distributive policy outputs will exercise lower levels of influence over legislation than 
committees with regulatory policy outputs. 
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understanding of the wider areas of committee influence. Most notably our understanding of turnover 
within committees and its effects on influence has been expanded far beyond previous assessments 
(Brady 1978, Weingast & Marshall 1988, Krehbiel 1991, Scarrow 1997, Shaw 1998, Mamadouh & 
Raunio 2003, Benedetto 2006, Mattson & Strøm 2006, Daniel 2013). As well as contributing new 
evidence over the potential consequences of turnover, with the previously unreported aspects of ‘new 
blood members’ and ‘committee refreshment’ being outlined in the selected cases, the concept of 
expertise has been expanded to define two unique types of expertise, namely ‘policy making’ and 
‘professional’, expertise. Both of these key findings may have a significant impact far beyond the case 
study area of the European Parliament and into the wider field of legislative politics if replicated 
beyond the limits of this small-n study. 
Previously, the general consensus has been that committee turnover wholly acts to reduce committee 
influence as extensive ‘policy making expertise’, specialization, and institutional memory, is lost. The 
evidence drawn from the case studies in this thesis has been that turnover, contrary to these previous 
assessments and expectations, consistently enhances, as well as acts as a source of legislative 
influence. The concepts of ‘new blood members’ and ‘committee refreshment’ as a consequence of 
committee turnover resulting in new policy ideas and new invigorated networking opportunities opens 
up many potential new avenues of research. The impact of committee ‘refreshment’ as a potential 
source of influence is not limited to the European Parliament, but could be applied in future projects 
to any legislative committee system as discussed below. As moderate turnover has been shown in this 
study to have a positive effect on the influence of the committees studied, a new hypothesis, which 
could be tested in future research, can be generated affirming that: ‘moderate membership turnover 
will reinvigorate and enhance committee legislative influence’. The generation of this new hypothesis 
can be used to further test and verify the significant findings of this thesis in future projects with the 
aim of developing new theoretical understanding of legislative decision making, as all committees 
experience membership turnover. The question to be asked, therefore, is, does the ‘injection of new 
blood’ on to a committee increase influence in committee systems, beyond the EU, and do other 
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comparative committees require regular ‘refreshment’ to maintain or enhance legislative influence as 
has been shown in the cases analysed in this thesis? 
Future studies can adopt the findings, and test the hypothesis, on committee turnover produced from 
this thesis’ empirical data, and apply them to all remaining committees of the European Parliament, in 
the first instance, in order to acquire a deeper understanding of patterns of committee influence as a 
result of turnover, from a larger sample group of legislative committees and begin to develop more 
generalizable results. This thesis has been a small-n case study focusing on an important but singular 
area; however, the aim of future research will be to test how generalizable the findings on ‘committee 
refreshment’ and the induction of ‘new blood’ are in a wider range of empirical cases. If these results 
are replicated, first within the wider EP committee system or within other systems, such as the US 
Congress, this will add further weight of support to the generalized points identified here, and help 
develop a more comprehensive theory of committee influence in parliamentary systems. The findings 
of this thesis have provided the foundations for such a significant theoretical development. Turnover 
had previously been accepted as having a consistently negative effect on committee influence (Brady 
1978, Weingast & Marshall 1988, Krehbiel 1991, Héritier 1996, Scarrow 1997, Shaw 1998, 
Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, Benedetto 2005, Mattson & Strøm 2006, Daniel 2013). The evidence 
collected within this thesis’ selected cases runs counter to this standard view. Consequently, if the 
findings from this study can be replicated in a wider range of cases, many of these previous studies 
which have been conducted both within the US Congress and European parliamentary systems are 
ready for reassessment. The impacts of these findings on turnover are, therefore, significant not only 
because they further the understanding of legislative politics in the EU, but because they may act as a 
new starting point for developing the theoretical perspective of institutional legislative decision 
making. 
The distinction between ‘policy making expertise’ and ‘professional expertise’ highlights other 
potential avenues of significant future research. While expertise has been identified correctly as a 
source of committee influence, and directly related to the ‘cost’ that drives its acquisition (Krehbiel 
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1991), expertise has not always been clearly defined despite its repeated application within various 
studies. This thesis has contributed a more coherent definition of expertise with a clear dichotomy 
demonstrated between ‘policy making expertise’ and ‘professional expertise’. As a result of the clear 
definition developed between the two types of expertise, both can be applied in different committee 
systems in future projects to understand their relative contributions to, and relationship to, legislative 
influence in a wider context. By adopting the lessons produced here that the type of expertise a 
committee uses as a source of its influence depends on the cost associated with not possessing that 
certain type of expertise on a particular committee, new research questions and hypotheses can be 
formulated. 
Two clear hypotheses can be proposed, from the data, which can be tested using a wider range of case 
examples, beyond those already observed in the EP system. In the first instance it could be proposed 
that: committees which retain high levels of ‘policy making expertise’ do not require ‘professional 
expertise’ to be influential’. Secondly, ‘the ‘professional expertise’ a committee uses as a source of its 
influence depends on the cost associated with not possessing that source of influence for the 
committee’. By applying these hypotheses to examples of committees outside of the EP, a more 
cohesive concept, and potential theory of committee expertise, can begin to be developed which 
builds upon the groundwork that this thesis has already contributed. While previous comparative 
research has looked at the cost of acquiring expertise, future research must focus on the costs that not 
possessing a single type of expertise has on an individual committee member’s ability to actively 
participate in legislation and its implications for the committee as a whole. Finding that the cost 
associated with a type of expertise can define the source of a committee’s legislative influence in a 
larger range of case studies will significantly expand the theoretical understanding of expertise as a 
source of committee influence. 
A further question which could, also, be addressed in future research is: are we now observing in the 
EP, with its increase in specialization (Corbett et al 2007) and institutionalization (Whitaker 2011), 
the establishment of two distinct types of committees: ‘political committees’, which contain high level 
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of ‘policy making expertise’, and ‘technical committees’, which maintain high level of ‘professional 
expertise? Developments of this kind have been observed in mature parliamentary systems such as 
that of Sweden and Italy, and would denote the European Parliament entering into a new stage of 
legislative maturity. Further investigation will contribute towards our understanding of parliamentary 
(institutional) development, an area of classic debate (Moravcsik & Katzenstein 1998) which has not 
often focused on committee development as an indicator of maturity and institutionalization, beyond 
the notable work of Whitaker (2011). 
Finally, with regard to potential future research, there is significant merit in examining the impact of 
unity within the committees. While disunity has been shown, as part of this study, to affect committee 
influence to differing degrees, little is known about ‘unity’ as a source of influence outside of the EU. 
By investigating the impact of unity across all EP committees a future project will be able to further 
confirm if committees only require unity to maximise influence depending on their own circumstance 
i.e. are some committee more capable of dealing with disunity and preventing it from affecting overall 
influence than others? Answering this question will result in a better awareness of committee 
influence that can be developed against the backdrop of an increasing partisan dynamic 
(politicisation), which appears the case in the EP. Greater politicisation will result in more examples 
of disunity and disharmony in a chamber historically marked for its unity. Alternatively, the findings 
developed within this thesis could easily be applied directly to a multi-party legislative system such as 
one of the many European state systems. 
6.5 Final Remarks 
An appropriate conclusion to this thesis would be to reflect upon the original research question that 
was proposed, namely ‘how do committees establish legislative influence’? The empirical evidence 
comprising the body of the thesis has addressed the research question in significant depth, and 
determined that committees are drawing upon different sources of influence in patterns not previously 
identified or understood. This thesis’ proposed hypotheses derived from different comparative 
examples of legislative committees, and suggested a number of different variables for testing them in 
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the context of the European Parliament. Each of these variables was assessed for their validly and 
were tested extensively in the three case study examples which comprised (consistent) highly 
influential committees within the European Parliament. Examination of each of these possible 
variables established a more comprehensive understanding of committee influence, and significantly 
addressed studies calling for further understanding of this significant, but neglected, area (Yordanova 
2013).
439
 Overall this thesis has, not only generated a better understanding of the sources of committee 
influence, but has also questioned previous conventions where expected results were not replicated. 
As a result of this contrary evidence to previously established conventions on sources of committee 
influence, new avenues of research have been identified that will require to be addressed, in future 
academic studies. 
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 ‘The observed strong variations in legislative influence between committees [also] calls for further 
explanation’ (Yordanova 2013: 112). 
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Appendix  
Appendix I – Committees of the 7th European Parliament 
AFCO:  Committee on Constitutional Affairs. 
AFET:  Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
 - DROI: Subcommittee on Human Rights. 
 - SEDE: Subcommittee on Security and Defence. 
AGRI:   Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development. 
BUDG:   Committee on Budgets. 
CONT: Committee on Budgetary Control. 
CULT:   Committee on Culture and Education. 
DEVE:  Committee on Development. 
ECON:  Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. 
ENVI:   Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. 
EMPL:  Committee on Employment and Social Affairs. 
FEMM:  Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality. 
IMCO:  Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection. 
INTA:   Committee on International Trade. 
ITRE:   Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. 
JURI:   Committee on Legal Affairs. 
LIBE:   Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. 
PECH:  Committee on Fisheries. 
PETI:  Committee on Petitions. 
REGI:   Committee on Regional Development. 
TRAN:  Committee on Transport and Tourism. 
CRIM:  Special Committee on Organised Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering. 
 
(Source:  European Parliament Activity Report 2009 -2011 DV\903361EN) 
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Appendix II – Interview List 
 
Interview with Member of the European Parliament 28/2/14 Edinburgh UK  
Interview with Member of the Secretariat for the ENVI Committee 19/3/2014 Brussels BE 
Interview with Assistant to Member of the ENVI Committee 20/3/14 Brussels BE  
Interview with Senior Member of the Secretariat for the ENVI Committee 20/3/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Secretariat to the TRAN Committee 2/4/14 Phone Interview 
Interview with Member of the ENVI Committee 8/4/2014 Phone Interview 
Interview with Secretariat to the REGI Committee 13/5/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Secretariat to the FEMM Committee 13/5/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Senior Secretariat to the JURI Committee 14/5/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Senior Budgetary Secretariat 14/5/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Secretariat to the IMCO Committee 15/5/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Secretariat to the IMCO Committee 15/5/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Secretariat to the AGRI Committee 16/5/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Secretariat to the EMPL Committee 25/6/14 Phone Interview 
Interview with Member of the Ex-Post Impact Assessment Unit of the European Parliament 3/7/14 
Phone Interview 
Interview with Secretariat of the ITRE Committee 4/11/14 Brussels BE. 
Interview with Committee on Budgets Leadership Member 4/11/14. Brussels BE 
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Interview with Senior Commission DG Budgetary Official 5/11/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Assistant to Member of the Committee on Budgets 6/11/14. Brussels BE 
Interview with Member of ENVI Committee 6/11/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Assistant to Member of the Committee on International Trade 7/11/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Assistant to Member of the ENVI Committee 7/11/14 Brussels BE 
Interview with Committee on Budgets Senior Leadership Member 4/12/14. Brussels BE 
Interview with Secretariat of the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament 4/12/14 
Interview with ‘Group Coordinator’ Member of the ENVI Committee 7/1/15 Skype Interview 
Interview with Senior Member of the Committee on International Trade 17/11/15 Phone Interview 
Interview with Member of the Committee on International Trade 2/12/15 Phone Interview 
Interview with Member of the Committee on International Trade 15/12/15 Phone Interview 
Interview with Member of the Committee on International Trade 12/1/16 Phone Interview 
Interview with Senior Member of the Committee on International Trade 15/1/16 Glasgow UK 
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Appendix III – Interview Question Key 
 
Interview Questions. 
  
Q1. Do you consider [the interviewee’s committee] to be a powerful legislative actor? 
  
Q2.  Is committee decision making usually consensual between the political groups [on the 
interviewee’s committee], or do conflicts often occur?  
  
Q3. Does the [interviewee’s committee] have a strong working relationship with the 
European Commission? Does the committee have a strong working relationship with the 
Council? 
  
Q4. Are you contacted by stakeholders or national government representatives attempting to 
supply you with position papers and information directly? 
  
Q5. Does seniority and committee experience play a significant role in the allocation of 
committee reports? 
259 
 
Appendix IV - Powers and responsibilities of Committee on the Environment, Public Health 
and Food Safety 
 
‘Committee responsible for:  
1.   Environmental policy and environmental protection measures, in particular concerning:  
(a)  Climate change, 
(b)  Air, soil and water pollution, waste management and recycling, dangerous substances and 
preparations, noise levels and the protection of biodiversity, 
(c) Sustainable development, 
(d) International and regional measures and agreements aimed at protecting the environment, 
(e) Restoration of environmental damage, 
(f) Civil protection, 
(g) The European Environment Agency, 
(h) The European Chemicals Agency; 
2.  Public health, in particular:  
(a) Programmes and specific actions in the field of public health, 
(b) Pharmaceutical and cosmetic products, 
(c) Health aspects of bioterrorism, 
(d) The European Medicines Agency and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; 
3. Food safety issues, including in particular:  
(a) The labelling and safety of foodstuffs, 
(b) Veterinary legislation concerning protection against risks to human health; public health checks 
on foodstuffs and food production systems, 
(c) The European Food Safety Authority and the European Food and Veterinary Office’. 
 
 Source: European Parliament Rules of Procedure (2014) 
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Appendix V – Professional Expertise in ENVI Committee  
 
Expertise was seen as possessed by a member if they possessed a background as an; 
Agricultural Engineer, 
Agriculture Specialist, 
Biomedical Researcher, 
Chemical Engineer,  
Environmental Lawyer,  
Environmental Scientist, 
Healthcare Manager, 
Healthcare Worker, 
Hydraulic Engineer, 
Medical Doctor, 
Medical Technician, 
Mental Health Specialist, 
Midwife, 
Regulatory Agency (Within the ENVI remit) Worker, 
Qualified Nurse, 
Qualified Surveyor, 
Veterinary Surgeon, 
Food Scientist, 
Or any other profession which contained a clear technical remit within the committee.
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Appendix VI - Powers and responsibilities of Committee on Budgets 
 
‘[Budgets] Committee responsible for:  
1.    The multiannual financial framework of the Union’s revenue and expenditure and the Union’s 
system of own resources;  
2.    Parliament’s budgetary prerogatives, namely the budget of the Union as well as the negotiation 
and implementation of inter-institutional agreements in this field;  
3.    Parliament’s estimates according to the procedure defined in the Rules;  
4.    The budget of the decentralised bodies;  
5.    The financial activities of the European Investment Bank which are not part of European 
economic governance;  
6.    The budgetisation of the European Development Fund, without prejudice to the powers of the 
committee responsible for the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement;  
7.    Financial implications and compatibility with the multiannual financial framework of all Union 
acts, without prejudice to the powers of the relevant committees;  
8.    Keeping track of and assessing the implementation of the current budget notwithstanding Rule 
95(1), transfers of appropriations, procedures relating to the establishment plans, administrative 
appropriations and opinions concerning buildings-related projects with significant financial 
implications;  
9.    The Financial Regulation, excluding matters relating to the implementation, management and 
control of the budget.’  
Source: European Parliament Rules of Procedure (2014) 
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Appendix VII - Professional Expertise in BUDG Committee  
 
Expertise was seen as possessed by a member if they had a background as an; 
Accountant, 
Agricultural Economist, 
Auditor, 
Budget Minister, 
Economic Advisor, 
Finance Minister, 
Financial Advisor, 
Prime Minister, 
Professional Economist, 
Or any other profession with a clear former Budgetary/Fiscal responsibility, or technical remit 
pertinent to the committee.
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Appendix VIII - Powers and responsibilities of Committee on International Trade. 
 
Committee on International Trade 
Committee responsible for matters relating to the establishment, implementation and monitoring of 
the Union’s common commercial policy and its external economic relations, in particular: 
1.    Financial, economic and trade relations with third countries and regional organisations; 
2.    The common external tariff and trade facilitation as well as the external aspects of customs 
provisions and management; 
3.    The opening, monitoring, conclusion and follow-up of bilateral, multilateral and plurilateral 
trade agreements governing economic, trade and investment relations with third countries and 
regional organisations; 
4.    Measures of technical harmonisation or standardisation in fields covered by instruments of 
international law; 
5.    Relations with the relevant international organisations and international fora on trade-related 
matters, and with organisations promoting regional economic and commercial integration outside the 
Union; 
6.    Relations with the WTO, including its parliamentary dimension. 
The committee liaises with the relevant inter-parliamentary and ad hoc delegations for the economic 
and trade aspects of relations with third countries. 
 
Source: European Parliament Rules of Procedure (2014) 
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Appendix IX - Professional Expertise in INTA Committee 
 
Expertise was seen as possessed by a member if they had a background as an; 
Accountancy with a Trade Remit, 
Executive of International, or Domestic, Company with Trade Remit, 
International Livestock Trader, 
Industrial Lawyer, 
International Business Manager, 
International Trade and Business Accountancy, 
Political Expertise with a Clear Indication of Trade Law Drafting, 
Trade Minister, 
Trade Lawyer, 
Medical Devices Trade Specialist, 
Or any other profession which contained a clear technical remit within the committee. 
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